Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

71. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Moscow, February 7, 1990, 8–10:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• Eduard Shevardnadze

Shevardnadze: I have just come from the Plenum. The Plenum is not over yet. The platform has been adopted but we are still debating with Lithuania. The debate has been quite heated and I may have to go back and give a second statement. I read your speech in Prague and I found many interesting points in it.

Baker: I am very grateful that you saw fit to leave the Plenum. I, of course, would like to discuss the events associated with the Plenum and I’d also like to discuss Germany. But I think it might be useful first for me to go through some of the general ideas that we have brought on arms control. I think we brought a basket of arms control items, and I hope you will see a number of new ideas. If we can get into some of these general points on arms control tonight then perhaps you can get that information to your experts this evening.

Shevardnadze: You have outlined a sensible plan. Let me just say this meeting is taking place at a very interesting time. The conditions are ripe and the events and dynamics, especially in Europe, are moving with great pace. Our Summit will take place in a couple of months, and it will be extraordinarily important. Thus, we attach great importance to the talks I will have with you over the next couple of days. And, if you go ahead and outline the main elements of your new arms control ideas it will make it easier for our experts.

Baker: I’d like very much to do that, and I believe that what I am bringing can help us do what our two Presidents asked us to do in Malta, that is to say, resolve certain key START issues. Let me just add that both the President and I are very anxious for you to succeed in what you are doing. We know there is a limit to what we can do to help, but we are trying hard to provide and contribute to a secure and stable international environment. We know that that can be of assistance to you. Of course, we also know that a stable international environment is not simply a favor to you but is also something that serves our interests. That is what I meant by saying we want to pursue points of mutual advantage.

Shevardnadze: Yesterday I spoke at the Plenum and my remarks will be published tomorrow; but I find it interesting that the thoughts you have just outlined coincide almost exactly with what I said in the Plenum. Specifically, I said that in order to implement our plans for democratizing and renovating our society we need a favorable international environment. I used these very words, and I believe that US-Soviet relations are very important in effecting that environment. I also believe that international relations are affected by what happens here in the Soviet Union. If one sees destabilization in the Soviet Union, it can affect the situation outside the Soviet Union. Anyway, I think that our thoughts are working very much along the same lines, that is also true for our two Presidents.

Baker: I hope that you have noticed that the President and I have been saying in almost every statement that we have made that we support what you are doing and we value it very much. I have said for some time that instability in the Soviet Union is not in the interest of the US. I have said this with regard to the Baltics, which is a sensitive matter for us because we have never recognized incorporation of these republics in the Soviet Union. More than this, I believe it is in our mutual interest to reduce the risk of confrontation and war and to reduce the burden that defense spending puts on our respective economies. We could both profit from a peace dividend.

[Omitted here are discussions not related to START.]

Baker: Why don’t I run through my broad agenda on arms control and then you can have your people study the papers I hand over to you. I have some important changes in our negotiating posture in START. I am going to present some significant proposals not only on the three issues our Presidents wanted us to resolve—ALCMs, non-deployed missiles, anti-telemetry encryption—but also on CFE and CW. I brought along our negotiators in both of those areas. I know you are familiar with our proposal on manpower. We also have one on air power. I think and I hope that our CFE proposals will remove some of the differences between us and that we can move the negotiations along very promptly. I’ve got some proposed elements of common ground on manpower and combat aircraft and I’d like to give it to you. (Baker turns over paper²) If you can agree on these, I think we could give CFE a major push forward. If you have a counterproposal, as you were suggesting to the press, I’d be pleased to hear about it as soon as you can tell me so that I can respond.

Shevardnadze: Yes, we do have something. It’s a counterproposal, not a counteroffensive.

Baker: On CW, I sent you a letter³ which outlined some of our ideas and also draft agreement. I’ve got a joint draft statement that I’d like to give you, and I hope that we can agree on it and issue it while I’m here. Both substantively and politically such a statement would send a very important signal to the rest of the world. (Baker turns over paper⁴) On START, I’d like to go through the proposal I brought. I would like you to understand that it represents some very hard work at the highest levels of the Administration particularly on the President’s part and on my part to move the bureaucracy forward. I don’t want to spend too much time going through the details tonight since I know we can do that tomorrow, but I would like to go through the three issues we said we would resolve and outline our general approach.

On ALCMs, we will propose a package that moves toward your position in nearly every element, e.g., on counting rules, on range thresholds, and on distinguishability.

Shevardnadze: That is very important.

Baker: You will be able to tell your bureaucracy that the United States has come in our direction on range, on distinguishability, and on counting. I am not saying that we have adopted your position on each, but we have certainly moved toward your positions. I hope that when you see the detail you will appreciate our movements because, let me tell you, I have got the scars on my back to show you this took some real effort.

Shevardnadze: You know, I’ve got quite a few of those scars myself.

