Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

72. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Moscow, February 8, 1990, 10:30 a.m.–1 p.m.

Baker-Shevardnadze Ministerial in Moscow, USSR
First Small Group Meeting: Arms Control

SUBJECTS

• START, Defense and Space/ABM, Krasnoyarsk Radar, Visits to Radars, Chemical Weapons, Nuclear Testing, Missile Technology, CFE, Open Skies, Naval Arms Control, Military Budgets

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.

  • James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
  • Jack Matlock, U.S. Ambassador to the USSR
  • Robert Gates, Deputy National Security Advisor to President
  • Reginald Bartholomew, Under Secretary of State, T
  • Ronald Lehman, Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
  • Robert B. Zoellick, Counselor, Department of State
  • Paul Wolfowitz, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
  • Raymond G. H. Seitz, Assistant Secretary of State, EUR
  • Dennis B. Ross, Director, Policy Planning Staff
  • Margaret DeB. Tutwiler, Assistant Secretary of State, PA
  • Richard Burt, U.S. Ambassador to the Nuclear and Space Talks
  • Arnold Kanter, Senior Director, NSC Staff
  • Steven Hadley, Assistant Secretary of Defense, ISP
  • Gen. William Graves, Joint Chiefs of Staff
  • James P. Timbie, Special Advisor to Under Secretary Bartholomew
  • Alexander Vershbow, Director, EUR/SOV (notetaker)

• USSR

  • Eduard A. Shevardnadze, Minister of Foreign Affairs
  • Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, First Deputy Foreign Minister
  • Viktor Karpov, Deputy Foreign Minister
  • Yuriy Dubinin, USSR Ambassador to the U.S.
  • Aleksey Obukhov, Head, USA & Canada Administration, MFA
  • Yuriy Nazarkin, USSR Ambassador to the Nuclear and Space Talks
  • Oleg Grinevskiy, USSR Ambassador to the CFE Negotiations
  • Sergey Tarasenko, Special Assistant to Shevardnadze
  • Gennadiy Gerasimov, MFA Spokesman
  • Vitaliy Churkin, Special Advisor to Shevardnadze
  • Georgiy Mamedov, Deputy Head, USA & Canada Administration (notetaker)

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze opened the discussion by noting that the previous night² he and the Secretary had discussed preparations for the June summit. He had recalled the U.S.-Soviet agreement at Malta to prepare agreements for signature. There were some major and complicated problems involved. It was clear that on nuclear and space arms we needed to take a stand by mid-summer.

On strategic offensive arms, Shevardnadze said, we had a directive from our two presidents to complete agreement on the main issues in the first half of the year so that the whole agreement could be finished by the end of 1990. The second task was to facilitate preparation of an agreement on conventional arms so that such a treaty could be signed in Vienna, preferably at a summit meeting of the leaders of all 35 CSCE countries. This event could include signature of an agreement on confidence-building measures as well.

Shevardnadze said the Soviets also believed that we should resolve all fundamental issues on chemical weapons this year. Good progress had been made in this area and there was a good basis for comprehensive and mutual understanding. Our delegations, however, were in a difficult situation at the present time; they had exhausted all their reserves and had no additional instructions. New guidance would be needed to resolve the numerous brackets that remained in the draft convention. Accomplishing this depended on him and Secretary Baker, as well as on our two leaders.

Regarding future ministerials and other contacts, Shevardnadze thought that it would be necessary for him and Secretary Baker to meet at least two times in expanded composition before the summit. The next meeting could be in the United States and another would be at some location to be determined in the Soviet Union. Shevardnadze offered the floor to Secretary Baker since he was the guest.

Secretary Baker said he looked forward to receiving Shevardnadze in the U.S. for the next ministerial. He was inclined to agree that we would need two ministerials for proper preparation of the summit. As he had said the previous evening, we saw several possible accomplishments for the meeting. First, we wanted to resolve all remaining START issues so that we could be reasonably confident of completing the drafting of a treaty by the end of year. Second, we wanted to sign a bilateral agreement on chemical weapons destruction. Third, we wanted to sign the protocols to the two nuclear testing treaties. In addition, we should push for progress on the multilateral CFE negotiations and Open Skies; we believed we had made substantial progress on CFE and we should try to resolve all the remaining issues before the summit. As he had said previously, if we could reach agreement on a joint statement on CW at this meeting, it would be a substantial and important political signal.

START

The Secretary said he would like to lay out in greater detail than at the previous evening’s meeting some new U.S. ideas on START. Our two leaders in Malta had said we should try to agree on three issues at this ministerial: ALCMs, non-deployed missiles, and telemetry encryption. The Secretary had given Shevardnadze a paper with proposed agreed common elements on ALCMs (copy of this and other U.S. papers are attached). He was prepared to discuss these proposals in detail if Shevardnadze wished. The papers³ spelled out all the details, so the Secretary would not repeat them; we looked forward to a Soviet response.

