Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII

324. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State¹

Tehran, September 1, 1955—1 p.m.

370. This is joint Embassy, USOM/I, ARMISH–MAAG message. Country team convinced basic contradiction requiring early policy reviews exists (Embtels 164² and 316³ and Deptel 226⁴ ) between US encouragement Iran proceed with adherence Baghdad Pact and US delay in decisions respecting military and other aid required for effective Iranian participation regional defense on minimum basis. This contradiction could delay Iranian adherence Pact and seriously embarrass whole US plan and policy for Middle East defense. We are moving either too rapidly on Pact or too slowly on assurance minimum aid Iran clearly implied by our expressed interest Iranian Pact adherence. Decision to encourage Pact presumes acceptance of at least its minimum aid implications and, despite limited and vague nature US aid assurances given Shah, provides Iran with strong basis for requesting adequate expanded aid after Iranian adherence Pact. If Iran adheres to Pact on urging Turkey and Pakistan, it will be on assumption by all three that US will come through with necessary aid to make arrangements effective. Ambassador’s statement to Shah on instruction Dept (Deptel 55),⁵ although not specific, would appear to give Shah some basis for such an assumption. There is obviously no other source than US from which to meet military deficiencies. We think it possible however that Shah will delay Pact adherence pending receipt further US aid assurances.

Shah states and Chief ARMISH–MAAG also believes that moderate forces recommended ARMISH–MAAG submittal May 26 represent minimum Iranian ground forces capable reasonable contribution regional defense. This assumes truncated defense Iran along Zagros Mountains. Northern (Elburz) defense concept favored by Turkey and Pakistan as required by their own defense would be far more expensive.

US military aid now envisaged appears to fall short of support even for forces recommended by ARMISH–MAAG May 26. Moreover, full account not yet taken of complementary aid, namely, direct forces support and defense support, concurrently necessary with military aid to support military buildup, strengthen civilian economic complement of military strength and avoid intolerable inflation. Importance civilian factor emphasized by vulnerability political structure Iran.

Question of training team results and Iranian military capability seems overstressed if position so far taken respecting Pact not premature. Sharp disparagement Iranian military capability some quarters seems to neglect some training results to date as well as Middle East defense perspective and necessity of working with material at hand to achieve US defense objectives.

Approaching visit Iran of Turkish President in September should intensify issues of Iranian Pact adherence and US aid Iran over which Shah restive. Habbaniya talks complicated question somewhat owing partly attention given northern [tier] defense concept. Fact of Shah’s pending visit Moscow probably also having some effect Iranian thinking. Most auspicious time Iranian Pact adherence may now be heard [at hand].

Country Team in view above and having perused OCB documents Iran July 6⁶ re NSC 5504⁷ finds conclusion inescapable that time has come for review of central issues of US aid policy Iran in relation US basic objectives Iran and plan and policy for defense Middle East, taking due account new factors such as Summit conference.

Further Country Team views this subject contained Emb desp 104 air pouched August 31.⁸

Decision Icato 258⁹ just received to reserve $25 million direct forces and defense support based on AMA estimate Dec 15 as target date for Defense Dept consideration this FY 56 program submittal renders the problem described above more acute and a policy decision more imperative. It also creates additional immediate and embarrassing problems in relations Iran owing to Washington publication tentative $55 million non military end-item aid figure at earlier date and to familiarity Shah and GOI with planned FY 56 program $25 million defense construction.

Chapin

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.5–MSP/9–155. Secret.
2. See footnote 4, Document 322.
3. In telegram 316, August 23, the Ambassador reported on a conversation he had with the British Chargé and the Shah on August 22; Chapin summarized the conversation in telegram 316 as follows:

   “Summing up, although conversation lengthy, it would appear that chief purpose of Shah’s summoning us was put himself in favorable light on both domestic and foreign issues and then appeal again for Western, i.e. US, military and also budgetary aid in order that he might go ahead and adhere to Baghdad Pact. It is possible, moreover, that Shah felt that by bringing in British on his appeal, he believed this might increase pressure on US.” (Department of State, Central Files, 788.00/8–2355)

4. Document 322.
5. Document 320.
6. Reference is to the OCB Progress Report, “U.S. Policy Toward Iran,” and OCB “Outline Plan of Operations,” both dated July 6; see footnote 2, Document 317.
7. Document 291.
8. Dated August 26, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/8–2655)
9. Not printed. (Washington National Records Center, ICA Files: FRC 57 A 248, Box 81, Tehran)