Baker: On non-deployed missiles, we are ready to endorse your approach and drop all numerical limits on non-deployed missiles with the sole exception of mobiles. And I think that the proposal I am bringing on this is one that you will find acceptable. On telemetry encryption, on data denial, Burt and Nazarkin have closed the gap on this. I hope that they will resolve it here—I assume they will. It is extraordinarily technical.

Shevardnadze: And, also very sensitive.

Baker: I’d like to keep Burt and Nazarkin together and let them resolve it. We won’t have to debate the technical details but if necessary we can produce the political will to resolve the negotiations if need be.

Shevardnadze: Well, on ALCMs, I can’t respond but will do so when we see the actual proposals. On non-deployed missiles and telemetry, I think what you have said provides a good base. We should be able to resolve those two questions while you are here.

Baker: I can get into some of the details now if you’d like. And I could also describe some of our other new positions.

Shevardnadze: Why don’t you.

Baker: I said we wanted to move the whole process forward, and we have come with some other ideas. We have proposed a verification approach on mobile missiles. We have proposed phasing for implementation of a START agreement, and we will also propose treaty duration. Some of these proposals fill the gaps in American positions in START that had not previously been addressed. The point is both the President and I want to move this process forward and want to see a START treaty.

On SLCMs, I know how important this issue is to you, and I recognize you made a very positive move in Wyoming. So I came with a form of declaration that I’d like to give you. I think it responds directly to some of the questions you raised in Wyoming. Also, you have been pressing in Geneva for informal discussions of the negotiating goals beyond the current START agreement. We have been resisting that. We are also ready to begin those talks.

Shevardnadze: This is good news.

Baker: Before I leave Moscow I think it is important to discuss what the marching orders are going to be with the negotiators between now and the next ministerial. We will be prepared to give our ideas in principle on the remaining issues to be resolved and I’d like to hear yours. I’ve got two other issues I’d like to take up.

One is of interest to you, one is of interest to us. The one of interest to you has to do with visits to our radars at Thule and Fylingdales. You raised the possibility of visiting these sites when we were in Wyoming. When I got home, I pursued that in our government. It wasn’t an easy issue for us because it is hard to see how visits by your officials to these sites would put the issue behind us, and many in our government argue that such visits would only make the problem worse. I argued that you would not exploit the visit for that purpose and that it would in fact put the issue behind us. Therefore, I am pleased to tell you that we will meet your request. To get agreement I had to agree to request from you an opportunity for our experts to visit two of your large-scale radars. The reason for that is that we did not want the visits to be seen as a quid-pro-quo for your elimination of Krasnoyarsk which is—as you have acknowledged—a violation. So we want to treat these visits as confidence-building measures just as we have done in the chemical weapons area.

For our part, we propose US visits to radars located near Pechora and Baranovichi. These radars perform similar early warning functions to the radars at Thule and Fylingdales. I am interested in hearing your reaction to the ideas I have put forward across the board on arms control. Then let us have Ambassadors Bartholomew and Karpov go to work. They can report back to us later in the day.

I do want to raise one issue that is a matter of concern to us. President Bush raised in Malta the modernization of your remaining SS–18s. We worry that the modernization will offset and compensate for the 50% reduction. As President Bush said, we view the continuing modernization of SS–18 as inconsistent with the new kind of relations we are trying to forge. Quite apart from that I think they do create a problem for ratification of the treaty. We don’t want to recreate the situation we had with SALT II. Many Senators—both conservatives and liberals—have said to Nazarkin that they can’t understand why you are committing the kinds of resources you are to that program when you have the kind of economic needs that you have. Anyway, let me move on the ALCMs and get into some of the details.

Let me turn over to you the paper that we have on ALCMs⁵ which spells out the details of our approach. As you can see from the paper, we are not able to go with your position on “as equipped” for the counting rule but we are able to modify our position in a way that we think is significant. On the counting rule, we’d like to see an attribution of ten warheads each to the B–52 and B–1 and any future heavy bomber that carries ALCMs. To take care of your concern that our attribution rule would leave room to equip bombers with numbers vastly greater than ten, we propose that we agree that no bomber may be equipped with more than twice the number that might be attributed to them. This would set a ceiling on the maximum number. Under this approach we would attribute eight warheads to each TU–95 and eight to each TU–160. As with the US there would be an attribution of ten for any future heavy bomber that might be constructed.

On distinguishability: we propose that non-nuclear ALCMs be distinguishable from nuclear ones on the basis of external differences observable by National Technical Means and also visible on site inspection. This is the point that moves towards your position. Non-nuclear ALCMs not distinguishable in that manner would be permitted but would be counted as nuclear under overall limits.

Shevardnadze: You are saying that they would be counted against the limits on ALCMs?

Baker: Yes. I am saying that if they are not observable differences they must be counted. For nuclear ALCMs, we would have an exchange of information with respect to the external differences, and we would also exhibit those nuclear ALCMs in a way that they confirm the information and its distinguishable characteristics.

