Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII

441. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, November 26, 1956¹

Washington, November 26, 1956

SUBJECT

• Iraqi-U.S. Relations

PARTICIPANTS

• Ambassador Musa Shabandar of Iraq
• Brigadier Hassan Mustapha, Iraq Armed Forces Attaché, Iraq Embassy
• Mr. Hashim Khalil, Counselor of Iraq Embassy
• Mr. William M. Rountree, NEA
• Mr. David D. Newsom, NE

Oil for Syria

Ambassador Shabandar said he wished to discuss a number of questions pertaining to U.S.-Iraqi relations. First, he wished to refer to the approach which Mr. Berry had made to him concerning the Syrian threat to blow up Tapline if American companies did not provide Syrian oil requirements.² The Ambassador said, in view of the state of Syrian-Iraqi relations, the Iraq Government had taken this matter up with Saudi Arabia. He believed King Saud had taken appropriate action.

Syria

The Syrian situation, itself, was most serious, the Ambassador said. Syria did not want a solution to the present crisis and the Russians were encouraging them in this policy. The Russians, he said, were, particularly, exploiting the Palestine issue and minimizing the role of the United States in the area. Their claim was that the United States took the stand it did to keep the Russians out, not to help the Arabs.

The Ambassador believed Syrian propaganda had been particularly helped by growing comment in the United States press that Israel has been the victim of the present circumstances and that the United States must help her. Iraq, also, is disturbed by this propaganda, he said, although the Iraq Government is confident President Eisenhower will not be swayed by these pressures.

U.S. Role

With the decline in prestige of Britain and France, the Ambassador said, the United States should “come openly” into the area. Sooner or later Britain and France, because they appeared to be the allies of Israel, will lose all their influence in the area, particularly in Iraq. Iraq, he said, wants the military and moral support of the United States. Iraq might forget the British action in a year or two, he said, but, right now, only the United States and the Russians had influence. The Russians are already in the area, he said, supported by the young officers in Syria. A strong entry of the United States, however, will make the Syrian officers re-examine their position.

Iraqi Military Needs

Brigadier Mustapha outlined needs of the Iraq Armed Forces which he believed the United States could help to meet. Pointing out that, in the past two years, the United States has helped to meet deficiencies in two infantry divisions, he said that Iraq had plans to develop still a third infantry division and wished, also, aid for her Air Force.

Iraq, he said, had only eight obsolete 3.7 inch anti-aircraft guns and needed new medium and heavy AA equipment. Her Air Force, he said, had three squadrons of obsolete Fury fighters, propellor driven; one squadron of Vampires, an early model jet fighter, and one squadron of Venoms. The latter are modern, he said, but cannot be compared to MIGs. He asked that the United States increase its military assistance program and include the Air Force. He said he had discussed this with the Department of Defense, but they had stated that the aid allocation was already determined and would be difficult to change. He wished to stress, particularly, the need for a squadron of modern jets and pilot training.

U.S. Position

Mr. Rountree assured both the Ambassador and Brigadier Mustapha that the United States was deeply concerned by the situation in the area and, particularly, in Syria. He recognized that Britain and France were being ostracized in the area and would continue to be the targets of anti-Western and pro-Soviet propaganda. The U.S. role, he said, is not to enter into the area to fill a vacuum through domination, but is to support the integrity and independence of the individual nations. We want no claim of U.S. colonialism, he said. The United States hoped, in its relations with the Baghdad Pact countries and Saudi Arabia, in particular, to establish a mutually beneficial relationship.

Noting that the U.S. position was best in those countries which had substantial resources or were financially sound, such as Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon, Mr. Rountree emphasized the U.S. desire to help those nations which did not have such advantages. These nations, however, he said, because they are poor, provide fertile fields for anti-U.S. propaganda; the United States would like to help them, but is prevented from doing so by prevalent attitudes in these nations. He mentioned Jordan, Syria and Egypt.

In speaking of these nations, Mr. Rountree noted also that some were receiving large quantities of arms—more than their own forces could effectively use. He agreed with the Ambassador’s observation that it was in the interest of these nations that a solution be found for the Arab-Israeli question.

Arab-Israel Question

Mr. Rountree emphasized the desire of the United States to find a mechanism though which the Palestine question could be settled. He said the United States thought it had the answer in the U.N. resolution which was tabled,³ but this had apparently generated much opposition.

The Ambassador said he believed any effort at a solution had to start with the 1947 resolutions to which the Arabs were committed and which provided a legal basis. He said he thought the Secretary-General, who had gained great prestige among the Arabs, would be more acceptable than the committee which the U.S. had proposed. He thought he, personally, might be able to sound out Arab leaders at the U.N. on their thoughts on the U.S. resolution. He agreed to inform Mr. Rountree of their comments when he returned from New York.

He pointed out Iraq was in a difficult position since they had been attacked by Arab extremists. He believed any move to a solution of the Palestine question needed to start with Nasser. The Arabs, he said, are shy of committees; they lost Palestine through committees.

U.S. Support for Iraq

Mr. Rountree said that, in implementing its policies in the area, the U.S. attached great importance to Iraq. He stressed that the United States wished to support Iraq and the Baghdad Pact in material and moral ways. The question of additional aid for Iraq, he said, was being considered at the highest levels of the U.S. Government.⁴ We want you to feel that the policies you are pursuing are the best policies, he told the Ambassador.

He said he hoped that Iraq would not abandon its supply relationship with the United Kingdom completely. The United States, however, would act independently to help and to demonstrate the U.S. good will and U.S. capability to assist those nations which help themselves.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.87/11–2656. Secret. Drafted by Newsom.
2. On November 15, Ambassador Shabandar met with Deputy Assistant Secretary Berry to discuss the Syrian threat to Tapline. A memorandum of this conversation is ibid., 883.2553/11–1556.
3. Text of this draft resolution, introduced by the United States on November 3 and designated as U.N. doc. A/3272, is printed in vol. XVI, p.960.

4. In a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, dated November 30, dealing with Turkish and Iraqi requests for U.S. support, Admiral Radford stated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered that the United States could deploy 12 interceptor aircraft (F–86D) and 3 mobile radars, with pilots and crews for both, in Iraq under the guise of a training mission. Radford said: “The Joint Chiefs of Staff are aware that such a move into Iraq is potentially dangerous from a political viewpoint, although Iraq would assume political responsibilities for any actions of these aircraft. In this connection, it might be pointed out that membership of the United States in the Baghdad Pact would help to dispel the political problems associated with these deployments.” The Joint Chiefs recommended expediting the political arrangements for this deployment and stressed that “this deployment of forces should be on a temporary basis only to meet an emergency situation.” (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 815)

   The subject of Iraqi desire for U.S. assistance in the form of military aircraft and radar rose during a meeting in Secretary Dulles’ office on December 3; see Document 156.