For the benefit of Shevardnadze’s colleagues, the Secretary said he would repeat what he had said the previous night. The U.S. viewed this proposal as moving in the Soviet direction in each of the three major areas on ALCMs: counting rules, distinguishability and range. He hoped the Soviets would find it acceptable so that we could close out this issue as our heads of state had directed.

On non-deployed missiles, the Secretary continued, our initial position had been that there should be numerical limits on all non-deployed missiles. Recently, however, we had taken a hard look and now had a new proposal that took account of Soviet suggestions in Geneva. Thus, we could accept the Soviet proposal that non-deployed missiles could be permitted near deployment areas only in agreed very small numbers, with all others confined to declared facilities some distance away. The U.S. now proposed to add numerical limits only on non-deployed ICBMs of types that have been flight tested from mobile launchers. Specifically, we proposed that there be no more than 300 non-deployed mobile ICBMs, and no more than 1500 warheads attributable to non-deployed mobile ICBMs. Apart from this there would be no numerical inventory limits on other types of non-deployed ICBMs or SLBMs. In this way we had considerably reduced the scope of our proposal to meet Soviet concerns.

The Secretary added that mobility, of course, created difficulties in verification. For this reason we believed that special measures should be adopted to limit and account for the total inventory of missiles that might be deployed in a mobile mode. The missiles covered by the U.S. proposal would be all of the Soviet SS–24s and SS–25s. The U.S. Peacekeeper and Small ICBM would be covered just as soon as they were flight tested from mobile launchers, thereby ensuring reciprocity. The Secretary then presented a paper on elements of common ground on non-deployed missiles that spelled out the details of the U.S. proposal. As he had indicated the previous night, we believed this responded directly to Soviet concerns in Geneva; we hoped it would be possible to reach agreement on this basis so that people could tackle the verification and inspection questions that depended in large part on what is done about non-deployed missiles.

On telemetry encryption, the Secretary continued, his understanding was that Ambassadors Burt and Nazarkin had made considerable headway in Geneva on this subject since the Ministers’ last meeting. We hoped to finish the job here in Moscow. Based on their earlier conversations, the Secretary was encouraged in this regard. He knew this was a highly technical subject and he hoped that Burt and Nazarkin could take it up with a view toward reaching agreement. The Secretary said we again had a paper with proposed elements of common ground spelling out our proposals.

Shevardnadze joked that we should include all the U.S. documents in the ministerial joint statement without any changes. The Secretary quickly replied that this was a very good idea. He asked whether Shevardnadze would like to hear the U.S. proposals on mobile ICBM verification. Shevardnadze said he would first like to comment on the other issues and then move on to that question.

Shevardnadze said that the Soviet view was that the exchange the previous day on ALCMs had been very productive. He wanted to say from the start that the sides appeared to be expanding the area of common ground, although there were still complex issues outstanding. Additional efforts would of course be needed. Several difficult issues related to the number of warheads attributed to the B–52 and B–1 and future heavy bombers. On the first item in the U.S. paper, counting rules, the U.S. side was well aware of the Soviet position. According to the U.S. formula either side would get an advantage with additional numbers of warheads. Therefore this provision needed a further look. The Soviet side had mentioned 100 heavy bombers, but perhaps some possible solution could be found.

Another important provision in the U.S. proposal, Shevardnadze continued, was to allow inspections of heavy bombers not equipped for ALCMs so that it could be demonstrated that these were not so equipped. The new elements in the U.S. proposal—namely, that each TU–95 with ALCMs and each TU–160 equipped with ALCMs be attributed with 8 warheads and that future heavy bombers be attributed with 10—appeared to be a major step forward. The same applied to the U.S. proposal for access to declared storage facilities at heavy bomber bases for non-ALCM equipped heavy bombers; this would enable the sides to verify that ALCMs stored there were not nuclear-armed. This was a very fundamental provision in the U.S. paper.

Regarding the range threshold, Shevardnadze said the U.S. proposals displayed some movement but there was still a difference. The U.S. proposed 1000 km whereas the Soviet position was 600 km. Therefore, we would need additional effort before we could arrive at a generally acceptable solution. Nevertheless, he did take note of the major steps to accommodate the Soviet position. Another important provision was that there would be no limits on non-deployed ALCMs and that heavy bombers could be equipped with no more than two times the number of ALCMs for which they were attributed. This was a provision on which movement had been made. We should identify other areas with a view toward making further progress.

