Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Volume XIV

368. Telegram From the Department of State to the Secretary of State, at Geneva¹

Washington,October 29, 1955—8:29 p.m.

Tedul 36. Eyes Only Secretary from Acting Secretary. I had two hour meeting this morning with Allen Dulles,Murphy and Allen covering present Middle East problem.

1. Following your instructions we have advised Embassy Baghdad inquire from Nuri his thinking re Syrian project without implying any concurrence on our part looking toward action by him.

2. Re Nasser it is our feeling that we should have one more good go-around with him in an endeavor to reach an understanding. If we fail then we can reassess our position and determine what to do next with considerably more flexibility than we feel free to do at present. If on the other hand he gives convincing evidence that he wishes to cooperate then we have much to gain by arriving at an understanding.

3. We believe there are a number of things which the US and UK could do for him and that in turn there are things which he could do for us. It is improbable that all of them could be arrived at in a single bite but it might be possible to start. The approach would be on a pari passu basis without attempting to list those items in order of their importance or the manner in which they would be balanced off against each other. The following are some of the things which US and UK might be able to do for him.

a. Continuance of existing economic aid program including those items now held in abeyance (such as PL–480 80,000 tons of wheat recently requested by Egypt and substantial locomotive deal included in this year’s program).

b. Active approach by IBRD on Aswan Dam of which Sudanese agreement to water rights is essential element.

c. Possibility of deferment of action looking toward a security pact for Israel.

d. Refrain from dumping US cotton on world markets in competition with Egyptian products.

e. Unfreezing of sterling balances in London.

4. On other hand, some of the things that US and UK would wish from Egypt could likewise be listed as follows:

a. Take more constructive attitude towards peace in the area, including both short and long term aspects.

b. Acceptance of Jordan Valley project.

c. Refrain from existing press and radio attacks on US and UK.

d. Limit activities of Soviet missions in Arab states.

e. Use influence with Syria to minimize communist penetration.

f. Use influence with Saudis to take more friendly attitude towards US.

g. Stop acting as intermediary on arms sales to other Arab states.

5. We feel that the above approach is desirable in the near future in particular endeavor to prevent a deterioration of existing relations with the West and forestall sporadic military operations which may lead to more serious conflict with Israel.

6. Method of approach to Nasser could either be (a) through US and/or Embassies, or (b) through special emissary, such as Dean Rusk or other suitable individual. Latter could follow through, if successful, in larger context of endeavoring to bring some understanding between Arab states and Israel.

7. In carrying forward such an approach it should be borne constantly in mind that in such things as economic aid for Egypt we must obviously receive something concrete in return in order to forestall general deterioration of our relations in the area as outlined by Zorlu in his conversation with you.² In particular we think that Aswan Dam project should be to all appearances purely an IBRD project, although there is risk that other countries will be suspicious that US and UK have underwritten the deal.

8. We will continue investigating these possibilities in more detail pending your comments as well as any other alternative courses of action. Among latter might be direct appeal to Nehru, who has undoubtedly been counseling Nasser closely, although at present we do not see any clear advantage to be gained.

. . . . . . .

Hoover

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/10–2955. Top Secret. Drafted, approved, and signed by Hoover.
2. According to Secretary Dulles’ Appointment Book,Dulles met with Turkish Foreign Minister Zorlu in Paris at 3:30 p.m., October 26. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers) The U.S. Representative at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization sent the Department of State a summary of this conversation in Polto 649 from Paris, October 26. (Ibid., 780.5/10–2655)