Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

33. Note From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Bush¹

Washington, June 19, 1989

Mr. President:

This package is not as formidable as it looks. These are specific fallout decisions stemming from our broad discussions. My suggestions are as follows:

Fundamental Limits: Approve retaining the 1600 limit. (Any required change should come much later in the context of any MIRV limitation proposal.)

Nondeployed Missiles: Option 1, at least until we determine U.S. requirements for nondeployed missiles.

Air Breathing Systems: Option 3, for now. My thought is that we should maintain our current position on this issue until we resolve the de-MIRVing issue, then offer a change to “as equipped” as a “sweetener” for our de-MIRVing proposal.

Mobile ICBMs: Option 1, until Congress acts on your ICBM modernization program (for mobiles) and pending resolution of verification concerns.

Defense and Space

(Testing Rights): Option 1.

(Deployment Rights): Option 1.
(These issues were discussed in the recent NSC meetings.)

Attached to this note is a memo from Cheney setting forth his views on START in general and on these issues in particular (should you wish a detailed explanation of OSD positions.)

Brent Scowcroft²

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council³

Washington, undated

START and Defense and Space Other Issues for Decision

A decision paper on the major START and Defense and Space issues raised in the NSR-14 arms control review has been forwarded for the President’s decision. This paper addresses the remaining issues identified in NSR-14 on which at least one agency believed decisions were required before negotiations resumed.

START—Fundamental Limits

1. 3000–3300 ICBM Warhead Sublimit. All agencies agree that the initial U.S. position when the talks resume should be to retain a sublimit of 3000–3300 warheads on ICBMs. At issue is whether the U.S. negotiator should encourage the Soviets in the belief that we have flexibility on this point.

Discussion

The issue is how rigid we should be in trying to further limit the number of Soviet ICBM warheads. The Soviets have resisted this limit unless SLBM warheads and bomber weapons are similarly limited, which has been unacceptable to us. Arguing against negotiating flexibility on this point is the belief that additional Soviet ICBM warheads would contribute to a first strike capability. Arguing for flexibility is the belief that other constraints to which the Soviets have agreed, especially 4900 warheads and 50% reductions in throwweight are effective, and our proposed ICBM sublimit is not worth the negotiating price necessary to gain Soviet agreement. In addition, JCS believes that any significant change to the existing framework, e.g., limiting or banning MIRVed ICBMs or SLBMs, would require readdressing this issue.

Option 1. Negotiator may indicate flexibility on the 3000–3300 sublimit. (favored by JCS and State)

Option 2. Negotiator will not indicate flexibility on this sublimit. (favored by Ambassador Rowny, OSD, and ACDA for the present)

NSC staff believe that this sublimit is a relatively minor constraint on Soviet forces compared to the 1540/4900 warhead limits and 50% throwweight reduction already agreed. In view of the Soviet opposition in principle to limits that affect ICBMs only, the ICBM warhead sublimit is not worth the likely negotiating cost. Further, it will be more difficult to fall off our position later in the negotiations. We should not remove the sublimit unilaterally, but now is the time to authorize the negotiator to pursue a trade—perhaps in the context of new initiatives—and make his recommendations back to Washington.

NSC Staff Recommendation

That you approve Option 1.⁴

2. Limits on Heavy ICBMs. The Soviets have thus far agreed to cut their SS-18 heavy ICBM force by one-half. At issue is whether to seek further reductions or restrictions on this particular system, or whether to allow flight-testing and modification of this missile in return for equal rights by the U.S.

Discussion

Any flight-testing of heavy ICBMs would complicate our ability to monitor a ban on modernization, and would remove the “withering away” aspect of our current position that satisfies the Jackson amendment “equality” requirement. Although Option 4 may satisfy the letter of the requirement, it could pose a ratification issue because, in practical terms, we will never deploy a heavy ICBM.

The JCS believe that we should not press further limits on heavies (Option 4) because they do not want modernization constraints to be applied to U.S. non-heavy missiles as a negotiating price.

In addition to their positions on the options, State, Ambassador Rowny and ACDA favor authorizing the negotiator to quietly pursue the possibility of additional reductions with the Soviets.

Option 1. Seek the negotiated elimination of all SS-18s. (favored by OSD and Ambassador Rowny, although Ambassador Rowny would not pay a high negotiating price for this)

Option 2. Retain current position, rescind contingency guidance. This would ban heavy ICBM flight testing and ultimately lead to a “withering away” of the Soviet heavy ICBM force. (favored by the DCI; acceptable to OSD and Ambassador Rowny as a fallback)

Option 3. Retain current position, rescind contingency guidance, relax flight test ban in future for further reductions (perhaps by one-half) in the 154 heavy ICBMs. (favored by ACDA as part of a move to permit mobile ICBMs)

Option 4. Retain current contingency guidance, allow testing and modernization of heavy ICBMs in return for comparable rights for U.S.; do not table at this time. (favored by JCS and State)

NSC staff believe that the U.S. should not formally alter our current position until we understand what kind of modernization restriction would replace it. That work has not been done. In addition, it may be desirable to explore further restrictions on SS-18s with the Soviets in the context of other new initiatives, but we are concerned that opening the SS-18 numerical issue in isolation would not be productive and may only unravel an agreement on 50% reductions that is in our interest. Nevertheless, a quiet probe by the negotiator should minimize this risk and may prove useful.

NSC Staff Recommendation

That you approve Option 2 and direct the development of a U.S. position on a modernization definition. The issue of seeking further reductions should be decided in the context of new initiatives, including authority for the negotiator to probe the Soviets quietly in Geneva.⁵

START—Nondeployed Missiles

Missile Destruction. The issue is whether the U.S. should seek a requirement to eliminate (or convert to a space launch vehicle) an ICBM or SLBM whenever a launcher is destroyed.

