327. Memorandum of Discussion at the 258th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, September 8, 19551
[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and items 1. “Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security,” 2. “Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles Program,” 3. “Activation of a Volunteer Freedom Corps,” and 4. “Evacuation of U.S. Civilian Population Abroad Prior to Hostilities Involving Regimes Hostile to the United States.”]
5. U.S. Policy Toward Iran (NSC 5504;2 Progress Report, dated July 6, 1955, by OCB on NSC 55043)
At the conclusion of his briefing of the Council on the reference Progress Report, Mr. Anderson indicated that Secretary Hoover was prepared to comment on developments in Iran which had occurred since the end of the period covered by the Progress Report.
In response to Mr. Anderson’s request, Secretary Hoover read from paragraph 22 of the Progress Report,4 dealing with the subject of the role of Iran in the defense of the Middle East. He then summarized a recent message from the U.S. Embassy in Tehran which gave Iran’s asking price for adhering to the Baghdad Pact.5 Secretary Hoover pointed out that this constituted Iran’s initial bargaining position. The Iranians were of course very astute traders and bargainers, but Secretary Hoover thought that the price that they had set was too high and that the Shah would be satisfied with rather less. Nevertheless, the United States could not possibly afford a completely negative reply to the Iranian message, and must be prepared to do a little trading and bargaining itself. Over and beyond this, it was obvious to Secretary Hoover that the United States Government must determine within the next few weeks what price it was willing to pay to secure the adherence of Iran to the Baghdad Pact. Finally, Secretary Hoover said that [Page 770] our Embassy in Tehran believed, and the State Department agreed, that the United States would be obliged to provide more military and economic aid to Iran. “We were smack up against the wire.”
The National Security Council: 6
Noted and discussed the reference Progress Report on the subject by the Operations Coordinating Board.
[Here follow items 6. “Antartica,” 7. “Expansion of the Labor Service Organization in Germany,” and 8. “United States Objectives and Courses of Action With Respect to Latin America.”]
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason on September 15.↩
- Document 291.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 317.↩
- Paragraph 22 reads
as follows:
“The U.S. position is that no determination as to the size and character of aid programs for Iran can be made until the exact role of Iranian forces in supporting a regional defense concept is determined. Accordingly, the Shah should be informed that, while the U.S. is prepared to help, the U.S. cannot support a large-scale development of the defensive delaying capabilities of the Iranian armed forces until the forces’ requirements are determined and an evaluation of training teams is known (in about a year) and unless we are assured that the ability of the Iranian Army to maintain internal security is not impaired thereby. It appears that the U.S. will not be in a position to give early military advice to the Shah regarding the role which Iran should play in Middle East defense or to provide at an early date large-scale military aid as envisaged by him.”
↩ - Document 325.↩
- The following paragraph constitutes NSC Action No. 1435, September 8. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)↩