Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Volume XIV

370. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State¹

Geneva,October 30, 1955—midnight.

Dulte 33. Secretary met with Molotov for hour this afternoon at latter’s villa.² Gromyko, Troyanovsky,Bohlen and Merchant present.

Secretary referred to exchange of letters between President and Bulganin³ on situation in Near East arising from Czech arms sale to Egypt.Molotov said he was familiar with correspondence. Secretary said President unable understand Bulganin view no grounds existed for concern and asked him to explain our concern and if possible ascertain why Bulganin felt no concern warranted. Secretary said two facts were indisputable as result arms sale: (1) risk of war between Israel and Arab neighbors had increased greatly; (2) anti-Soviet public opinion had risen in US. He hoped Molotov could explain why these two developments gave Soviets no grounds for concern.

Molotov replied that Bulganin letter to Eden set forth in detail Soviet view this subject. As to estimate of situation Molotov said had read recent statement by General Burns (which Gromyko later produced in October 27Herald Tribune)⁴ to effect no danger hostilities in area. Secretary assured Molotov this statement did not coincide with Burns’ private views.Molotov said USSR, in conformity with general policy for peace, was pursuing similar aims in Near East and had not felt it necessary prevent arms sale to Egypt. However, he appreciated Secretary calling attention to rise in anti-Soviet feeling in US which was matter deserving attention. Soviet Government had done nothing to justify any hostility. Up to present sale of arms to Near East area by US,UK, France had been considered entirely proper. Any piling up of arms had come about not from Czech sale but from above sources. Therefore small quantity arms Czech selling Egypt on normal commercial basis could not increase danger in area.Molotov then inquired what specifically was expected from Soviet Union.

Secretary said he did not know whether Molotov intended to see Sharett here but that if he did he would have opportunity judge for himself extent of danger. There was widespread feeling in US that Israel was placed in jeopardy. This was also official view Israel Government.

Secretary said he had no desire to argue rights of Soviets or Czechs to sell arms or right of Egypt to purchase them. Question was how to prevent two developments he had mentioned earlier from going further. US had tried to exercise restraining influence, as proper, on Israel to prevent what was termed a preventive war. Israel understandably found it difficult stand by doing nothing while hostile forces built up armaments to point where it might be destroyed.Molotov again asked what was expected of Soviet Government.Secretary said it would be presumptuous for him to advise Soviets; he had merely pointed out two results of recent events. As to how counteract these consequences, he could only say that there had been considerable mystery and speculation as to what going on and whether program of arms deliveries would be extended to other Arab countries. If transaction were isolated and limited and if Soviet Government would so state, it might be easier deal with. If this was merely start of vast arms transaction, that was another matter. Secretary said he was not making suggestion since US lacked pertinent facts, which he was not asking for, but Soviets were in possession of all facts and hence in better position to determine available steps.

Molotov inquired whether exchange of information regarding sale of arms to other countries was sought. Secretary replied that he had drawn Molotov’s attention to two facts. In reply to Molotov’s question he had merely observed that if Soviet program for delivery arms to area was limited and this could be stated publicly, it would be easier to exercise restraint on Israel and American public opinion. He was not suggesting exchange of information.

Molotov said there were no new considerations in Soviet policy and that there were no grounds for concern in view of small amount of arms involved, their purely defensive character, and fact transaction was strictly commercial.Molotov alluded to recent statement in US by Israel Minister whose name could not recall concerning preventive war. He said it would appear that threat was not from Egypt but Israel. Threat from this quarter also deserved attention. He also asserted that for reasons unknown to Soviets Western powers had ceased arms shipments to Egypt which certainly had right to look elsewhere for defensive armaments.

Secretary said that danger of war should concern us all. He was neither partisan of Israel nor Egypt but of peace and good relations with Soviets. He did not deny right of Soviets or Czechs to sell arms or of Egypt to buy, but some rights exercised without restraint or concern for consequences tend to produce bad results. US had limited its right to sell arms to Egypt and Israel in order to avoid increasing dangers in area. US is now strongly urged to sell Israel comparable quantity of arms Egypt had received. This question must be decided but anything US did would be solely for purpose preserving peace in area. He hoped Molotov would ponder two aspects of situation which he had raised.

Conversation closed with Molotov saying exchange had been useful and Soviets working for peace and good relations. His attitude throughout was thoughtful.⁵

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.11–DU/10–3155. Secret; Limit Distribution. Received at 9:13 p.m. Repeated to Moscow.
2. The memorandum of this conversation is not printed. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627,CF 570)
3. Documents 334 and 349.
4. For text of this article, entitled “Mid-East ‘Shooting War’ Not Expected by Gen.Burns,” seeNew York Herald Tribune, October 27, 1955, Section 1, p. 2.
5. Dulles transmitted a summary of this conversation to Eisenhower. (Dulte 32 from Geneva, October 30; Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/10–3055)