Discussion

When the U.S. withdrew its position for comprehensive limits on nondeployed missiles, a political concern was raised that START might be criticized for failing to require missile destructions. (The number of missiles that would be destroyed is a function of both the types of nondeployed missiles constrained and how low the numerical limit, neither of which has been determined.) The disadvantage of this requirement is that the U.S. has a need for missiles removed from launchers for such uses as RDT&E boosters, space launch vehicles, operational spares, flight-testing, or conversion to other ballistic missiles. Destroying an expensive missile inventory could compel us to open production lines for the same or similar missiles at additional cost.

The DCI believes that this requirement would have a negligible effect on our ability to monitor the inventory of Soviet nondeployed missiles.

Option 1. Retain the existing U.S. position; do not add an additional treaty requirement that for every launcher destroyed in reducing to new limits, one missile associated with that type of launcher must also be eliminated or converted to other purposes as space launch vehicles. (favored by OSD)

Option 2. Task an interagency study of the best approach, including, where feasible, meeting the objectives set forth above, but do not raise with the Soviets at this time. If a satisfactory approach can be devised, require missile conversion or elimination incident to launcher destruction. (favored by State, JCS, ACDA and Ambassador Rowny)

NSC staff note that no alternative now under consideration by agencies will result in significant INF-style missile destructions, but would force the conversion (rather than storage) of missiles withdrawn from ICBM or SLBM launchers. On balance, the study is worth doing, although we should reserve judgment on the desirability of making a proposal to the Soviets.

NSC Staff Recommendation

That you approve Option 2.⁶

START—Air Breathing Systems

1. ALCM Range. START distinguishes between short-range missiles (which are limited as bombs) and long-range ALCMs. The issue is what range threshold should divide the two classes of cruise missiles.

Discussion

There are two aspects to this issue. First, a range cut-off of 1500 kilometers protects future U.S. options to extend the range of nuclear-armed cruise missiles on both heavy bombers and on tactical aircraft to hedge against improved Soviet air defenses, without having such missiles count as ALCMs under START. Although there are no current programs for nuclear armed cruise missiles with ranges between 600 and 1500 kilometers, some believe there is a clear military requirement to protect the option to deploy such systems in the future. Second, some have argued that the 1,500 km range better protects U.S. options for future conventional cruise missiles, pending resolution of how future nuclear and conventional cruise missile are to be distinguished from each other. (INF essentially treated both nuclear and conventional GLCMs as nuclear-armed and thus subject to the ban.)

Those who support Option 3 believe that Soviet agreement to our other ALCM proposals, including counting rules and nuclear/conventional distinguishability, should be achieved before we relax our range threshold.

The DCI sees no monitoring difference among the options.

Option 1. Accept the Soviet position of a 600 kilometer range cutoff, contingent on resolution of:

— Option 1A. the ALCM distinguishability issue (see issue below); or

— Option 1B. all remaining ALCM issues.

Option 2. Accept a 1000 kilometer range cutoff, contingent on resolution of:

— Option 2A. the ALCM distinguishability issue; or

— Option 2B. all remaining ALCM issues.

Option 3. Maintain the existing U.S. position of a 1500 kilometer range cutoff, but continue to indicate flexibility in return for Soviet acceptance of other elements of our ALCM position, (favored by JCS, State, ACDA and Ambassador Rowny)

Option 4. Maintain the existing U.S. position of a 1500 kilometer range cutoff; do not indicate any flexibility. (favored by OSD)

NSC staff believe that this issue should be considered internally and in the negotiations in close coordination with following issue, ALCM distinguishability. See staff comments on that issue below.

NSC Staff Recommendation

That you approve Option 3.⁷

2. ALCM Distinguishability. We have agreed with the Soviets that all currently existing ALCMs (with the range threshold still unresolved, as noted above) will be considered to be nuclear-armed, and that future conventional ALCMs will either be distinguishable from nuclear-armed cruise missiles by NTM or will be considered to be nuclear-armed. At issue is whether to alter this agreed element in the draft Treaty.

Discussion

In establishing this position, the United States recognized that it provided no assurance against supposed conventional cruise missiles being illegally equipped with nuclear warheads. Some believe this is a serious problem, since it provides the Soviets with an option for deploying nuclear ALCMs disguised as “conventional” cruise missiles (which we could not reliably verify not to be nuclear-armed) on a wide variety of aircraft, thus increasing the threat to the United States. Others believe that the primary consideration is protecting U.S. programs, not constraining Soviet ones.

JCS favor studying the issue because it is not clear that NTM alone will be sufficient to distinguish between conventional and nuclear ALCMs.

The DCI strongly supports altering our position and eliminating the monitoring task of trying to distinguish between nuclear-armed and conventional ALCMs. The Intelligence Community has very little confidence in its ability to determine if a bomber tested with any long-range ALCM was not in fact capable of carrying nuclear-armed ALCMs.

Option 1. Reconsider our basic position on ALCM distinguishability and agree to treat all ALCMS, both nuclear-armed and conventional, over a specified range (1500 kilometers) as nuclear armed. (favored by the DCI)

Option 2. Reaffirm our existing approach to ALCM distinguishability, accepting the drawbacks as the necessary price for avoiding constraints on conventional cruise missiles, (favored by State, OSD and Ambassador Rowny)

Option 3. Reconsider our existing approach. Undertake a study of alternatives. Inform the Soviets that we have the ALCM distinguishability issue under review. (favored by ACDA and JCS)

NSC staff is doubtful that any measures can be found that will give us a meaningful distinction between a nuclear and conventional ALCM capability in Soviet heavy bombers. Details in our current position (e.g., geographic separation of nuclear and conventional ALCMs) are useful confidence building measures, and continued study might identify additional such measures. But the central problem will remain. The U.S. will have to protect its conventional ALCM options with either a range threshold (see previous issue), a distinguishability rule, or accept constraints on these conventional capabilities in order to reduce verification and breakout problems. We should continue to flesh out our distinguishability position and press the Soviets for acceptance of a high range threshold. If the Soviets indicate flexibility on their 600 km. range proposal, we should be prepared in the future to eliminate the distinguishability requirement and treat all long-range ALCMs as nuclear-armed.