On the factor of distinguishability, Shevardnadze said, the proposal that externally distinguishable features be included that would be detectable by national technical means was interesting. Those ALCMs that were not distinguishable would have to be treated as nuclear arms. This was an important step. Regarding nuclear ALCMs, the proposal for an exchange of information regarding the external distinguishing features was another common point.

On the proposal to ban MIRVed ALCMs, Shevardnadze did not believe there was any problem with that. We could also finalize agreement on inspections of heavy bombers as well as the provision on bombers that were originally built as ALCM carriers.

To sum up, Shevardnadze said that the points the Secretary had presented the previous evening and repeated on this occasion indicated that very good movement had been made and we did seem within reach of an agreement, as long as some additional efforts were made. He suggested the experts today give an additional push. If not all issues were resolved, we would have to work on them in Washington. Nevertheless, there was a lot of common ground and this warranted optimism.

Shevardnadze said that on non-deployed missiles, there did not seem to be very many differences. We could just leave the question as it was without going into all the details. This seemed to be another major step to accommodate one another’s concerns.

On telemetry encryption, Shevardnadze joked that he needed some help in deciphering his encrypted notes. He believed the Soviets had no objection to the U.S. proposal to limit the number of launches of missiles not equipped with telemetric devices so that these could be launched without broadcasting engineering measurements. The Soviets believed that the agreement should include all types of ballistic missiles without regard to when their testing had been completed. We needed a complete ban on telemetry encryption and other measures that denied access to telemetry. The Soviet side was prepared to show flexibility so that we could have an accord formalized as a separate text or as an agreed statement to the START Treaty. He suggested the working group address this issue to see whether we could make progress at this ministerial.

The Secretary said Ambassadors Burt and Nazarkin should work to see if elements of common ground could be developed that would resolve or narrow our differences. Shevardnadze agreed, adding that he wanted to reiterate his view that we had some good ground to build on in all the areas discussed so far and perhaps could find some solutions.

The Secretary said he next wanted to address mobile ICBM verification. He presented a paper and asked the Soviets to study it with a view toward considering it in detail later on. Shevardnadze said he would leave this issue with the working group. He had the general impression that we would need to find a compromise. The Secretary said he did not expect an immediate reaction to the U.S. paper since it had not even been presented in Russian translation. Shevardnadze joked that the Soviets would provide papers that could be immediately approved by the U.S. side.

The Secretary said he wanted to say a few words about sea-launched cruise missiles. Shevardnadze had emphasized the importance of this issue in Wyoming and had said there could be arrangements for SLCMs separate from the START Treaty. As he had indicated the previous night, the U.S. had prepared a draft of the kind of declaration we would propose be exchanged on a reciprocal basis. This statement would commit each side to declare its SLCM plans annually for the three years ahead. The declaration would need to be updated annually for the duration of the treaty. In our political system, such a declaration would carry great weight. We hoped it would fully meet Soviet concerns.

The Secretary added that, despite significant efforts, we had been unable to identify any way to verify formal limits on SLCMs without a degree of intrusion that would be unacceptable. The Secretary knew that the Soviets wanted to address the question of SLCM verification. We agreed that Ambassadors Burt and Nazarkin could engage in formal exchanges on SLCM verification in Geneva. We hoped that the Soviet side would take a hard look at our proposed declaration so that we could deal with this issue outside the formal START Treaty. He asked whether Shevardnadze wanted to respond now or move to the next topic, non-circumvention. He handed over a copy of the draft declaration.

Shevardnadze thanked the Secretary for the proposal. It would be necessary to study the draft declaration before responding. The U.S. was aware of the Soviets’ fundamental approach. They believed it was necessary to set limits on long-range SLCMs, to determine the range above which systems would be limited (namely, 600 km), and to set a ceiling of 1000 on such weapons. The Soviets could agree to do away with separate nuclear and conventional categories and consider SLCMs in the single category if the U.S. preferred. To reach agreement on specific numbers of SLCMs with which surface ships and submarines could be equipped, the Soviets had suggested that ships be permitted to carry no more than 1000 SLCMs. In other words, we should agree on the number of surface ships and submarines equipped for SLCMs.

With respect to verification, Shevardnadze said the Soviets realized this was complex but they believed such measures should be based on exchange of information on what types of surface ships and submarines were equipped for SLCMs; it was possible to agree that such a data exchange would be kept confidential. The sides, using NTM, could verify the numbers of surface ships and subs. At the same time, continuous monitoring of SLCM production facilities could be established and, for each cruise missile produced, a unique identifier could be applied. In addition, we could agree on cooperative measures to facilitate verification.

