Office of the Historian

94. Memorandum of a Conversation, White House, Washington, January 30, 1956, 2:15–4 p.m.1

ETW MC–1
Washington, January 30, 1956, 4 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

  • US
    • The Secretary
    • Under Secretary Hoover
    • Ambassador Aldrich
    • Mr. Merchant
    • Mr. MacArthur
    • Mr. Bowie
    • Mr. Allen
    • Mr. Rountree
    • Mr. Hagerty
    • Mr. Cottman
  • UK
    • Prime Minister Eden
    • Foreign Secretary Lloyd
    • Ambassador Makins
    • Sir Harold Caccia
    • Sir Leslie Rowan
    • Mr. Evelyn Shuckburgh
    • Mr. Ian Samuel
    • Mr. Willie Morris

[Here follows discussion of press arrangements, a draft declaration to be issued at the conclusion of the talks, European integration, the Arab-Israeli dispute (see volume XV, page 101), and Saudi Arabia and the Buraimi dispute (see volume XIII, page 327).]

Baghdad Pact

Reverting to the Baghdad Pact, the Secretary observed the United States position had been reasonably consistent. We had thought it would be politically impossible for the United States to join until we were able to offer a comparable security arrangement to Israel. Without this, the United States could not get public support for undertaking the Baghdad treaty. We had hoped to achieve a settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute which would make it possible for us to undertake both pacts, but it appeared this could not be done quickly. He stated that he could not say the initial reactions on the part of Israel and Egypt were worse than had been expected. We had not yet pierced their initial bargaining positions and did not know the full extent of their flexibility. Unless there were grave issues it was possible that [Page 241] Egypt would follow dilatory tactics so long as they could get what they wanted. The Israelis likewise would not agree to truncate territory claimed by them unless grave issues should compel them to go beyond their initial bargaining position. He thought the main source of trouble would be in finding a solution to the Negev. Initially, Nasser claimed the whole area along a line north of Beersheba. The Secretary did not consider that to be a defensible position and hoped it might be possible to work something out. Meanwhile, since the United States could not include Israel in a security treaty, it could not join the Baghdad Pact.

Mr. Lloyd commented upon the great importance attached by the British to American support for the Baghdad Pact even though it could not now join. The Iranian Government was in a difficult position financially and had asked that assistance be given to support the contention Iran had not made a mistake in adhering to the Pact.

Iranian Situation

Mr. Hoover said we had the Iranian situation very much in our minds. One of the main elements of the present budgetary problem was that only 10 per cent of the oil revenues could be devoted to budgetary purposes, the other 90 per cent being required by law to go to the development program. It was difficult to justify on economic grounds financial aid to Iran since the Iranians theoretically could meet the problem by their own means. Nevertheless, the United States was exploring the problem thoroughly and hoped to be able to help in some way.

Mr. Lloyd said the Shah had “put his neck out” in adhering to the Baghdad Pact against the tradition of Iranian neutrality. The Shah now saw no concrete benefits derived from such adherence and, on the contrary, he had heard of substantial Western offers of assistance to Egypt in financing the High Aswan Dam and would naturally wonder if he had not make a mistake.

The Secretary commented the United States had not pressed Iran to join but that this had been done on the basis of Iranian judgment that it was the thing to do. Nevertheless, we did want to support Iran and to render any assistance which was warranted and which we might be able to provide.

In reply to a question of Mr. Lloyd, Mr. Rountree said the financial aid which we had been rendering to Iran for budgetary purposes had been exhausted but we were considering the possibility of some additional aid to help meet the problem until the situation in Iran, including the political and psychological factors, rendered it possible for the Iranians to cope with the problem themselves. Requests for additional aid had been based on the assumption that increased economic activity resulting from the development program would soon [Page 242] provide resources adequate for the Iranian Government to meet budgetary requirements from normal sources. A two-year period was considered to be required before this balance could be met. Present availabilities of American aid for Iran consisted primarily of a $53 million Export-Import Bank loan for development purposes and a continuation of military and technical assistance.

To Mr. Eden’s comment that the Shah was now “on a limb,” the Secretary responded we did not want to break it off; that he hoped we would be able to help.

Mr. Eden stated it would be a calamity if the Baghdad Pact should collapse. The treaty now had few friends in the area. He understood United States difficulties which prevented its adherence. He hoped, however, the communiqué following the current talks could give some support for the Pact. The object should be to give our friends heart, without excluding help to those who were not firmly in our camp.

Iraq

The Secretary, responding to Mr. Lloyd’s query, said we were contemplating additional tanks for Iraq.

Mr. Eden inquired whether it would be possible to let Nuri know tanks could be expected.

Mr. Allen said congressional approval for the related appropriation would first be required, after which we might be able to inform Nuri.

Mr. Lloyd inquired whether United States thinking in the matter might be conveyed to Nuri, even though a firm commitment would not be possible.

The Secretary thought this might be done and suggested the matter be discussed again at a later meeting.

[Here follows discussion of Syria and Jordan (see volume XIII, pages 567 and 20, respectively).]

  1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 648. Secret. Drafted on February 7, but no further drafting information is given on the source text. According to a note on the source text, the memorandum of conversation, cleared at the Assistant Secretary of State level only, was being given restricted circulation to appropriate U.S. officials on a need-to-know basis.

    This memorandum of conversation is one of a series that records talks in Washington between President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Eden, January 30–February 1. For additional documentation on Eden’s visit to Washington pertaining to the Arab-Israeli question, see vol. xv, pp. 101 ff.

    Briefing and background papers prepared for the use of Assistant Secretary Allen during Secretary Dulles’ briefing of President Eisenhower on January 26 prior to the Eden visit are in Department of State, Central Files, 611.41/1–2656.

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