Office of the Historian

95. Memorandum of a Conversation, White House, Washington, January 30, 1956, 4 p.m.1

ETW MC–2
Washington, January 30, 1956, 4 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

  • US
    • President Eisenhower
    • Secretary Dulles
    • Under Secretary Hoover
    • Ambassador Aldrich
    • Mr. Merchant
    • Mr. Allen
    • Mr. MacArthur
    • Mr. Bowie
    • Mr. Hagerty
    • Mr. Rountree
    • Mr. Cottman
  • UK
    • Prime Minister Eden
    • Foreign Secretary Lloyd
    • Ambassador Makins
    • sir Harold Caccia
    • Sir Leslie Rowan
    • Mr. Evelyn Shuckburgh
    • Mr. Ian Samuel
    • Mr. Willie Morris

[Here follows discussion of the Arab-Israeli dispute (see volume XV, page 108).]

Baghdad Pact

The Secretary stated that at the earlier meeting the Baghdad Pact had been discussed and the difficulties of US adherence had been explained. The possibility of demonstrating greater support for the Pact had been examined and the possibility of providing additional Centurion tanks to Iraq had been mentioned. It had been agreed that in the more detailed portion of the communiqué some reference to moral support for the Baghdad Pact should be included. The unsatisfactory situation in Syria had been examined but it was thought little could be done until we knew more about what might be expected of Nasser in Egypt. The Saudi Arabian problem was much more difficult and this matter had been left for discussion with the President.

Mr. Eden remarked it was difficult to know whether Nasser could be dealt with. If so, our course of action in the Middle East could go one way; if not, it should go another.

The President recalled the British had originally thought Nasser to be a great improvement for Egypt and inquired whether they had lost confidence in him.

[Page 244]

Mr. Eden replied it was difficult to evaluate Nasser who was a man of limitless ambition.

The Secretary remarked he did not mind ambition, which was a healthy thing that could be played upon. However, Nasser might have become a tool of the Russians. Events of the next week or two might be revealing, particularly in connection with conversations which were now taking place. If he should come to an agreement upon the High Aswan Dam it would be encouraging, but if not, we might have to consider a revision of our whole policy.

The President said he had talked recently with an American businessman who was clearly impressed with Nasser and thought that he was going about his business in an intelligent way. He had expressed the view that Nasser was not one who would cut off his nose to spite his face.

The Secretary agreed Nasser talked intelligently and made a fine impression. However, he made violent anti-Israeli statements on the one hand, while on the other saying privately that a settlement is possible. When recently presenting the new Constitution, Nasser said its main purpose was to create a core uniting the Arab world from the Atlantic to the Persian Gulf and to put back into that core a heart that had been plucked from it: Palestine. This was, of course, inflammatory and would argue against Nasser’s sincerity in stating he would like to find a settlement and line up the other Arab states.

[Here follows discussion of Saudi Arabia and Buraimi (see volume XIII, page 329).]

  1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 648. Drafted on February 7, but no further drafting information is given on the source text. According to a note on the source text, the memorandum of conversation, cleared at the Assistant Secretary level only, was being given restricted circulation to appropriate U.S. officials on a need-to-know basis.↩