An agreement had to be acceptable to both sides, Shevardnadze added, if we were to arrive at a final solution. He did not know about the U.S. declaration, or whether it contained any convergence of views in principle. If it did we could perhaps make progress. Shevardnadze reiterated that the problem of SLCMs was very complex and difficult for the Soviets. Gorbachev had told this to the President at Malta, saying that an agreement on SLCMs would not be included in the START agreement itself but should be considered in connection with the Treaty. Without an understanding on SLCMs there would be no treaty. Shevardnadze said he would comment at the next session on the U.S. paper on SLCMs. He hoped what he had just said sounded better than the U.S. declaration.

The Secretary said that Shevardnadze’s comments suggested that there was still a lot of difference between us on SLCMs—more difference than he was hoping to hear. He urged that Shevardnadze look closely at the U.S. draft declaration. A lot of thought had gone into the proposal, and he urged Shevardnadze to keep in mind what a declaration would mean in the U.S. political system. This said, the Secretary assured Shevardnadze that he had been heard clearly: the Soviets still wanted formal limits. This represented a major difference and we hoped the Soviets would study our proposal carefully.

The Secretary said non-circumvention was a subject that had been discussed in Geneva. Shevardnadze knew we had a longstanding obligation to cooperate with the United Kingdom on SLBMs. This would continue and START could not affect this commitment. We could not accept constraints on our commitment to support the independent British nuclear deterrent. That commitment had been made over a period of decades by several U.S. presidents. During this period the U.S. and USSR had reached agreements, SALT I and SALT II, neither of which had affected the continuing U.S. program of cooperation with the UK. So it was our position that we did not need any non-circumvention clause at all. Customary international law made it clear that states had an obligation not to circumvent the intent of a treaty. We would, of course, scrupulously comply with our treaty obligations. Therefore, the provision proposed by the Soviets would not in any way strengthen that obligation. The Secretary urged the Soviets to remove this impediment to concluding a START Treaty by dropping their proposed non-circumvention clause.

Shevardnadze replied that a non-circumvention provision was simply necessary. The Soviets did understand U.S. relations with the UK, but they believed a solution could be found. Unless we recorded our joint attitude at the level of principle, we would open up dangerous opportunities for transfer of strategic weapons to other countries. For this reason, the principle of non-circumvention should be recorded in the treaty. As for the U.S. relationship with the UK, we could find some proviso to make clear the non-circumvention clause did not call into question U.S. commitments. This should be acceptable to the U.S. side, Shevardnadze stated, if the key question for the U.S. was compliance with its obligations to Britain.

Ambassador Burt said this sounded very constructive. In Geneva, however, the Soviets had proposed a very detailed provision that referred to technology transfer. In INF, by contrast, a more general sentence had been proposed. Why was such complex language needed in START and not in INF?

Shevardnadze replied that he was not sure; perhaps the Soviets had failed to finalize something in the INF Treaty. Deputy Foreign Minister Karpov said that the point was that in INF we were destroying two classes of missiles, so we could limit the issue to non-transfer of those systems. But in START, strategic offensive arms would remain in existence, so the question was more complicated; we had to deal with the technology as well as the systems.

Shevardnadze said that if we could find a solution with respect to the UK, then all remaining questions, definitions and standards should be a matter of common interest.

Burt said this sounded constructive. Secretary Baker suggested our experts engage on this question and see what might come up. Shevardnadze remarked that it was seldom that heads of delegations said their partner’s views were constructive.

The Secretary said that on other START issues we were prepared to add some new ideas to the overall package. We proposed a treaty duration of 15 years or until superseded by a follow-on treaty, with a review one year before the end of the 15-year period to decide on the future of the treaty. Regarding START II, the Soviets had proposed to begin discussions of what might go into such an agreement. We did not yet have fixed views on the subject but were prepared to authorize Ambassadors Burt and Nazarkin informally to discuss this subject and hear Soviet ideas.

On the phasing of reductions, the Secretary said the U.S. proposed that this take place in four phases of two years, two years, two years, and one year duration, with equal levels somewhat below current U.S. levels after the end of the first phase. He had a paper on elements of common ground on this question that explained U.S. ideas in detail.

On another miscellaneous item, the Secretary said the U.S. was prepared to drop the SS–N–5 SLBM from START on the basis of the statement by Ambassador Nazarkin that all these missiles would be eliminated by the date of signature. Finally, he wanted to present a draft elements of common ground on attributing warheads to future types of ballistic missiles. He hoped the Soviets would respond in due course.

The Secretary said this concluded his presentation of the new START ideas he had brought to Moscow. We would be prepared to talk with the Soviets over the next days to see if we could reach agreement on these proposals.