NSC Staff Recommendation

That you approve Option 2.⁸

START—Mobile ICBMs

1. Mobile ICBM Sublimit. If the President decides now to change its position and allow mobiles, the issue is how should we deal with the question of a mobile sublimit when START negotiations resume. There is a consensus that, if mobiles are permitted, it is premature to table a specific numerical sublimit. If the President decides to maintain our current position to ban mobile ICBMs, no decisions on this issue (text ends in the middle of page 9) are required at this time.

Discussion

If mobile ICBMs are to be allowed in START, there is consensus that some form of sublimit is appropriate, to constrain Soviet deployment of mobiles to a level no greater than the U.S. plans to deploy. Verification and breakout concerns are not the driving considerations in limiting the number of mobile ICBMs once the number of launchers is several hundred.

One approach on sublimits is to defer the discussion until the Soviets accept our verification scheme. This approach was endorsed by the previous administration. A second approach is to propose a stand alone mobile ICBM sublimit now. Various values of such a sublimit have been considered in the past, with 500–700 warheads being accepted by most agencies.

A third approach is to propose a mobile ICBM sublimit, but to nest it within the 1540 warhead sublimit for heavy ICBMs. The Soviets would be allowed a total of 1540 warheads on heavy ICBMs and mobile ICBMs, of which no more than 500–800 could be on mobile ICBMs. This approach would force the Soviets to trade heavy ICBMs for mobiles, thus forcing tradeoffs between two systems of greatest concern to the United States. If the Soviets accept this approach either the first strike threat from Soviet heavy ICBMs or the number of relocatable targets the United States must hold at risk would be reduced.

On the other hand, some find such an approach difficult to explain since it appears to equate the SS–18, the most destabilizing Soviet system, and mobile systems which some believe are inherently stabilizing. A variant of this approach would focus strictly on MIRVed mobiles as a tradeoff with heavies. Since non-MIRVed mobiles do not present the same breakout threat as do MIRVed mobiles, they would be handled under different sublimits.

If we do not seek a ban on MIRVed mobile ICBMs: a mobile ICBM warhead sublimit as low as 500 warheads would only allow 50 rail garrison Peacekeepers. If we are to protect the forces implied by the President’s ICBM modernization decision, the U.S. proposed sublimit must be sufficiently above 500 warheads to allow for a reasonable Small ICBM deployment. A value of 800 thus appears the minimum the United States could accept and still preserve both programs.

Since the Soviets have proposed a sublimit of 1600 mobile warheads, there is a negotiating incentive for the U.S. to suggest a low number. Thus, some believe 800 warheads is an appropriate initial U.S. proposal if both single and MIRV mobile ICBMs are to be allowed. Others would propose a number as high as 1000 because, if we propose 800 and the Soviets accept, we could lose flexibility with respect to the Small ICBM.

Option 1. Advise the Soviets that, while we expect to propose a mobile ICBM sublimit, and we expect that sublimit to be substantially smaller than the Soviet proposed 1600 sublimit, we are not prepared to discuss specific values until agreement has been reached on a verification approach. (favored by OSD, JCS and Ambassador Rowny)

Option 2. Propose a mobile ICBM sublimit of 800–1000 warheads.

Option 3. Propose a mobile ICBM sublimit of 800–1000 warheads nested within a 1540 warhead sublimit on combined mobile ICBM and heavy ICBM warheads.

Option 4. Propose treating MIRVed and non-MIRVed mobile ICBMs differently:

— Include a sublimit of (500?) warheads on MIRVed mobile ICBMs within the 1540 sublimit on heavy ICBM RVs; (favored by ACDA, but at the range of 400–800 warheads)

— Include a separate sublimit of (300?) warheads on non-MIRVed mobile ICBMs within the 4900 (and 3300) sublimits.

NSC staff agree with the consensus that it is premature to propose to propose a specific numerical sublimit on mobiles.

NSC Staff Recommendation

That you approve Option 1.⁹

If the United States is to seek a ban on MIRV mobile ICBMs¹⁰: a lower value for the sublimit, perhaps 200–500 warheads, may be more appropriate. The United States is unlikely for fiscal reasons to be able to deploy more warheads than this under a MIRV mobile ban when only the single-RV variant of the Small ICBM would be allowed. We may also have a separate deterrence reason to limit the number of Soviet relocatable targets. It is thus in our interest not to allow the Soviets a greater number than the U.S. plans.

Option 1. Advise the Soviets that, in the context of a ban on MIRVed mobiles, we expect to propose a mobile ICBM sublimit, and we expect that sublimit to be substantially smaller than the Soviet proposed 1600 sublimit; we are not prepared to discuss specific values until agreement has been reached on a verification approach. (favored by OSD and Ambassador Rowny)

Option 2. Propose a mobile ICBM sublimit of 300–500 warheads.

Option 3. Propose a mobile ICBM sublimit of 200–300 warheads nested within a 1540 warhead sublimit on combined mobile ICBM and heavy ICBM warheads.

NSC staff agree with the consensus that it is premature to propose to propose a specific numerical sublimit on mobiles.

NSC Staff Recommendation

That you approve Option 1.

2. Movable ICBMs. The issue is whether the U.S. should continue to insist that a START Treaty protect the option to deploy so-called “movable” ICBMs in the future.