In addition, access to designated weapons storage areas at non-ALCM heavy bomber bases and former heavy bomber bases would be permitted to confirm that any ALCMs present are non-nuclear. There would be a ban on ALCMs with multiple independently targetable nuclear warheads. We would permit inspections of non-ALCM heavy bombers of a type that have been tested with ALCMs to confirm that they are not equipped for ALCMs. Each side would have a continuing right to 115 former heavy bombers outside the START limits for non-nuclear roles. We would permit inspections of former heavy bombers to confirm that they have been converted. There would also be a ban on conversion of aircraft originally constructed as aircraft other than bombers into ALCM carrying heavy bombers. There would not be a 1100 limit on bomber weapons. And there would be no limits on non-deployed ALCMs, SRAMs, and bombs.

There is no need to respond tonight. Tomorrow I will also want to talk to you about cooperation, on non-proliferation, on open skies and on defense and space which I hope is still not a problem between us. I was certainly encouraged by what you said in Wyoming.

Shevardnadze: I won’t comment on all your proposals, but I will give them to our people and they will work on them through the night. My general impression is that there are many reasonable and sensible elements here. Of course, they are going to take some work and discussion with our experts, and we will try to take advantage of this evening.

As far as non-deployed missiles and telemetry are concerned, I am sure we will find answers to these. The verification of mobiles is an issue that can be resolved. I will also welcome your suggestions on the phasing of START reductions. I do believe this is fundamental for both of us and lies at the heart of stability and predictability. I welcome the fact that you are addressing this issue.

As for SLCMs, I will have to take a look at your declaration.

Baker: I will give it to you tomorrow.

Shevardnadze: It remains a very complex issue. I appreciate very much your compromise on the visit to the radars. I will tell you very frankly that the decision to destroy the Krasnoyarsk radar was very hard and the debate was very difficult. Even now, in the press, some are saying we made an unnecessary concession. Your move is, therefore, very important. I understand your interest in having a right to visit the two radars and I’ll have to consult on that, but I hope to be able to give you an answer. To be honest, I don’t know anything about the two radars you mention.

Baker: Don’t worry. I didn’t know and still don’t know anything about the radars and the two in Fylingdales. But your request is reasonable, and I believe we shouldn’t have anything to hide. Nevertheless, this was a knock-down drag-out fight on our side.

One other point that I was going to raise tomorrow. When we were in Wyoming you said you would be completely destroying Krasnoyarsk. Now, however, in the SCC, we are hearing that you plan to take down only half the building. So our bureaucracy is saying that your people at the SCC haven’t gotten the word from Shevardnadze. We have even had a debate about whether you should destroy the foundations of the buildings. The proponents of that argument are saying that it is necessary to do that because it was a violation and therefore the standards for construction have to exceed the standards for destroying legal radars. Obviously, there is a confidence-building need right now. I want to put the Krasnoyarsk issue completely behind us. To do so, I think you have to do what you said you would do in Wyoming and that is completely eliminate the buildings. I want to put this behind us because as you know it has been our policy that we cannot enter into START until Krasnoyarsk is eliminated. I hope there is no difference of opinion on what it means to eliminate the structures.

Shevardnadze: This is not a problem. It will be done just as I said it would be in Wyoming. What I said was the result of a political decision taken at the time. What you have told me will make it easier to carry out and ensure that we carry out the steps that I told you we would.

Baker: I think word should get to your representative at the SCC.

Shevardnadze: Maybe we ought to disband the SCC at some point. Anyway, I will speak to you tomorrow about the SS–18. This is a difficult question. You may not know how difficult it was for us to say at Reykjavik that we would destroy 50% of these missiles. I know that Reagan and Shultz did not expect us to do that. This is a question and an issue that needs to be looked at in a larger context—the context of the SDI program and the ABM treaty. They are all interrelated. We have no vested interest in this missile but it is interconnected. Many things can become clear when we begin our dialogue on strategic stability.

On ALCMs, there are quite a few new elements in your proposal. I am not sure we will agree on all of them. One difficult question is range. But you have made an effort to accommodate us on verification. You have made some important moves but our experts are going to need to study this.

[Omitted here are discussions not related to START.]

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Lot 93D187, Secretary James A. Baker III’s Classified Papers, January 1989–August 1992, JAB Papers Feb 1990. Secret. The meeting took place in the Osobnyak Guest House at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The full memorandum of conversation is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1989–1992, vol. III, Soviet Union, Russia, and Post-Soviet States: High-Level Contacts. Baker arrived in Moscow earlier that day, after flying from Washington to Shannon and Prague on February 6.
2. Not found. See footnote 3, Document 71.
3. In telegram 34575 to Moscow, February 3, 1990, the Department transmitted the text of Baker’s letter to Shevardnadze along with a draft bilateral destruction MOU and instructions to submit both to Karpov or more senior Soviet official in preparation of Baker’s visit. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N900001–0300)
4. Not found. See footnote 3, Document 71.
5. Not found. See footnote 3, Document 71.