Shevardnadze responded that on treaty duration the Soviet position was on the record and he would not repeat it. As for the destruction timetable, the Secretary’s suggestions should be discussed at the expert level. He suggested instructing the working group to address this and report back.

Shevardnadze said the Soviets attributed fundamental importance to the fact that, at this stage and at the summit, we should determine how to behave after the completion of START I. For both the U.S. and USSR the question of strategic stability was of basic importance, as was the entire future of the disarmament and confidence-building process. The future would depend on how our two countries moved down this road. Therefore, the Soviets would like our delegations to begin a specific discussion of START II so that at the summit we could delineate the next stage of the negotiations. Shevardnadze then asked if the Secretary was prepared to address ABM and space issues.

The Secretary said he had points to make on these subjects and also on the Krasnoyarsk radar, chemical weapons, CFE and other topics. He asked whether Burt and Nazarkin should go to work or whether we should first address defense and space. Shevardnadze replied that the Ambassadors should probably stay for that discussion.

Defense and Space/ABM Treaty

The Secretary said the U.S. had tabled a revised defense and space treaty. Its aim was to reduce the risk of war by strengthening deterrence and stability. Our revised treaty responded to the steps the two Ministers had taken in Wyoming. In addition to resolving the issues dealt with in our draft treaty, our negotiators should agree upon certain predictability measures to build confidence as the strategic defense programs on both sides go forward. The December visit by Soviet experts to U.S. SDI labs showed the clear value of such measures. In order to expedite our negotiations on defense and space, the U.S. was developing an initiative for early implementation by both sides of certain predictability measures. These might later be integrated into a defense and space treaty, specifically, in its protocol on predictability. This approach would parallel our verification and stability measures initiative in START. Our negotiators would be presenting a specific proposal later in the current round in Geneva.

The Secretary said the Soviets had suggested a protocol on what the ABM Treaty permitted and prohibited. In the U.S. view, there was really no need for such a protocol. We were simply not prepared to negotiate new limits that were more restrictive than the present ABM Treaty. In Wyoming and Geneva, the Soviets had also proposed that violation of the ABM Treaty would justify withdrawal from START. He wanted Shevardnadze to know that we did not accept this. We could not and would not agree that exercise of our rights under the ABM Treaty in any way justified withdrawal from START. As he had mentioned in Wyoming, the START and ABM treaties each stood on their own merits. Therefore, we hoped that the Soviets would not continue to insist on some kind of common understanding. We thought that our position was reasonable in light of the fact that each side could withdraw from the START treaty under the supreme interests clause. To insist on a common understanding was going to put a major impediment in the way of concluding a START treaty. To repeat, given the supreme interests clause, which allowed withdrawal on six months notice, either party already had available means to withdraw from START.

Shevardnadze said he wanted to make a few comments on the Secretary’s thoughts and ideas. At Malta the sides had agreed that our experts should throw further light on the relationship between START and the ABM Treaty. From the outset the Soviets had seen this as the problem of problems. At the same time the question was not intractable. In Wyoming he had proposed a pragmatic way out of the deadlock of sterile conceptual debates. The Soviets had stated their readiness to sign and ratify a START treaty even if, by the time of completion, the sides had not reached agreement on ABM issues. The only point was that the sides would continue to observe the ABM Treaty as signed in 1972. Elimination of the Krasnoyarsk radar had removed another impediment to completing START. Yet despite these Soviet moves aimed at opening the way to a START agreement, the last round in Geneva indicated that U.S. policy had not undergone any change for its part; the aim continued to be to discuss ways of ensuring strategic stability through a cooperative transition to increased reliance on defense. Such an approach was the basis of the U.S. draft treaty. The Soviets had studied that draft very carefully and believed it offered no promise.

Shevardnadze said the Soviets were consistently following a policy that START would only be possible if the sides continued to observe the ABM Treaty. This was a position of principle for Moscow. He wanted to call the Secretary’s attention to the need to continue moving toward agreement on a common understanding defining the line between permitted and prohibited activities. Achieving such an understanding was not a precondition for signing a START treaty, however. He wanted to emphasize this point, although he did not mean to diminish the importance of reaching an understanding on a clear line between permitted and prohibited activities.

Frankly, Shevardnadze continued, the Soviets did not understand the motivation of their negotiating partners in opposing a common understanding that the provisions on withdrawal for reasons of supreme interests would include the right to withdraw if the other side violated the ABM Treaty. He believed the U.S. understood that if a side had the right to withdraw and if it believed there was a threat to its supreme national interests, it should be able to use this right in the event of an ABM violation. The Soviets did not see any contradiction here. Such an understanding would not detract from the Soviet right to determine what was a threat to its national interests. Perhaps the sides would continue their discussions on this, but an agreement would only be possible on this basis.