Discussion

The United States has explained the concept of movable ICBMs as an alternate approach, different from both mobile ICBMs and silo-based ICBMs, intended to enhance ICBM survivability. The movable ICBM concept involves a large number of low cost vertical shelters, among which a hardened capsule containing an ICBM is rotated. Survivability is gained by denying the Soviets knowledge of which specific shelter among the large number of vertical shelters contains a missile.

We have provided no details to the Soviets and no treaty text. There is as yet no agreed verification approach for such ICBMs.

There is no program within the Department of Defense to develop such ICBMs. Some believe that, now that the President has made an ICBM modernization decision, the United States no longer needs to protect the option of deploying movable ICBMs, and that we should cease attempts to include provisions protecting such an option in START. We would not want to allow the Soviets this option if it would not be exercised by the United States.

Others believe that, until it is clear what the Congress will do, we can not rule out the prospects that we will need to find an alternate solution to both Peacekeeper and small ICBM deployment in order to ensure ICBM survivability. Further, they note that the President’s decision results in only part of the ICBM force being survivable, and that we may wish to increase the survivability of the remainder of the force in future years.

Option 1. Drop further consideration of movable ICBMs in START. (favored by JCS, and Ambassador Rowny)

Option 2. Continue to insist that a future START Treaty include provisions allowing movable ICBMs; defer detailed discussions with the Soviets; develop detailed verification scheme for such ICBMs. (OSD, ACDA, State, pending Congressional reaction to the ICBM modernization package)

NSC staff note that movable ICBM concepts have been studied and rejected by several Administrations for reasons apart from arms control, and there is no evidence that such options will become more attractive in the future. Moreover, the vertical shelter concept that has been discussed recently is far less verifiable than mobile ICBMs because the shelters can be converted to hardened silo launchers rapidly and loaded with nondeployed missiles. Finally, in the unlikely event that the U.S. will want to deploy a transportable ICBM in the future, there is no reason why it cannot be accommodated within our definitions of fixed and mobile ICBMs. We do not need to add the complication of a third category of “movable” ICBMs to our position.

NSC Staff Recommendation

That you approve Option 1.¹¹

START—Mobile ICBM Verification

1. Road Mobile Basing Mode. The issue is whether to alter the current U.S. position to restrict road-mobiles to a large Deployment Area as an aid to verification and whether to eliminate our proposal for a small Restricted Area where mobiles are normally deployed in peacetime.

Discussion

The U.S. approach to verification of road-mobile ICBMs confines such systems to 25 square kilometer Restricted Areas in peacetime except for notified transits or operational dispersals. The U.S. concept includes a Deployment Area which contains several Restricted Areas, but the only function of this larger area is to constrain exercise dispersals. Operational dispersals are not constrained to any area.

The JCS understand that the U.S. verification proposal is compatible with current Small ICBM basing concepts for both the Minuteman basing mode and Southwest basing mode. However, the final basing mode for Small ICBM has not been selected and some possible basing concepts are not compatible with the U.S. verification proposal.

Although the existing U.S. concept could support a form of random periodic movements, some believe it is better suited to Minuteman basing. They believe that a primary rationale for Restricted Areas is to aid in monitoring the number of deployed missiles and launchers.

If the number of missiles/launchers permitted outside the Restricted Area at any one time is small (10% or less), then the IC believes monitoring is improved. Such small numbers may be compatible with training and maintenance requirements for Small ICBM Minuteman Basing, but are inadequate for Southwest Basing, which may require up to 30% out of the Restricted Areas.

Moreover, some believe that it is impossible to assign a maximum percentage that will protect future operational concepts that may be necessary to ensure survivability. Finally, depending on the size and number of Restricted Areas, the area available to each missile may not be sufficient for survivability without dash on warning.

Two approaches have been suggested to address these concerns. One revised approach would eliminate the Restricted Areas in favor of larger Deployment Areas in which road-mobile missiles could operate without restriction. Another approach would eliminate the percentage limit on the number of missiles that could be outside the Restricted Areas at any one time. (Variants of these approaches would not permit missiles outside the larger Deployment Area for operational dispersals.)

Option 1. Retain the existing position confining mobile ICBMs to a small Restricted Area. (favored by JCS and Ambassador Rowny)

Option 2. Alter the existing position to drop the small Restricted Area and adopt a larger Deployment Area. Movement is unrestricted within the Deployment Area and there is no requirement to notify movement within the Deployment Area. (favored by OSD)

— Option 2A. Continue to allow operational dispersals without geographic limit.

— Option 2B. Do not allow any dispersals beyond the Deployment Area. (favored by the DCI, and ACDA as a fallback)

Option 3. Alter the existing position to adopt a larger Deployment Area and very small Restricted Areas (perhaps no larger than missile-operating bases). Movement within the Deployment Area is unrestricted, but changes in the net number of missiles/launchers in each Restricted Area must be pre-notified. The concept of exercise dispersals is eliminated.

— Option 3A. Continue to allow operational dispersals without geographic limit, with post-notification and a stated national security rationale.

— Option 3B. Do not allow any dispersals beyond the Deployment Area. (favored by ACDA, State, and the DCI as a fallback)

NSC staff believe that the analysis in the NSR-14 review was not sufficient to support any of the options. Further work needs to be done, and until then we should not change our position.

NSC Staff Recommendation

That you approve Option 1.¹²

2. Rail Mobile Basing Mode. The issues and options parallel those for the road-mobile issue above: Should we add a Deployment area out of which rail-mobiles cannot go? Should we remove the Garrison concept that restricts rail-mobiles in certain ways?

Discussion

The U.S. approach to verification of rail-mobile ICBMs parallels the approach taken for road-mobile ICBMs, except that there is no provision for a Deployment Area for constraining exercise dispersals. Thus, rail mobiles would be confined to rail garrisons no larger than a specified size (yet to be determined), and would be allowed to leave the garrison for training, maintenance and testing, as well as for dispersals. There are no geographic or other operational limitations on rail-mobile ICBMs when they are taking part in exercise or operational dispersals.

