442. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, December 21, 19561
SUBJECT
- Increase in Military Aid for Iraq
PARTICIPANTS
- Ambassador Musa Shabandar of Iraq
- Brigadier Hassan Mustafa, Iraqi Armed Forces Attaché
- Col. Ishmail al-Arif, Secretary, Iraqi General Staff
- The Under Secretary
- Mr. Rountree, NEA
- Mr. Newsom, NE
Ambassador Shabandar said he wished to discuss Iraq’s need for greater military assistance. Col. Arif had been sent by the Iraq Government to assist him in this matter. Iraq was particularly concerned about the growing strength of Syria, he said, and Col. Arif brought word from the Iraqi military attaché in Damascus of substantial Soviet aid, including 60–70 MIGs. When questioned as to Syria’s actual military capacity, the Ambassador said it was not a question of capability, but of mentality; Col. Sarraj, he said, was a young and unpredictable military leader whose actions were to be feared.
The Under Secretary said that, while the Department had had reports of Soviet arms shipments to Syria, the U.S. information did not show they were as great as some reports indicated; the number of planes, for example, was smaller than the Ambassador’s figure.
Mr. Rountree added that the actual Syrian threat was less than many believed it to be. He pointed out that the Syrians had nothing like the quantity of equipment possessed by the Egyptians, yet the Egyptians collapsed quickly before the Israelis. He said the United States wished to do what it could to improve Iraq’s capability as rapidly as possible, but in an orderly fashion. He said the United States did not believe the Syrian threat justified hasty action.
The Ambassador said he agreed that the actual Syrian threat may have been exaggerated, but stressed that Iraq was under fire from her Arab neighbors, as well as being threatened from the Soviet Union, and needed a greater defense capability. He said British deliveries to Iraq over the years had been exceedingly slow. In contrast to this, he said, the Syrians had asked for Soviet arms one week and they were “delivered the next.” He feared, he said, that Syria, Iraq’s “younger brother,” would become a stronger military power than Iraq. He cited, as an example, that Iraq’s jet aircraft were obsolete in comparison to [Page 1022] the new Soviet types received by Syria. He emphasized Iraq’s vulnerability to air attack, particularly with respect to the new dams in the north.
The Ambassador and Brigadier Mustafa, during the course of the conversation, enumerated Iraq’s immediate needs as follows:
- 3 squadrons jet fighter aircraft,
- 100 M–24 tanks to replace armored cars for which spare parts are no longer available,
- Equipment for a third division, in addition to the equipment for two divisions currently being supplied under MDAP, and
- Mobile radar stations.
Mr. Hoover said he was aware of Iraq’s request for these items and that the State Department had been in discussion with Defense on the matter. He said he had hoped to have an answer in time for the Ambassador’s call, but that it now appeared definitely a decision might be reached by December 28.
Mr. Rountree added that the United States had every intention of assisting Iraq in every way possible. In answer to a question by the Ambassador, Mr. Rountree said that the United States still supported the Baghdad Pact and hoped to strengthen the Pact by assistance to Iraq. The Ambassador asked whether the Nehru visit2 had changed the U.S. position; Mr. Hoover assured him it had not.
Supplementing what the Ambassador had said, Brigadier Mustafa reported Iraq needed eventually six Army divisions and a nine squadron (one group) Air Force. He said, further, Iraq wished to change to a basic U.S. equipment standard and that he believed the British, in the light of recent circumstances, would agree to this. He said he hoped the pace and volume of U.S. shipments could be speeded up. He commented that shipments from the UK were particularly slow. Col. Arif said that some of the equipment from the UK, purchased under the U.S. program, was second hand. Brigadier Mustafa added that the British had agreed to provide one squadron of jet aircraft starting in June, but that this fell far short of meeting Iraq’s needs.
The Under Secretary said he assumed Col. Arif would be in touch with Defense on these matters and suggested that he might wish to review the FY 1957 program for Iraq while he was in the United States. Mr. Hoover reiterated that the United States was aware of Iraq’s problem and of the implications of the Syrian situation.
Ambassador Shabandar said he wished also to ask the United States to implement a “propaganda cease fire” between Iraq and Syria and Egypt. Mr. Hoover said the United States had made strong representations [Page 1023] on this matter and that, while he did not know how effective the representations concerning propaganda might have been, he hoped they were effective in preventing physical attacks.
The Ambassador said he had also spoken to Foreign Minister Fawzi of Egypt on this matter, but he believed there was little Mr. Fawzi could do.
At the conclusion of the meeting, Mr. Newsom received word from ICA that Mr. Clifford Willson had been nominated as the U.S. member of the Iraq Government Development Board. This news was passed on to the Ambassador.
(Note: Brigadier Mustafa called Mr. Newsom following the meeting to ask which section of the Department of Defense was considering the Iraqi requests and whether they were considering the latest requests submitted by the Brigadier. Mr. Newsom said the problem was receiving wide consideration and he could not say that any particular section had the responsibility. He said particulars of the program should be worked out with the MAAG in Baghdad and that what was being considered was the general policy in the light of over-all U.S. commitments and budgetary limitations.
Brigadier Mustafa said he wished to correct what the Ambassador had said about Syria. He should have said 60–70 tanks, not MIGs. The actual number of aircraft, he said, were few.)