Shevardnadze explained that the Soviets believed they had made major changes in their position in Wyoming. These ideas had received a mixed reaction inside the Soviet Union and he could not preclude the fact that Secretary Baker would personally get a sense of this dissatisfaction when he addressed the Supreme Soviet. As for Krasnoyarsk, the Soviet position had been the subject of public criticism to the effect that they had made unjustified concessions. Though they were able to defend themselves on this question, it was important that the START Treaty take into account the other side’s interests and arguments.

The Secretary said Shevardnadze had underscored the fact that we still had significant differences on the Defense and Space issue. It had been our belief and hope in Wyoming that the Soviets had delinked START from the question of interpretation of the ABM Treaty or from a D&S agreement. It was our concern that the Soviets were now attempting to relink the two. It was difficult to understand why Soviet interests would not be sufficiently protected by a provision allowing withdrawal at any time a side saw a threat to its supreme interest, which could include a situation in which the Soviets believed the U.S. was in violation of the ABM Treaty. To insist on a common understanding presented the U.S. with difficult political problems, problems no simpler than the ones Shevardnadze had cited. Some would see such a common understanding as constraining our ability to move toward greater stability and predictability.

Shevardnadze said he hoped that the Secretary had clearly understood the Soviet position and concerns. In his view it was necessary to stick with the agreement reached in Washington. If so, the views he had just expressed would not be unacceptable to the U.S. side provided the U.S. considered the Washington summit accord to remain in effect. It was the Soviets’ firm view that there had to be a clear standard on how either side interpreted the ABM Treaty. What counted most was defining what was permitted and what was prohibited under the ABM Treaty. We had not had a discussion in depth of this issue and he suggested it continue in parallel to the negotiation of a START treaty. In this way, we could see clearly what types of activities were permitted and which were banned.

There was an understanding on both sides that the ABM Treaty would be complied with, Shevardnadze continued. The Soviets hoped a common understanding could be reached on this question. This was not a departure from the position he had presented in Wyoming. The Soviets were prepared to sign a START treaty if the ABM Treaty were to be observed. On this basis the sides could proceed with the practical elimination of 50% of their strategic offensive arms.

The Secretary said he understood the Soviets were prepared to sign a START treaty on the basis of an understanding that the ABM Treaty would be observed. He asked Shevardnadze what would happen if we resolved all START issues and we were still observing the ABM Treaty in one another’s opinion. Could it then be signed?

Shevardnadze said yes. That was what he had said previously.

The Secretary asked whether the Soviets would sign without a common understanding on prohibited and permitted activities.

Shevardnadze said they would sign, but they would want to continue discussions on that question. At some time in the future, they hoped we would be able to reach an agreed understanding on permitted and prohibited activities.

The Secretary said he just wanted to understand: there was no condition that we had to have a common understanding on withdrawal from START in the event that either side determines the other is not observing the ABM Treaty. If at the time we sign START we were observing the ABM Treaty, would the Soviet Union sign the treaty without any common understandings about the right of withdrawal?

Shevardnadze replied that basically this was correct.

Burt asked to clarify this point. It had been our understanding that the Soviets wanted the U.S. to agree to an understanding that there would be a right of withdrawal if the ABM Treaty were violated and that this was a precondition to implementing START. Was Shevardnadze saying we now did not need this?

The Secretary said his understanding had always been what Burt had said. In Wyoming he had asked Shevardnadze whether the Soviets were delinking START and ABM and Shevardnadze had replied in the affirmative. Therefore, his question was whether we could sign a START treaty without any common understanding about the right of withdrawal in the event of future non-observance of the ABM Treaty. Such a common understanding, he repeated, would prevent us from moving forward. He heard Shevardnadze just say that we could sign START as long as we were in fact complying with the ABM Treaty at the time of signature. Was it correct that the Soviets would sign without any common understanding about withdrawal rights beyond the general right under the supreme interests clause?

Shevardnadze replied that his point was that the Soviets were prepared to sign without linking START specifically to the ABM Treaty.

The Secretary asked whether this meant there was no link between signing a START treaty and reaching an agreed interpretation on permitted and prohibited activities? Shevardnadze said this was correct but negotiations should continue on the content of the ABM Treaty—whether we would have a broad or narrow interpretation, what was permitted and prohibited—parallel to implementation of START and the elimination of strategic offensive arms. If either side violated the ABM Treaty, this would provide a right to withdraw from START. This might happen, but it was also possible the U.S. could choose not to violate the ABM Treaty; alternatively, we might reach some other kind of agreement covering additional elements beyond the current agenda. The Soviets could not say with certainty how the negotiations would go.

