Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII

93. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, January 18, 1956,10 a.m.¹

Washington, January 18, 1956

SUBJECT

• The Baghdad Pact

PARTICIPANTS

• US
  • NEA—Messrs Allen and Rountree
  • NEA—Ambassador Byroade
  • NEA—Mr. Dixon
  • S—Mr. Russell
  • NE—Messrs Wilkins, Newsom, Bergus
  • SOA—Mr. Jones
  • GTI—Mr. Baxter
  • S/P—Mr. Mathews
  • EUR—Messrs Wilson and Belcher
  • OCB—Mr. Eveland
• UK
  • Mr. E. Shuckburgh (ForOff)
  • Mr. G. Arthur (ForOff)
  • Mr. I. Samuel (ForOff)
  • Mr. W. Morris (Embassy)
  • Mr. R. Bailey (Embassy)

Mr. Allen opened the conversation by noting that although many of the points of the Baghdad Pact subject had been touched on before, the UK might wish to express further views. Mr. Shuckburgh said while favoring a broader organization they were not disposed to pressfor other Arab membership at this time. No action should be taken in the case of Jordan. Mr. Allen asked if he had any thoughts as to how to heal the rupture between Cairo and Baghdad. Mr. Shuckburgh said the relationships between the two countries are not too bad, there is still some contact between them. The basic trouble is, of course, Iraqi-Egypt rivalry. He said that Mr. Lloyd will step off to talk with Nasser and Nuri on his return from SEATO.

Mr. Allen said that there were three reasons which make undesirable US adherence to the Baghdad Pact at this time: It would 1) arouse the Soviets considerably, 2) exacerbate inter-Arab rivalries, and 3) reduce US ability to influence developments in the area, particularly the Arab-Israeli situation. Mr. Shuckburgh said that he did not feel the first reason was really valid and that if the third reason can be eliminated the US should feel ready to move forward towards membership.

Mr. Allen speculated about the possibility of bringing Iraq and Egypt into one security organization which would eventually include all Arabs. Mr. Shuckburgh said that his government had not come to any conclusion concerning this question although they had thrown out some feelers to Nasser. The Arab League as a unit is not hostile to the Baghdad Pact. In the formation of the Pact the door had been left open to let other Arabs come in. This had not been followed up and it does not appear beneficial to do so at this time. It is always possible to open the door later. Ambassador Byroade said that he felt that clipping off one Arab country at a time was not a good idea and that an approach made to the other Arabs generally would be preferable. Any such moves would, of course, have to be informal. Any formal treaty arrangement is far away. Mr. Allen pointed out that Nasser himself is making a strong bid for Arab unity to overcome the division which occurred after World War I.

Mr. Allen said that he understood the UK position regarding US adherence to the Baghdad Pact to be one of welcoming it at any time but understanding our reluctance to move in this direction at this time. Mr. Shuckburgh said that the UK did not necessarily concur in the position but recognized that the US is the best judge of its own capabilities. Mr. Allen asked, overlooking whatever excitement would be aroused in Cairo, what would be the effect upon the Pact of US adherence. Mr. Shuckburgh said that the question of timing was very important. Many factors influenced the timing. Could we expect help from Cairo in settling the Israeli problem? If US adherence to the Pact would have to be accompanied by a similar US guarantee to Israel we would be set back considerably. Mr. Allen said he was not 100% sure we would have to give assurance to Israel. Politically in the interests of a need for settlement, this would seem to make US adherence inadvisable presently.

Mr. Allen asked whether, if we come to the conclusion that Egypt had launched itself on a full course of neutralism, the US should go into the Pact and take the other Arabs with us. Nehru does not like SEATO but we are able to participate in SEATO and get along with Nehru. Nehru realizes we are not trying to pull him down.

Ambassador Byroade said that if Nasser came to such a conclusion it would not be due to East-West difficulties. He did not feel the Pact itself was too much of an irritant to Egypt. Mr. Allen said US aid to Pakistan along with Pakistan membership in the Pact has helped influence the Indians to be more attentive to the Soviets. Mr. Shuckburgh said that Nasser was not like Nehru. Nasser does not like the Pact, but if he could have been the leader, he would have taken a different position. Mr. Allen pointed out that Egypt could have taken up MEDO when it was offered. Mr. Byroade said that Nasser thought it better to play one group off against the other. He said that some thought might be given to the possibility of trying to draw the southern area together and gradually tie it in with the Northern Tier.