The U.S. approach to rail-mobile verification is consistent with the rail-mobile Peacekeeper, allowing Peacekeeper trains to have access to most of the U.S. rail network. The President’s ICBM modernization decision of April 22, 1989 is consistent with this approach.

However, some are concerned that under the current U.S. proposal, which allows geographically unlimited dispersals from small garrisons, [2 lines not declassified] They also believe that our current approach may detract from stability because it would require dispersal of the force during a crisis for survivability. They believe that the need for such dispersal could be a factor toward inducing a Soviet first strike.

Those who favor the current position note that all of these issues were considered in great detail by the Reagan Administration. They believe the current approach allows for the operational flexibility necessary to ensure survivability in the future while also providing a necessary degree of predictability and force transparency. The Peacekeeper concept requires that the missiles be able to deploy onto the full commercial rail network and blend into the larger commercial train population, forcing the Soviets to barrage the entire network or search the entire network in the hope of employing selective targeting.

Option 1. Retain the existing position allowing rail-mobile ICBMs to depart the rail garrison for training, maintenance, and testing purposes, and for exercise and operational dispersals with notifications, but without geographic limitations. (favored by JCS, OSD, Ambassador Rowny, and by the DCI as a fallback)

Option 2. Alter the existing position to adopt a large Deployment Area with unrestricted movement within that Deployment Area. No dispersals permitted outside the Deployment Area. (favored by both ACDA and DCI as a fallback)

— Option 2A. Provide for Deployment Areas using the civilian rail network limited only by geographic boundaries.

Option 3. Alter the existing position to adopt a large Deployment Area in addition to the small Garrisons. Movement within the Deployment Area is unrestricted, but changes in the net number of missiles/launchers in each Garrison must be pre-notified. The concept of exercise dispersals is eliminated.

— Option 3A. Continue to allow operational dispersals without geographic limit, with post-notification and a stated national security rationale.

— Option 3B. Do not allow any dispersals beyond the Deployment Area. (favored by State, ACDA and the DCI)

NSC staff believe that the analysis in the NSR-14 review was not sufficient to support any of the options. Further work needs to be done, and until then we should not change our position.

NSC Staff Recommendation

That you approve Option 1.¹³

3. Perimeter and Portal Monitoring (PPM). The issue here is whether to review our position and, if so, whether to withdraw it from the negotiating table in the meantime.

Discussion

The current U.S. approach would subject to PPM a subset of the facilities capable of producing rocket motors; namely, plants currently engaged in strategic rocket motor production which also produce a motor at least as large as a mobile first stage. It does not provide for PPM at all production plants which may have critical equipment in place to produce a mobile first stage motor or segment of a motor (these facilities would be subject to suspect site inspection).

Some believe that the current approach is insufficient for effective monitoring and that we should PPM all facilities that have casting and curing pits/chambers of sufficient width and depth to produce an accountable motor or segment (additional 3 U.S. and 3–6 Soviet facilities).

Others believe that the current approach captures the facilities where covert production would be easiest to carry out and that such production at other facilities would require a change in practices that the Soviets could not be confident of hiding from U.S. NTM and short-notice SSI. In this view, the cost of establishing additional PPM sites and the intrusiveness of additional Soviet PPM sites in the U.S. are not justified if we are satisfied with the potential Soviet production facilities included on the SSI list.

Option 1. Retain the existing position for PPM only at facilities that are producing an ICBM or SLBM stage and are also producing any type of motor that exceeds the size of the smallest mobile accountable stage. (favored by the DCI and JCS)

Option 2. Retain the existing position for PPM, but do not seek to engage the Soviets on the issue. If the Soviets press, inform them that the issue is under review in Washington. (favored by State, Ambassador Rowny and ACDA)

Option 3. Inform the Soviets that we are withdrawing our PPM proposal pending a review of our position. (favored by OSD)

NSC staff note that our PPM position will require study in the months ahead as we flesh out the details. The existing position was the subject of much study in the Reagan Administration, but it is possible that a review will conclude that additional facilities, such as missile final assembly plants, should be included. The potential changes are relatively minor and can be introduced at a later time without withdrawing our position.

NSC Staff Recommendation

That you approve Option 2.¹⁴

4. Mandatory SSI. The issue is whether to change the U.S. position on what types of facilities must be subjected to short-notice, mandatory inspections.

Discussion

The existing U.S. proposal would permit mandatory short-notice SSI at facilities on an agreed list, for the purpose of resolving compliance concerns regarding ballistic missile-related activities. This list would focus chiefly on solid rocket motor production facilities. However, no specific proposal has been made to the Soviets, or agreed to in the USG. SSI at all other locations would be subject to a right of refusal by the inspected party, although the refusing party is required to make a “good faith” effort to resolve the concern by other means.

Many believe the agreed list should comprise only solid rocket motor production plants where PPM is not in place. They note that the issue of how to balance the U.S. interest in a comprehensive SSI regime to deter Soviet cheating, with our need to protect sensitive U.S. facilities was the subject of extensive study in the Reagan Administration. Although the existing proposal is not ideal in serving any one of our objectives, it strikes a good balance between our verification and security requirements. It also is consistent with the U.S. constitutional protection against unreasonable search.

Others believe that the list should be substantially expanded to include almost all solid rocket motor production plants that are not subject to PPM, major military storage locations (about 11 U.S. facilities, depending on the definition), and civilian railyards and open areas in which mobile launchers could be located.

