Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII

440. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State¹

Baghdad, November 26, 1956—5 p.m.

933. Paris pass Knight for Norstad and USRO. Deptel 898.² Embassy’s comments follow on suggestions made in reference telegram re measures which might strengthen Iraq as member Baghdad Pact.

(1) In Embtel 812 of November 9³ I supported Iraqi request for radar equipment. I continue to feel US assistance in this field in addition to filling important gap in US intelligence coverage would have highly beneficial effect locally. Purely defensive nature this equipment provides no reasonable basis for adverse criticism of such assistance. Prime Minister only yesterday expressed great interest in this matter and Chief of Staff has been pressing air attaché for reply. (See Embtel 927, November 26)⁴

(2) We feel announcement our readiness increase scope Iraqi pilot training US from present program of 15 spaces would have good psychological effect.

(3) We note USG’s attitude re undesirability moving US fighter aircraft into Iraq now. While stationing such aircraft in Turkey would be recognized by local military authorities as measure which could contribute to Iraq’s defense, we believe only very limited psychological benefit would be derived locally from such action.

(4) Alternative proposal that we make available USAF fighter interceptor trainers with instructors is similar to one that Iraqi Chief of Staff has already made. I feel we could in cooperation and with local authorities do something along these lines under our MDAP agreement or on some other basis in way to demonstrate our real concern for defense of this area. Political implications of assistance in this form would of course be rendered less vulnerable to criticism if aid extended within context of Baghdad Pact.

(5) Re memorandum of understanding: Department’s attention invited to MAAG Chief’s message 9–192 November 7⁵ recommending reappraisal value continuing policy expressed in this document. In my view we should, if we feel it advantageous to continue this policy, interpret the memorandum as liberally as possible.

(6) Other steps which US could take to strengthen position of Iraqi Government:

(a) Department’s attention invited Embtel 931 of November 26.⁶ I hope no effort will be spared to ensure that this towing equipment reaches Iraq in time for Iraqi Army Day parade.

(b) While Embassy appreciates that great demands being made on limited MDAP funds we feel any evidence of reduction in US assistance effort would have unfortunate political repercussions locally. On other hand position of GOI would be considerably strengthened by substantial increase of size of aid equipment, and acceleration of deliveries.

(c) It would be helpful if item content of FY 1957 MDA material program could be made known to GOI at early date.⁷

Gallman

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 787.5/11–2656. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Ankara, Moscow, Tehran, Karachi, London, and Paris.
2. Supra.
3. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 787.5/11–1056)
4. In telegram 927, Gallman reported both Nuri’s inquiry about the status of the Iraqi request for radar units and fighter aircraft defense and General Rafiq Arif’s earlier approach to the U.S. Air Attaché on the same subject. Gallman noted that Nuri was deeply concerned about Iraq’s “exposed position.” (Ibid., 787.5/11–2656)
5. Not found in Department of State files.
6. Telegram 931 dealt with the Government of Iraq’s need for towing equipment for the 8-inch howitzers it recently obtained from the United States. (Department of State, Central Files, 787.5–MSP/11–2656)
7. Telegram 918 to Baghdad, November 28, informed Gallman that his various suggestions were being given “urgent consideration.” In the meantime, Gallman could inform Nuri Said that Iraq’s defense needs, including its recent requests for air defense assistance, were receiving priority attention at the highest levels of the U.S. Government. Ambassador Shabandar was similarly informed on November 26. (Ibid., 787.5/11–2656) See infra.