At this point, Mr. Allen read from a telegram from the Ambassador at Tehran which had been handed him. It was to the effect that the Soviets would be willing to promote and participate in giving Iran a guarantee, if the 1927 guarantee were considered inadequate. This would, of course be dependent upon the Shah’s leaving the Baghdad Pact. Mr. Allen inquired as to what Nasser’s reaction would be if Iran left the Pact. Ambassador Byroade said Iranian membership in the Pact does not appreciably concern Nasser. He said that Nasser did not object to the Pact basically but to the tactics in forming the Pact.

Mr. Allen said that he was afraid that this Soviet move might have an unfavorable effect in Iran and tend to undermine the government. He thought that it would be useful to counter this move by stressing within Iran the tangible benefits of being in the Pact. US adherence to the Pact, were it in order, and economic assistance would of course be helpful. Mr. Shuckburgh said that on the whole he felt the Shah was very steady with regard to the Pact. When the Shah was invited to Russia, both the US and UK were asked to brief him. He did not feel that we should be too worried about this Soviet move. The Iranians obviously wish more US assistance. In this connection he said that he wished to make clear that his instructions were to say that any military or economic aid which the US could give would be most helpful to the Pact.

Mr. Allen said that economic aid presented some difficulties. Iran did not yet have full oil revenues. The Iranians had recently decided not to utilize an Export-Import Bank credit for a specific development project while at the same time asking for a loan of equal proportions for budgetary support. The question arose as to what the Shah would say if the Soviets asked him why he had joined the Baghdad Pact. Mr. Allensaid that were he the Shah he would say that he had joined for good and sufficient reasons. There were, in fact, no strings attached when he joined the Pact. Mr. Shuckburgh said that he thought we would encourage the Shah and give him stiffening advice.

Mr. Allen said he would like to return to the subject of Egypt and the prospect of interesting Nasser in cooperation. Mr. Shuckburgh said that if things go right for Nasser internally, especially on the Aswan Dam and there is no extension of the Baghdad Pact or attempts to isolate him, he thought we might be able to make some progress. It would seem worthwhile to try to convince Nasser that the Pact is really in his best interest in order not to permit the Soviets to gain overwhelming influence in the Middle East and particularly Persia.

Ambassador Byroade said that the Soviets had consulted Nasser about giving aid to the Sudan. Nasser asked the Soviets why they had come to him and they replied that they would not do anything without consulting Egypt. Nasser had commented to Byroade that the Russians were devils but were very clever. He did not understand why the angels of the West were so blockheaded.

Mr. Allen said that it had been reported that the Sudan was thinking of recognizing Communist China and wondered why? Mr. Shuckburgh said that it had come up as a part of the general consideration which the Sudan was giving to establishing relations with the other governments of the world. Mr. Allen posed the question of declaring Egypt “beyond the pale” and “putting all our eggs in one basket—Nuri”. He presumed that if we did, Nasser would throw his lot with the Soviets. He had heard that Nuri might resign and let someone else take over as Prime Minister. Mr. Shuckburgh said he had not heard of this. Mr. Arthur said that it was understandable that Nuri got tired and actually needed to get out of office for a rest. A number of people who support the same view were capable of taking over. Mr. Shuckburgh commented that while this was true, none of the other people were as strong internally as Nuri.

Mr. Shuckburgh said he thought it was unfortunate that where the UK seeks to work with or assist a government in the Middle East it was labeled domination. But if others do the same, it is not labeled domination. The impression is given that the UK started Israel, divided the Arab world, and that Iraq was a minion, because British bases were there. Mr. Allen asked if Turkey had been accused of being foreign dominated. Ambassador Byroade said they were considered our imperialist tools. Mr. Shuckburgh said that there was always the factor of foreign exploitation of Arab resources. Mr. Byroade said that the Egyptians felt that oil negotiations for all the Arab world should be undertaken in Cairo. Mr. Samuel said the Arabs had never united themselves and have to blame someone other than themselves. Mr. Allen said that the Arabs felt the Israelis were the worst imperialists that they had ever encountered because they had thrown out the indigenous inhabitants. When the Turks conquered the area, they did not do this but simply controlled the area. Mr. Shuckburgh said that the UK had in mind attempting to narrow the imperialist position as they have done in Iraq by following the same course in Jordan. If there is to be a defense in the area, supply lines must run through Jordan.