Option 1. Retain the existing position on Mandatory SSI. (favored by JCS and the DCI)

Option 2. Retain the existing position on Mandatory SSI, but do not seek to engage the Soviets in Geneva. If the Soviets press, inform them that the issue is under review in Washington. (favored by State, ACDA and Ambassador Rowny)

Option 3. Inform the Soviets that we are withdrawing our Mandatory SSI proposal pending a review of our position. (favored by OSD)

NSC staff note that this issue, too, was the subject of much study in the last Administration. Except for OSD, all agencies are satisfied with our general position, and differ only on the details of which facilities would be put on the list. That work needs to be done, but it can be accomplished under Option 1 and does not require a major review as envisioned in Options 2 or 3. There appears to be no way to reconcile OSD’s broad approach with the intrusiveness concerns of the JCS and DCI. We see no merit in plowing that field again.

NSC Staff Recommendation

That you approve Option 1.¹⁵

5. Right-of-Refusal SSI. There is consensus that we should maintain the current approach to permit SSI at locations not on the mandatory list, subject to a right-of-refusal; if a request is refused, the refusing party is required to make a “good faith” effort to resolve the concern by other means.

NSC staff note that this part of our inspection regime requires more work. We agree with the consensus that the existing position is on the right track and we should not remove our position from the table pending further study.

NSC Staff Recommendation

That you approve the consensus.¹⁶

6. SSI at Facilities Subject to PPM. The issue is whether to allow inspections at facilities subject to PPM, but where the monitoring party has chosen not to install a PPM system.

Discussion

The current U.S. position specifies that such facilities would be subject to either mandatory SSI or right-of-refusal SSI. Prior to entry into force, a list of facilities subject to mandatory SSI would be agreed between the sides. However, procedures for determining which category such facilities would be placed after entry into force have not been developed.

The JCS and State believe that it is desirable to have the right to inspect Soviet facilities we have chosen not to PPM, and that the security risk of such Soviet inspections of U.S. facilities is acceptable. They believe that since the Soviets have more facilities that may be subject to PPM and since the Soviets will insist on equal numbers of PPM sites in the U.S. and Soviet Union, this mandatory SSI right would be to our advantage.

OSD and DCI believe that it makes little sense to offer the Soviets the right to either type of SSI in lieu of PPM since, in their view, we will require continuous monitoring to count Soviet production. They believe the right to SSI would not provide a cost saving to us or aid to verification, but would give the Soviets access to our production techniques for strategic missiles, large space/SDI boosters, and intelligence programs collocated at these facilities, should they choose to exercise the SSI option. OSD further argues that subjecting such facilities to right-of-refusal SSI would severely undermine our ability to prevent covert production, since it is likely that the Soviets would reject requests to inspect plants at which they were cheating.

Option 1. Do not permit SSI at facilities subject to PPM. (favored by OSD and DCI)

Option 2. At a facility subject to PPM, but where the monitoring side decides not to establish a PPM system, negotiate the right to either place that facility on the mandatory SSI list or have it remain subject to PPM in the future. (favored by ACDA)

Option 3. Permit right-of-refusal SSI at facilities subject to PPM, but where the monitoring side decides not to establish a PPM system. (favored by JCS and State)

NSC staff believe that we should stay with our existing position (Option 3) until our PPM position is further developed. At that point we will know whether the JCS fear is well founded and there is a large asymmetry in the number of U.S. and Soviet facilities subject to PPM. If we need to protect specific facilities, we can alter the details of our position as needed. Inevitably, the PPM and SSI negotiations will be conducted on a facility-by-facility basis.

NSC Staff Recommendation

That you approve Option 3.¹⁷

Defense & Space

During the non-withdrawal period, all agencies agree that we should retain our proposal to allow unlimited development, testing, and deployment of space-based sensors. They argue that both the United States and the Soviet Union will be improving their space-based early warning and attack assessment capabilities and that these improvements will make it increasingly difficult for the sides to verify compliance with the ABM Treaty. Finally, they note that the Soviets expressed interest in discussing this proposal further as the negotiations adjourned in November 1988.

NSC staff concur with the interagency consensus.

NSC Staff Recommendation

That you approve affirming the space sensor proposal.¹⁸

Attachment

Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Cheney to President Bush¹⁹

Washington, undated

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT

• U.S. Positions in START and the Defense and Space Talks (U)

(S) The fundamentals of our current approach to the START and Defense and Space negotiations remain sound. In START, while we reserve the right to make changes to improve the agreement, I do not believe that we are ready to alter our positions, particularly on central strategic limits, until we have a better sense of the overall direction of the negotiations and have studied possible new initiatives in detail, beginning with the verification of any new positions. In the Defense and Space Talks, and supporting your decision on SDI, I recommend that we reconfirm our negotiating positions as they have been tabled in Geneva.

(S) Since the initiation of START, the United States has opted for relatively loose constraints on air-breathing systems, to encourage Soviet movement toward these more stabilizing forces, and to allow us the air-launched weapons we need to cover the large and well-defended Soviet target set. That approach remains sound. Therefore, we should maintain the 1500-km. range limit, protect our conventional ALCMs, and continue with the current ALCM counting rule. Like the counting rule for heavy bombers, a substantial discount factor for ALCMs is essential.

(S) One basic premise of the U.S. approach to START has been that Soviet MIRVed ICBMs, especially the heavy SS–18s, are the most threatening element of Soviet strategic forces, because their hard-target-kill capability and vulnerability to attack make them best suited for a first-strike. This basic premise remains correct. At the same time, we must recognize that MIRVing has substantial cost advantages, which have strongly influenced U.S. force structure decisions. In that context, we must vigorously protect our SLBMs from strict START constraints. The question remains open of further restraints on vulnerable, silo-based MIRVed ICBMs, but any initiatives must take into account existing Soviet advantages in single-warhead and mobile ICBMs, and must also avoid downloading provisions that could give the USSR a significant breakout capability. Decisions in this complex and difficult area require considerable further study, and should not be taken now.

