Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII

326. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State¹

Tehran, September 5, 1955—noon.

391. Following are country team comments on my discussion with Prime Minister Ala and his memo reported Embtels 385 and 386, September 3:²

1. Although having no official status, memorandum represents considered Iranian initial negotiating position and has backing of Shah, who may well have inspired it. It constitutes most complete price tag, in political, economic and military terms, that Iranians have so far placed on their adherence to regional defense pact. Factors leading to various components this price have been building up gradually over some time. Presentation now constitutes important element of Iranian preparation for imminent visit Turkish President and anticipated strong Turkish pressure for pact adherence.

2. It is conceivable that price has been set so high in order provide GOI with excuse for indefinite delay and eventual refusal enter pact, but we do not think Iranian Government has made or is likely in near future make any such negative decision. In stating its conditions GOI may anticipate response that will give grounds for not making decision at time of Turkish visit. Basic intent memorandum probably, as Ala states, find out where they stand as step towards eventual adherence to pact, adherence on which Ala at best lukewarm but which has been a constant in Shah’s policy both because of his serious interest in defense of Iran and sentimental attachment to army and because of ambitions for additional prestige, for greater personal power within country and greater influence with neighbors.

3. Despite this intent join pact, completely negative and unsympathetic reply from US would mean at very least indefinite delay actual adherence to pact. Such delay would be publicly regarded as tantamount refusal and might in fact bring about reversion traditional Iranian avoidance of foreign commitments.

4. Without assessing merits of case, there is little question that leaders public opinion Iran as elsewhere have been greatly affected in their thinking by course of world events, apparent West–East détente and new “sweet reasonableness” of Soviet Union. They may feel both consciously and subconsciously that there is now less reason for them take on additional burdens and incur additional risks in face what appears to them to be diminishing US aid and interest. Reflection of a corresponding attitude in US, namely that it is no longer worth our while building up Iran’s forces—could very well be taken as confirmation of such doubts by those responsible for Iranian policy.

5. With respect to request for additional financial, economic and military assistance, Ala’s approach serves to underscore real inadequacy of US assurances so far given (Embtels 164, July 30,³ and 370, September 1,⁴ and Embdes 475, April 25,⁵ 41, July 9,⁶ and 104 August 26⁷). Meeting increased defense budgets as armed forces expand is a real problem in Shah’s mind, and he has emphasized to Ambassador need for US budgetary support for this purpose. Although US might be able resort to some aid formula other than continuing budgetary support, we consider that US cannot escape need for providing additional military and complementary aid in order assist Iran meet range of problems that must be solved if Iran to make desired contribution to regional defense.

6. With respect request for US/UK guarantee territorial integrity, believe that Shah will ultimately be satisfied with considerably less than face value of request. Essence of what Shah and Ala have in mind is that US and UK undertake to come to aid of Iran if attacked by Soviets. Although ultimate decision will be Shah’s, he is undoubtedly influenced on this point by widespread genuine apprehension among Iranians that adherence to pact without some assurance of US protection would gratuitously expose Iran. (Ala correct that few Iranians now see concrete benefits from mere membership in pact.) Ambassador would much appreciate early indication, and in any case in advance of visit Turkish President, as to what assurances US might be ready to give.

7. With respect to bid for recognition Iranian sovereignty over Bahrein, this is clearly bargaining counter and Iranians may well have put it forward in order to provide prompt example of their “moderation” when they withdraw it.

8. US is now faced with necessity for determining US actions and assurances necessary to obtain Iranian pact adherence, readiness of US to pay this price, and consequences for US policy of possible Iranian decision not to adhere to pact owing absence adequate US measures. Failure of Northern Tier concept to be brought to completion within reasonable period of time would be regarded in Iran as US political failure that would weaken our influence on other aspects Iranian policy. We assume that loss of prestige would extend to pact members and other Middle East states. In this connection would point to fact Soviet propaganda already trying to make capital out of claim that policy of neutrality and non-participation military blocs and coalitions is developing in Middle East (Embassy Moscow telegram 541 to Department September 1).⁸

Chapin

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/9–555. Secret; Priority. Repeated priority to London.
2. Telegram 386 is supra. Regarding telegram 385, see footnote 2 thereto.
3. See footnote 4, Document 322.
4. Document 324.
5. Document 308.
6. Despatch 41, “Semi-Annual Evaluation of Progress Toward Attainment of United States Mutual Security Objectives” in Iran, is not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 788.5–MSP/7–955)
7. Not printed. (Ibid., 780.5/8–2055)
8. Not printed. (Ibid., 396.1–GE/9–155)