Karpov said that he wanted to dot the i’s on this question. The Soviet position was that the two sides should have a common understanding regarding compliance with the ABM Treaty. They also believed that there should be clear limits that would not be crossed so that neither side would be charged with violating the ABM Treaty. This was why they had suggested defining a clear line between permitted and prohibited activities.

The second point, Karpov continued, was that compliance with the ABM Treaty was the sine qua non for implementation of a START treaty. Only in conditions of compliance with the ABM Treaty could the START reductions be implemented. Third, the Soviet position was that the two sides already now should record a common understanding that if either violated the ABM Treaty, the other could view this as a threat to its supreme national interest and withdraw per Article XVI. If, by the time the treaty were concluded, no common understanding were reached, then the Soviets wanted the U.S. side to be aware of this position: namely, that the Soviets would see a U.S. violation of the ABM Treaty as contrary to Soviet supreme national interests and, in such circumstances, they would act under Article XVI.

The Secretary said that a common understanding stating that a violation would be a grounds for termination of the treaty was not something to which we could agree. The Soviets were free to make whatever determination they wished. They could withdraw from START because the sun did not come up the next day; that was the Soviets’ business. But if the Soviets were asking us to agree that what might be, in the Soviets’ opinion, a U.S. violation of the ABM Treaty would represent specific cause for withdrawal, this we could not do. The Soviets had the same latitude and freedom to place whatever interpretation they wished on the supreme interests clause. But a specific common understanding was not acceptable. The U.S. had to retain the right to interpret the ABM Treaty in the way it believed it should be interpreted. This did not prejudice the Soviet position.

In any event, the Secretary said, failure to agree on an interpretation of the ABM Treaty was not, as he understood the Soviet position, something that would prevent signature of START. The only point we were hung up on was the Soviet preference for a common understanding that an ABM violation would trigger the supreme interests clause. The Secretary repeated that this was the Soviets’ business. We would not agree, but the Soviets had the right to withdraw on this basis. He urged that the Soviets not make this a requirement for a START treaty.

Burt said that what he had just heard Karpov say suggested that we may no longer have a problem. The Secretary commented that he didn’t think we had a problem since Wyoming. He just wanted to make clear that we could not accept a common understanding.

Karpov said that it was the Soviet preference to have such a common understanding.

The Secretary asked whether it was a precondition to signing the treaty. If so, we could not sign or implement the treaty. This was a key question.

Under Secretary Bartholomew said he wanted to try out one sentence on the Soviet side. Did we understand correctly that a common understanding regarding ABM violation being a grounds for withdrawal from START was a Soviet preference, but not a precondition for signing and implementing a START treaty?

Karpov said he had just said this.

Bartholomew said that, in this case, the issue was closed.

Shevardnadze asked whether the Secretary was satisfied. The Secretary said he was.

Shevardnadze said he understood the U.S. did not find it easy after Wyoming because there were some in the U.S., including some very knowledgeable people, alleging that there was nothing new in the Soviet position. In fact, that position contained fundamental new elements. Nevertheless, the Soviets would still like to clarify what the ABM Treaty was all about.

The Secretary said he had always felt in Wyoming that there had been a significant change in the Soviet position. He had asked whether the Soviets were delinking and had received a positive answer. Some had suggested the Soviets had not delinked; thus he was glad that the two of them had had this conversation so that we could clarify our understanding that START and ABM were not linked, but rather would stand on their own two feet. This had been a very useful and productive exchange. He asked whether they should turn to another subject.

Shevardnadze said that perhaps the working group should have more discussion of this language in order to lay the groundwork for subsequent efforts on strategic stability.

Krasnoyarsk Radar/Visits to Radars

The Secretary said he wanted to raise the Krasnoyarsk radar which he had spoken about briefly the previous night. In Wyoming we had understood that the Soviets, in offering to eliminate the Krasnoyarsk radar, would take the buildings down in their entirety. Yet in Geneva there had been suggestions that the Soviets would only destroy half of each building. This was a very important issue for the ratification of a START treaty. It was important that we be able to say that agreements made would be agreements kept. We hoped there was no question preventing taking the Krasnoyarsk radar structures down to the ground.

The Secretary added that some on the U.S. side wanted the Soviets to go further and destroy the foundations too. We could forgo this, however. This was not necessary or desirable. The previous night he had spoken of a disconnect between the Soviet people in the SCC and Shevardnadze’s position in Wyoming. Shevardnadze had reassured him, having made the point very forcefully that a decision had been made at the political level and it would be carried out at the technical level.