(S) One of the most important START issues before you is whether to retain the existing U.S. position on mobile ICBMs. I strongly recommend that you retain the ban, until we agree in Geneva on effective verification, and obtain a firm Congressional commitment to required U.S. mobile deployments. If we agree now to permit mobile ICBMs under START, we will lose all leverage to persuade the USSR to accept effective verification for those systems. Moreover, Congressional support for U.S. mobile ICBMs will increase if we make it clear that we will not accept a START Treaty which gives the USSR a monopoly in those systems. If we rescind the ban on mobile ICBMs now, we would run a real risk that START would result in a unilateral Soviet mobile ICBM force whose limits could not be verified. Such a Treaty could not be ratified.

(S) Mobile ICBMs present the greatest verification problems for START, because of the inherent difficulty of the task and the extent of the cheating threat. However, other important START areas—for example, warhead counts and definitions of new types of ballistic missiles—also pose serious verification concerns. Overall improvements to our proposals for verifying START and limiting Soviet cheating require further analysis. We should redouble our efforts to find means for effectively verifying permitted strategic forces.

(S) Our current position in the Defense and Space Talks is designed to preserve full SDI testing rights during the period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, and to preserve our options to deploy defenses at the end of that period. Thus, our current DST position fully supports your SDI decision, and I strongly recommend that you reaffirm it. That would send a strong signal to the Soviet Union regarding your commitment to the SDI and to eventual defenses, and lead to a Defense and Space Treaty which facilitates both the development of defensive options and the deployment of defenses when they are ready.

(S) The Soviet Union claims that our goals in START and Defense and Space are incompatible. In fact, just the opposite is true. The SDI program helps to preserve stability by deterring the Soviets from breaking out of the ABM Treaty. Over the longer term, defenses may contribute more directly to maintaining a robust deterrent against qualitative Soviet force improvements that cannot be constrained by START. We must not accept a START Treaty at the expense of the SDI. Neither can we accept inadequacies or inequities in START on the assumption that defenses or other future force improvements will eventually redress them.

(U) The attachment at TAB A provides my views on the specific START and Defense and Space issues that have been considered.

Dick

Tab A

Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense²⁰

Washington, undated

Summary of OSD Positions on DST/START

DST 001:

U.S. Testing Rights—OSD supports Option 1 which would reaffirm our current position. OSD would not negotiate a new space-testing assurance.

DST 002:

Deployment Rights—OSD supports Option 1, to reaffirm the existing U.S. position.

Fundamental Limits:

Issue 1—OSD supports consensus position to retain 1,600 limit on ballistic missiles and heavy bombers.

Issue 2—OSD would not show any flexibility on the current 3,000–3,300 ICBM warhead sublimit.

Issue 3—OSD supports Option 1, to ban heavy ICBMs. As a fallback position, OSD would permit heavy ICBMs, but ban their modernization and flight-testing.

Nondeployed Missiles:

Issue 1—OSD supports Option 1, to require numerical limits on mobile ICBMs, heavy ICBMs, modern ICBMs (including SS–17 and 19) and all future types of ICBMs or SLBMs.

Issue 2—OSD supports Option 1, to retain the existing U.S. position not to require destruction or conversion of one missile for every associated launcher that is destroyed.

Air Breathing Systems:

Counting Rules—OSD supports Option 3, to make no change in the existing U.S. position, and retain the existing ALCM counting rule attributing 10 ALCMs to each ALCM-carrying heavy bomber.

ALCM Range—OSD supports Option 4, to maintain 1,500 km range cutoff.

ALCM Distinguishability—OSD supports Option 2, to reaffirm our existing approach and to avoid constraints on conventional cruise missiles.

Mobile ICBMs:

Issues 1/2—OSD supports Option 1, to maintain our existing ban on mobile ICBMs.

Issue 3—If the ban on mobile ICBMs is rescinded, OSD supports Option 1 on mobile ICBM sublimits (whether or not MIRVed mobiles are permitted), not to discuss specific mobile ICBM sublimit numbers until agreement has been reached on a verification approach.

Issue 4—OSD supports Option 2, to protect U.S. options with regard to potential deployment of movable ICBMs.

Mobile ICBM Verification

Issue 1—OSD supports the Option 2 Deployment Area concept for Road-Mobile ICBM basing, as it is most consistent with survivability of a Small ICBM force.

Issue 2—OSD supports the Option 1 rail garrison concept for Rail-Mobile ICBM basing as it is most consistent with Peacekeeper rail garrison requirements.

Issue 3—OSD has not taken a position on the issue of Permeter/Portal Monitoring (PPM), pending a decision on permitting mobile ICBMs. If the mobiles ban is rescinded, OSD would strongly support Option 3.

Issue 4—On Mandatory Suspect-Site Inspection (SSI), OSD has not taken a position on this issue, pending a decision on permitting mobile ICBMs. If the mobiles ban is rescinded, OSD would strongly support Option 3.

Issue 5—On Right-of-Refusal SSI, OSD has not taken a position on this issue, pending a decision on permitting mobile ICBMs.

Issue 6—OSD supports Option 1, not to allow SSI at places where PPM is an option but is not chosen.

DST 001; Assuring U.S. Testing Rights

(S) Our current position regarding U.S. testing rights supports the President’s decision to maintain the original objectives of the SDI program and should be affirmed. The Department of Defense can execute the President’s guidance on SDI within the ABM Treaty if we preserve our existing rights under the ABM Treaty and as agreed at the Washington Summit. There is no activity in the SDI program during the specified period of non-withdrawal which compels the U.S. to enter into a renegotiation of the terms of the ABM Treaty, which would inevitably result from a negotiation on the U.S. unilateral assurance. In the event of a decision offer up our testing rights for renegotiation, we would have to anticipate that this process would result in restrictions on the SDI program beyond those we accepted in 1972, thus undercutting the President’s decision on SDI.

