Office of the Historian

369. Telegram From the Director of Central Intelligence (Dulles)1

Washington,October 29, 1955.

Please pass Sec State from Dulles. Following is CIA intelligence background for Tedul cable from State tonight re Egyptian situation.2

1.
Nasser has won prestige and a position of leadership in the Arab world by the Soviet arms deal. He is determined to do everything possible to maintain this position.
2.
He is today no more anxious to come under Soviet domination than to join a Western alliance and is still convinced he can hold to a middle path.
3.
If he can maintain his independence and prestige through an arrangement with the West, he would prefer that to a close tie-up with Soviet.
4.
If he feels that the West has definitely turned its back on him, he will accept further Soviet aid, if proffered, and endeavor, [Page 680] probably with a good chance of success, to bring Syria and Saudi Arabia along with him.
5.
Western negotiations with.Nasser would be long, difficult and uncertain. If, however, the chosen alternative to this is an effort to isolate Egypt and destroy Nasser, this presents grave danger, as it would probably tempt Israel to attack Egypt.
6.
If we favor Nasser with economic and other aid, we will of course, be importuned to bring comparable additional aid to our friends in the Northern Tier and to refuse to do so would place us in an invidious position towards our friends.
7.

If Nasser should for any reason be eliminated by death, it is likely that the RCC would continue temporarily in control probably under Chief of Staff,Amer, who would probably be more under control of army than Nasser.

. . . . . . .

9.
Jordan’s adherence to Northern Tier at this particular juncture would reduce possibilities of negotiations with Egypt.
10.
There is no good solution immediately available to us, but if the Egyptian-Israeli situation can be kept from erupting into open conflict, we may have some time in which to explore alternatives, both with Egypt on the one hand, and with Turkey, Iraq, etc., on the other.
11.
Foregoing assumes that neither USA nor UK are prepared to enforce a policy within the area with their own armed forces.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 774.00/10–3155. Top Secret; Personal.Dulles transmitted the telegram to Hoover under cover of a memorandum dated October 31.

    The copy of the telegram in the Dulles Papers bears a notation that the Secretary saw this message. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers,White House Memoranda)

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  2. Supra.↩