Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Volume XIV

384. Telegram From the Delegation at the Foreign Ministers Meetings to the Department of State¹

Geneva,November 3, 1955—5 p.m.

Secto 151. Limit distribution to Acting Secretary and Allen. Following is summary of informal memo on Middle East problems prepared by Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick who is here with British Delegation.² Secretary and Macmillan plan have discussion November 9 on overall policies toward Middle East. Would appreciate receiving by November 7 Dept’s comments on Kirkpatrick paper and other suggestions for approach to problem which might be discussed at meeting.³

Following is Kirkpatrick memo:

“Following premises on which our policy should be based:

1. Russians have deliberately elected open new cold war front in ME. Recent exchanges showed they are not to be moved.

2. We must therefore be prepared settle down long contest and consistent long term policy must be devised.

3. Western policy must be based on need have most inhabitants this large area with West and on their willingness let West have easy access their oil fields.

4. Obligations of Western Powers to Israel under 1950 Declaration must be fulfilled. But Israel must understand West cannot afford estrange Moslems otherwise Arab States will come under Russian domination and it will then be impossible for West effectively protect Israel.

5. In coming contest with Russia West enjoys certain solid advantages. Not reason be stampeded into panic measures; or give Russians and Arabs impression we have lost confidence in our ability protect our interests.

6. In particular Northern Tier can constitute solid bastion of Western influence. Must be sustained and strengthened. Must demonstrate association with West pays.

7. Egypt is largest of Arab States and no Western policy in the Middle East which is actively opposed by Egypt will be entirely satisfactory. Effort should be made to prevent Egypt falling completely under Russian domination. If this fails we must try ruthlessly to isolate Egypt.

8. In meantime we must try prevent uncommitted Arab States joining Egypt-Syria-Saudi combination.

9. Finally must recognize it is Israel-Arab conflict which has weakened Western influence in Middle East and opened door to Russia. If we wish maintain position of influence with Arabs we must bring conflict to an end as soon as possible. This means strong pressure on Israel and also on those Arab States in which we still have influence.

If above premises accepted it would seem our Middle East policy should be on following lines:

Northern Tier

(a) The United States should accede to Baghdad Pact or at least declare its active support.

(b) Effective steps should be taken to supply arms to participating states especially Iraq. In particular advantage might be taken of forthcoming Baghdad meeting to announce creation of machinery (with US participation) to consider and satisfy arms requirements of countries concerned.

Jordan

(a) Put concerted pressure on Jordan to join Baghdad Pact.

(b) Press Jordan to open direct negotiations with Israel for settlement of frontier.

Lebanon

(a) Bring pressure on Lebanon not join Egypt-Syria-Saudi combination. Offer arms and a joint examination of economic aid. This should be done urgently.

(b) As soon as Jordan joins Baghdad Pact bring pressure on Lebanon to do same.

Israel

(a) Israel should be allowed buy sufficient arms for reasonable defensive purposes. But it would be a mistake attempt match Russian deliveries to Egypt. This would not only involve US in arms race in area but we should also have to give arms to Jordan to enable her to keep up with Israel. Question of arms deliveries to Israel should be subject Anglo-American joint study and agreement.

(b) Israel should be urged in her own interests try reach settlement with Arab States. If she is to survive, she cannot afford pursue policy which estranges Arabs from West.

Egypt

Egypt constitutes most difficult problem. We should not write her off or drive her irrevocably into Russia’s arms. On other hand it would be mistake give impression blackmail pays.

Attempt should be made detach Egypt from Russia. But it would be mistake make representations to Nasser at this stage. If he were reject them, relations with Egypt would be exacerbated. If he complied, we should not be ready with measures to reward him and relations would once more deteriorate.

Moreover reports from Cairo describe Nasser as being intoxicated with popularity which defiance of West has brought him. Moment does not seem propitious.

Finally, approach to Nasser now would be regarded in Turkey, Iraq and elsewhere as appeasement. Would be better fortify Northern Tier before undertaking any move in Cairo.

Nevertheless UK and US Governments should begin now to concert package deal which should be put to Nasser at first favourable opportunity after necessary preparatory work has been done. Following would be elements of package deal.

A. Nasser would undertake:

(a) Turn away from Russia on completion present arms deal, which would be a once and for all commercial transaction.

(b) Limit arms purchases thereafter to expenditure Egyptian economy can bear, having regard to regime’s commitments in social welfare.

(c) Agree open negotiations with Israel for settlement.

B. Western powers would undertake:

(a) License sale of weapons to Egypt within limits defined in A(b).

(b) Bring concerted and strong pressure on Israel to agree to just settlement.

(c) Finance cost of High Dam.

(d) Use such influence as they have in Iraq and Sudan to put Egyptian relations with these countries on sound footing.

These terms would be negotiable, but if Nasser rejects collaboration with West on these lines we should:

(a) Refuse all economic aid to Egypt.

(b) Cut off all further arms deliveries.

(c) Endeavour isolate Egypt.

And make it plain to Nasser that we have vital interests in area and will shrink from nothing to protect them from Soviet encroachments.

Syria

. . . . . . .

. . . Syria is at moment so much under Egyptian influence that future of Syria may depend on developments in Egypt. We should consequently hold our hand there and in meantime give what short-term encouragement we can to our friends.

. . . . . . .

Persian Gulf

Persian Gulf States are at moment probably only completely Western-minded Arab States. Represent Western sphere of influence which it is essential preserve from outside encroachment.

This is primarily a UK responsibility.

Saudi Arabia

Saudi relations with Egypt and Saudi plans for territorial aggrandizement at expense of Persian Gulf States and Aden Protectorate have caused Saudi-United Kingdom relations to deteriorate to point where UK can profitably take no initiative. If progress made in Egypt it will be for US Govt to endeavor to induce Saudi Arabia to conform. But for moment situation warrants no move by Western powers.”

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–355. Top Secret. Received at 4:05 p.m.
2. Russell transmitted Kirkpatrick’s memorandum of October 30 to Dulles on November 1 under cover of a memorandum to the Secretary which indicated that Kirkpatrick had handed the memorandum to Russell the previous day during the course of an informal conversation. (Ibid., 674.84A/11–155)
3. See Document 388.