96. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iraq1

583. Baghdad’s 755, 791.2 Following for use Gallman Baghdad but info posts may also find useful in explaining our position re Pact.

[Page 245]

US relationship Baghdad Pact thoroughly discussed by President, Eden and reviewed at special meeting between Selwyn Lloyd and Baghdad Pact Ambassadors, with US attending. While acknowledging psychological and practical reasons which favored US adherence, we emphasized US responsibilities in area and necessity retain maximum US influence in light current Near Eastern problems preclude formal adherence presently. UK understands US viewpoint and agrees our conclusions. Other powers likewise expressed understanding. Final communiqué of talks reiterates solid support for purposes and aims Pact and indicates observers will play constructive roles in work of committees.

We are fully mindful principal purpose of Pact is deter possible aggression against Northern Tier and promote political and economic cooperation among its members. We will continue give full support these aims as well as facilitate indigenous efforts working towards them. Practical aspects our liaison with Pact are just being evolved. It was with the idea strengthening relationship US recently assigned additional officers to Military Observer adding more comprehensive technical support to observer function. Observer reports receiving close scrutiny with particular attention planning aspect mentioned your tel 755. In addition to direct relationships with Pact organization we expect continue utilize existing close military and diplomatic channels express US views on bilateral basis to Pact members. As Pact organization develops we expect progressively adjust our relationship in an effort be of greatest utility to Pact and our common interest. Separate FYI only telegram follows re US relationship to military committee.

Dulles
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/1–3056. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Dixon and Newsom and approved by Rountree who signed for Dulles. Repeated to Karachi, Ankara, Tehran, and London.
  2. In telegram 755, January 30, Gallman expressed his concern that the lack of a U.S. voice in Baghdad Pact military planning would result in a situation both dangerous and costly and urged U.S. adherence to the Pact at the earliest possible date. (Ibid., 780.5/1–3056)

    In telegram 791, February 6, Gallman asked for guidance in the event that he might be asked at the February 8 meeting of the Deputies of the Baghdad Pact Council whether there was any additional information about U.S. support for the Baghdad Pact and the U.S. observer role. (Ibid., 780.5/2–656)