Mr. Allen said that he was not suggesting it, but would like to explore the possibilities which would open up should Glubb Pasha leave Jordan. Mr. Shuckburgh said that a Jordanian who would be suitable to take over from Glubb Pasha would be ready in two or three years, but that time table might have to be speeded up. Mr. Allen asked if the departure of Glubb Pasha could be used as a negotiating point with Nasser. Mr. Shuckburgh said that he did not think so.

Mr. Allen said that he wanted to turn to the question of the US rights at Dhahran Airfield. We must soon renegotiate for the continuation of these rights. The field was a great convenience but not worth enough to pay through the nose, unless we wanted to do this in an effort to increase our influence with the King. Ambassador Byroade commented that negotiations of this kind in Saudi Arabia would run into trouble and wondered if we had thought of the idea of continuing to operate in Saudi Arabia with no agreement at all. Mr. Bergus added that in the past we had used the facilities for some period of time simply by getting extensions.

Mr. Shuckburgh asked what the field was used for. Mr. Allen said it was used principally for US military air transport operations and a training program for the Saudis. The Saudis were quarrelsome, and argued that they did not get enough use from the arrangement. A factor which is important in this connection is the presence of US military personnel in the area which constitutes a psychological assurance to the oil companies.

Ambassador Byroade said that Nasser had once said to him that the really important steps which needed to be taken at this time were to establish roads and air fields in the area. He asked if the US would like air bases in Syria. Nasser said he could get them at any time we wished. Ambassador Byroade thought it might be useful to consider building facilities without strings attached.

Mr. Allen said that the question had been raised as to whether the US should undertake fewer but larger and more impressive technical assistance projects in the Middle East. By doing so our efforts would not be dispersed and frittered away by numerous small projects. Another school of thought was that we must take a careful look around the area and at plans for development in the area to see where we could help most usefully. The latter school had prevailed as the predominant idea of our aid in the area.

The Soviets have followed the former school in India and Afghanistan. Not long ago we were requested by the Indian government to give them a million cc’s of gamma globulin. Hundreds of cases of hepatitis have occurred in New Dehli and the Indian government naturally turned to the US for help. We are giving them ½ million cc’s at a cost of $1 million and we expect delivery within the seven-day period in which they requested it. If the Soviets had done this, there would have been great publicity. Mr. Allen doubted if any mention would be made of this US help. Mr. Shuckburgh said that is our nature. He thought that we were not doing aid in the wrong way. On the other hand perhaps, we should take a new look at our programs now and then from the aspect of public relations value.

Mr. Allen reverted to the subject of Jordan. Mr. Shuckburgh said that he was glad that this was brought up again as he did not wish to leave a misimpression of their views regarding Jordan. The country could not exist without subsidy. The British today are in fact supplying that subsidy and holding the country together. If the British moved out, a vacuum would ensue. The Israelis would probably take over the West Bank of Jordan and a squabble would break out regarding the rest of the country. British officers in the Legion make the force what it is today. In fact, it’s the only good Arab armed force, including Egypt. For these reasons, the British position in Jordan is most important. Furthermore Iraq would never forgive the UK if they pulled out. Mr. Allen asked whether an Iraqi force in Jordan would make sense. Mr. Shuckburgh said “perhaps”; the UK had recently been urging Iraq to have more effective representation in Jordan. Ambassador Byroade said he believed that an important factor was that the Egyptians felt that the Jordanians would not fight against Israel should Israel and Egypt engage in hostilities. This bothered the Egyptians considerably. Mr. Morris commented that you could not expect Jordan to fight simply to save Egypt. Mr. Shuckburgh pointed out that if for no other reason, the Jordanian force was useful to Egypt in that its presence made it necessary for Israeli forces to be stationed adjacent to Jordan. This Israeli force could not be moved from the Jordan borders to be used against Egypt. This Arab force would not be there at all except for the British. Ambassador Byroade said that nevertheless this was a source of irritation to Egypt.

Mr. Allen asked if the presence of UK officers in the Arab Legion might be used as a point of negotiation with Nasser. Mr. Arthur said that if the British pulled their officers out of the Legion and generally left Jordan to its own fate, great instability would grow. All of her neighbors would be plotting against her territory. The Jordanians would stand this only for a short time before pulling a coup d’etat and establishing a military dictatorship. This would please Nasser considerably.

1. Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Middle East 1954–1957. Secret. Drafted by Dixon.