Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Volume XIV

396. Telegram From the Delegation at the Foreign Ministers Meetings to the Department of State¹

Geneva,November 10, 1955—8 p.m.

Secto 243. Following is draft of proposed agreed position between US and UK on Middle East policy incorporating suggestions in Secto 151² and points made by Secretary and Macmillan in discussion yesterday.³ Secretary and Macmillan propose consider paper further and to discuss Middle East policy with Pinay⁴ along lines of memo (without however referring to existence of memo).Russell planning see Roux⁵ in Paris on return from Geneva and Shuckburgh may go to Paris for discussion there. Believe desirable an indication [from] French our desire work with them in connection Middle East problem. Would appreciate Department’s comments on memo.⁶ Memo follows.

“The Middle East

The Premises

1. Our policy in the Middle East has been directed towards retaining the area within the free world, developing the oil resources, assisting the economic and social development of the countries concerned, ensuring an adequate defense arrangement for the area as a whole, keeping a reasonable arms balance between Israel and the Arab States working toward a settlement of the Israel-Arab dispute.

2. The Russians have now elected to open a new cold war front in the Middle East. Our recent exchanges show that they are not to be moved from this policy.

3. In consequence we must be prepared to settle down to a long contest. This means that a consistent long term policy must be devised. There is no short cut.

4. This Western policy must be based upon the need to have most of the inhabitants of this large area with the West and upon their willingness to let the West have easy access to their oil fields.

5. The obligations of the Western powers to Israel under the 1950 Declaration must be fulfilled. But Israel must be made to understand that the West cannot afford to estrange the Moslems. Otherwise the Arab States will fall away, come under Russian domination; and it will then be impossible for the West effectively to protect Israel.

6. In the coming contest with Russia the West enjoys certain solid advantages. There is no reason to be stampeded into panic measures, or to give the Russians and the Arabs the impression that we have lost confidence in our ability to protect our interests.

7. Egypt is the largest of the Arab States and no Western policy in the Middle East which is actively opposed by Egypt will be entirely satisfactory. An effort should be made to prevent Egypt falling completely under Russian domination. Only if this is seen to have failed should we have recourse.

8. Meanwhile the northern tier can constitute a focus of Western influence. It must be sustained and strengthened. We must demonstrate that association with the West pays.

9. We must try to influence the smaller Arab States against association with Egypt or Saudi Arabia for purposes hostile to our policies.

10. Finally we must recognize that it is the Israel-Arab conflict which has weakened Western influence in the Middle East and opened the door to Russia. If we wish to maintain a position of influence with the Arabs we must bring the conflict to an end as soon as possible. This means strong pressure on Israel and also on the Arab States.

Future Policy

11. Generally we must continue to make plain to the people of the Middle East our policy of equal friendship and desire to assist in the development of the area. We must avoid being pushed by the Russians into a position of opposition to Arab interests. We must not start a competition with the Soviet Union to arm the countries of the area.

12. The Soviet Union. We should make no further attempt to plead with the Russians to abandon their present offers to the Middle East countries, although we should continue to make it plain to the world that we regard this as incompatible with the Soviet pretense to desire reduction of tension. We should resist any effort by the Soviet Union to claim as of right to participate in decisions regarding Middle East affairs. Means should be found of assuring the Soviets that it is not the purpose of the Baghdad Pact to provide the Western powers with strategic air bases in countries contiguous to the Soviet Union. This must be considered in the light of the British position in Iraq. Subject to this, we should continue our efforts to build up a defensive system in the area while keeping open the possibility, when our position is stronger, of working out some modus vivendi with the Soviet Union.

13. Israel. Under present conditions the US and the UK should not grant a special security guarantee to Israel. Such a guarantee will continue to be offered to Israel in the context of a settlement of the Palestine question. This policy might have to be reviewed if it should develop that Egypt was working closely with the Soviet bloc and there was no chance of bringing about a reversal of this trend. In such an event the US might adhere to the northern tier and grant a guarantee to Israel at the same time.

Israel should be urged in her own interests to try to reach a settlement with the Arab States. If she is to survive, she cannot afford to pursue a policy which estranges the Arabs from the West. This will involve a willingness to agree upon some compromise between the United Nations resolutions of 1947 and the present armistice frontiers.

14. Armament supplies. We should try to arrange a coordinated policy of arms supplies to Middle East countries on the part of the tripartite powers, Italy, and perhaps other NATO powers. Machinery to this effect should be worked out in Washington at an Ambassadorial level between the three powers. Consideration [should] be given to the question of associating Italy in this study.

Our guiding principle is that we should not seem to be moving in to supply Israel with arms on a large scale to offset those supplied by the Iron Curtain. The Western powers have in the past supplied arms to both sides under the principles of the 1950 Declaration and this should continue to guide our arms shipments to the area. With respect to Israel, arms shipments by any one of the Western powers should take into account shipments to Israel made or contemplated by other powers, and should reflect the security afforded to Israel under the 1950 Declaration. It should be our purpose not to allow a substantial increase in the striking power of the Israeli Armed Forces, although some increase in their defensive equipment should be contemplated.

15. Egypt. We should not write off Egypt or drive her into Russia’s arms. There are indications that Nasser does not desire to be identified with the Soviet bloc. It is probable that he envisages a neutralist policy in which the Arab world, with Egypt at its head, would be in a strong bargaining position. His present attitude to the West has been affected (a) by the Israel question and (b) by his opposition to the development of the Baghdad Pact. We should not make an immediate approach to Nasser on either of these two issues. He is intoxicated by his present popularity and this is clearly not a propitious moment. We should not of course reject any overture Nasser might make. We should hope that the next few months will show whether he is ready to mend his fences with the West and avoid further involvement with the Soviet bloc. We should assist him in this period by refraining from any punitive measures, and keeping contact with him over such matters as the Aswan Dam, the Sudan, and other subjects of common interest. The object would be to reach a point at which Egypt would be willing in effect to turn away from Russia as a source of arms, to limit arms purchases to her economic capacity, to give support to the Jordan Waters Plan, and to agree to open negotiations for a settlement with Israel. In such a case we would offer to supply Egypt with her reasonable arms requirements, assist in the financing of the High Dam, bring influence on Israel to agree to a just settlement, and help Egypt to play a role of leadership in the Arab world. An opportunity might be made at the November 20 meeting at Baghdad to make it plain that behind the defense of the free countries of the area provided by the Baghdad Pact it is our object to foster cooperation among the Arab powers for constructive purposes, and that this need not be confined to members of the Pact. Egyptian leadership in such an effort is not excluded.

If all this fails and Egypt is clearly lost to Western influence, we should have to consider policies which would minimize the harm which she could do to Western interests.

16. Northern tier. It is the intention of the United States to maintain liaison with the Baghdad Pact Council. The scope of the material support which the United States will give to the Baghdad Pact will depend on further studies by the US Government. These will take account of the sensitivity of the Soviet Union to Western military relations with Iran. Her Majesty’s Government as a member of the Pact will seek to establish effective machinery for cooperation among the members in the interest of common security. It is the intention of both the US and the UK to give full public support to the Pact as evidence of Arab cooperation with the free world. Advantage might be taken of the forthcoming Baghdad meeting to announce the creation of machinery (with appropriate United States participation) to consider and satisfy the arms requirements of the countries concerned.”

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–1055. Top Secret; Limit Distribution. Received at 7:46 p.m.
2. Document 384.
3. See Document 391.
4. This discussion took place on November 13. For a summary, see Document 404.
5. Henri Roux, Director of Afrique-Levant Affairs in the French Foreign Ministry.
6. See Document 407.