The Secretary recalled that Shevardnadze had also spoken in Wyoming about visiting U.S. radars at Thule and Fylingdales. He had told Shevardnadze in Wyoming that we would discuss this among ourselves. We had now reached a decision allowing us to facilitate visits to these radars. We had discussed the question with the Danes and the British. The visits would, of course, need to be closely coordinated with them, particularly in the case of the UK since Flyingdales was an RAF base. As he had told Shevardnadze, it would be important that if these visits were to be conducted that they be done so in a manner that put these issues behind us rather than making the problem worse. He had also suggested that the U.S. would like to visit two large Soviet radars at Pechora and Baranovichi. He understood that Shevardnadze had agreed to look into these requests and reply later.

Shevardnadze said that, the previous day, he had said with full responsibility, and would reaffirm today, that everything he had said in Wyoming about Krasnoyarsk would be put into effect in full. He was not in a position to say exactly what procedures would be carried out. He had put this question to Karpov; notwithstanding the latter’s clarifications, he would now repeat that the Wyoming statement would be carried out.

As for the request to visit U.S. radars in Greenland and the UK, Shevardnadze thought the Secretary’s reply was a very important step forward. The visits would serve to enhance confidence and help the Soviets to arrange their further relationship with the U.S. on the basis of reciprocity and mutual trust. The Soviets were prepared to contact the British leadership and find a mutual agreement on the terms for a visit. He expected the U.S. would work to the same end, given that these were American allies. Regarding Pechora and Baranovichi, as he had said the previous day he did not even know where these were. But in principle he favored openness—Open Skies, Open Lands, etc. Nevertheless, the Soviet side would need to work on this specific request.

To repeat, Shevardnadze said their position on Krasnoyarsk had not changed. The Soviet side would look into the question of visits to Soviet radars in return for the U.S. offer to visit Thule and Fylingdales. As for the U.S. request to take the Krasnoyarsk radar down to the ground, he was not against this but joked that he hoped the U.S. would pay for this. The Secretary replied that we could probably find a way.

Karpov said he would not like the U.S. to have the impression that the Soviet SCC delegation had been employing evildoers who were not fulfilling the decisions conveyed at the ministerial level. The SCC included legal people who have been guided by the 1974 procedures regarding destruction of ABM radars. He noted that the U.S. radar at Malmstrom had been eliminated in the way the Soviets had suggested in Geneva for Krasnoyarsk.

Shevardnadze remarked that this was why we needed to change people; old ideas still burdened the Soviet side.

The Secretary said it was, indeed, very important that there be some new blood. We also had people who wanted to destroy the concrete foundations at Krasnoyarsk.

Karpov said that the Soviet proposal had been based on what the U.S. had done at Malmstrom. After all, this had been enough for a large phased-array radar; why not do the same thing to a ballistic early warning radar? Under the 1974 procedures, half of the phased array had to be dismantled. The phased array would be removed and left for six months, after which it would be put under concrete.

Shevardnadze said he just wanted to reiterate that everything he had said in Wyoming remained the Soviet position.

The Secretary said that we understood Shevardnadze to have said in Wyoming that the radar would be taken down to the ground. This was necessary as a confidence-building measure. If he were to be asked why destroying half of the radar was not enough, his answer would be that the Soviet Minister had said it would be “completely eliminated.” This was the only way to build confidence.

[Omitted here are discussions not related to START.]

Shevardnadze said that to save time, the Soviets had prepared a paper listing all their views and suggested the experts now take up these questions (copy of Soviet paper is attached⁴).

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Lot 93D187, Secretary James A. Baker III’s Classified Papers, January 1989–August 1992, JAB Papers Feb 1990. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Osobnyak Guest House at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Drafted by Vershbow; cleared by Seitz, Timbie, and Ross. The full memorandum of conversation is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1989–1992, vol. III, Soviet Union, Russia, and Post-Soviet States: High-Level Contacts.
2. See Document 71.
3. Attached but not printed are undated U.S. papers entitled: “Additional Elements of Common Ground on ALCMs,” “Elements of Common Ground on Non-Deployed Missiles,” “Additional Elements of Common Ground on Mobile ICBM Verification,” “Elements of Common Ground on the Phasing of Reductions and Intermediate Limits,” “Elements of Common Ground on Warhead Attribution for Future Types of Ballistic Missiles,” “Elements of Common Ground on Non-Denial of Telemetry Data,” “Proposed Elements of Common Ground on Strategic R&D Boosters,” “Draft Joint Statement on Chemical Weapons,” “Proposal on Personnel,” “Agreed Common Elements on Combat Aircraft,” and “Declaration of Policy by the United States of America Concerning Nuclear-Armed Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles.”
4. Not found.