333. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State1
588. 1. As I foresaw (my 572 paragraph 3)2 Shah asked me to fly today in his private airplane to his Caspian retreat where we had long talk both before and during lunch.
2. Shah explained to me very convincingly his current problem re joining pact. He said Majlis members are aware of budget difficulties (which he put presently as $35 million deficit with judges and teachers salaries already in arrears) and in consequence he must have something which will partially satisfy Majlis members who ask “how can you reconcile adherence to pact, which in long run is going to cost Iran more money, when you already have a budget deficit”? He stressed that this seeming inconsistency is the soft point upon which Soviet propaganda and sympathizers likely to harp with telling effect. Therefore, [Page 779] Shah asked me to endeavor obtain for him from Washington before October 8 assurances that US will issue a post-adherence statement which in addition to welcoming Iran’s adherence and restating US interest in Iran’s territorial integrity, stability and well-being would contain a phrase to effect US will continue to entertain sympathetically Iranian requests for military and economic assistance. He said that if I can inform him prior to October 8 that such a statement will be forthcoming he will include in his speech a strong statement “inevitably leading to Iran’s adherence in a few days”. He said his hand would be immeasurably strengthened by US reference to military and economic assistance and he thought this would be sufficient to still the doubters in Majlis and to assure early Majlis ratification.
3. Shah said if assurances along above lines are not received prior October 8 he would have to consult Cabinet both as regards content of his speech (“which could be all platitudes”) and timing of adherence (“we could adhere later in month or even after Geneva”).
4. Among additional points made by Shah: a. “When I talked to President Eisenhower he told me we would receive military aid but that Iran’s greater need is for economic development”; b. “Egyptian arms order must be disappointing to Department and I should think Egyptian behavior would lead to greater US appreciation of Iran’s steadfast pro-West and cooperative attitude notwithstanding Iran’s temporary budget difficulties”.
5. This was my first opportunity for man to man talk with Shah. We got on well. He impressed me with his sincerity, good will and realism although last seemed clouded by an inadequate appreciation of the fact and figures of Iran’s budgetary problems. He showed interest in joint fact-finding exercise described paragraph 2 my 582, October [4]3 about which he seemed to have heard little, but hoped desired statement from US would not be held up pending results of exercise.
6. I believe if Shah does not use his October 8 speech to pave way for entry into pact this will be clear sign that pact schedule has been set back. I did not get impression that Shah is attempting to highjack US into commitments newer or broader than those already inherent in our recent policy toward his country; all evidence now reaching Embassy confirms Shah’s estimate that he faces real problem with Majlis.
[Page 780]7. Only Department can determine how important it is to our global policy for Iran to announce its adherence to pact within coming days or whether it can afford risk of appreciable delay, during which Shah under pressure from Majlis may waver from his present determination.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/10–555. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, Baghdad, Ankara, and Paris.↩
- Dated October 3, not printed. (Ibid., 780.5/10–355)↩
- Telegram 582 reported that Amini proposed a joint U.S.-Iranian planning effort to divide Iran’s oil revenues based on the principle that the major part be used for development projects. (Ibid., 780.5/10–455)↩