(S) Furthermore, the alternative to our current position suggests that renegotiation of ABM Treaty obligations is the only way in which we can gain explicit assurance of testing rights which we have had since 1972. OSD flatly rejects this proposition. From the perspective of OSD, the United States is not interested in modifying the ABM Treaty to conduct prohibited tests. We are interested in having the Soviets acknowledge our existing rights to conduct tests permitted by the ABM Treaty. Finally, as a point of principle, the President’s legal freedom of action with regard to SDI testing, as represented by our current position, should be preserved apart from an immediate desire to exercise that freedom and apart from any putative political benefit which sacrificing the President’s freedom might have in Congress.

DST 002: Rights after the Non-Withdrawal Period

(S) The goals of the SDI program are unchanged: to produce options to deploy effective defenses against ballistic missiles at the earliest opportunity. It follows that our current DST objective remains valid. The current U.S. position in DST was designed to support a strong SDI program by maximizing flexibility in its development and testing phase and by removing potential political obstacles to the deployment of ballistic missiles in the future.

(S) It has been improperly suggested that our current DST position regarding deployment rights provides the Soviet Union with a deployment opportunity or right which it does not already have, or that it may increase the possibility of a unilateral, near-term Soviet deployment of strategic defenses. Under Article XV of the ABM Treaty, the Soviet Union already has all the legal rights it needs to deploy defenses. Technically, the United States enjoys the same legal rights, but using this right would pose a serious political barrier that would not be experienced by the Soviet Union. Eliminating this practical inequity would have little effect on Soviet deployment options, but could be essential in providing the United States with a meaningful deployment option. Moreover, even if the Soviet Union did not have deployment rights under the ABM Treaty, the history of Soviet violations of arms control agreements demonstrates that the lack of such rights would not deter the Soviet Union from deploying defenses. Because the Soviet Union makes military decisions less on the basis of legal limitations than on that of military advantage, the best means of countering the possibility of a near-term Soviet defense is by pursuing an effective SDI program and a fully supportive Defense and Space position.

(S) Additionally, we should point out that alternatives to our current position of making explicit our freedom to deploy would give up what we clearly achieved at the Washington Summit. The freedom to deploy without further reference to the ABM Treaty was an element in the quid pro quo agreed at the Washington Summit. We would be profligate in the extreme if we were to discard hard-fought concessions from the Soviet Union. Given the President’s stated position on the objectives of the SDI, we must establish our right to deploy strategic defenses without further reference to the ABM Treaty. Thus, we should reaffirm our current position.

Fundamental Limits

(S) With regard to the fundamental limits issues in dispute, OSD supports Option 1 with regard to heavy ICBMs, and would continue U.S. negotiating pressure on the 3,000–3300 ICBM warhead sublimit. OSD believes that our fundamental START objectives of enhancing stability requires above all that we seek reductions in those elements of the Soviet strategic force that threaten a first strike.

(S) The fact that the Soviet Union is prepared to devote almost one-third of the ballistic missile warheads allowed under START to their heavy ICBMs, a force that has no significant second-strike capability but unmatched first-strike potential, is disturbing. START should not allow this, and should ban heavy ICBMs. At a minimum, START must prohibit heavy ICBM modernization. Changing our position to allow Soviet modernization of their heavy ICBMs would greatly reduce the survivability of our ICBM force.

(S) For the foreseeable future Soviet heavy ICBMs will constitute the only significant threat to our ICBM silos. The [2½ lines not declassified] If flight testing and modernization are prohibited, U.S. silo survivability will increase. If heavy ICBMs are banned and rapidly eliminated, the survivability of our silos will substantially increase. There is no dispute over these facts in the intelligence community.

Non-Deployed Missiles

(S) With regard to the limitation of non-deployed missiles (NDMs), OSD supports Option 1. OSD also supports Option 1 with regard to destruction of missiles from dismantled launchers. OSD notes that the NIEs on Soviet strategic forces have long recognized the existence and significance of a Soviet ICBM refire potential. It could be more significant under START. Furthermore, the use of soft-site launchers as a breakout mechanism will be facilitated if large highly fractionated ICBMs are not numerically limited. Absent NDM limits, the agreed START reductions themselves would add about 650 large MIRVed NDMs to the Soviet arsenal. The OSD option will have virtually no effect on the United States for the next two decades simply because we have no ICBM refire plans and do not plan large numbers of mobile NDMs.

(S) Requiring the destruction of one missile per launcher destroyed will negate the advantage to the U.S. of not limiting all NDMs, and yet would permit the Soviets to retain all of their refire missiles and to build more.

Air Breathing Systems

(S) OSD supports Option 3 with respect to the ALCM counting rule, Option 4 with respect to the ALCM range threshold, and Option 2 with regard to ALCM distinguishability. The United States requires substantial discounting of all types of air delivered weapons to effectively target the Soviet military target base, which is harder and more numerous than is the U.S. target base. Deep ALCM discounting is also necessary because of the massive and unlimited Soviet air defense system, that is certain to improve with time.

(S) The range definition is vital in preserving our theater and strategic options and in hedging against unexpected advances in Soviet air defenses. The Soviet 600 km number is highly asymmetric in the Soviets’ favor due to geo-political and force structure differences.

(S) On ALCM distinguishability, OSD is strongly opposed to sacrificing our options for conventional ALCMs to fashion an ineffective but cosmetic verification regime for ALCMs. The 600 km range definition combined with the distinguishability requirement could ban the U.S. Tacit Rainbow conventional ALCM and other future systems.

Mobile ICBMs

(S) OSD supports Option 1, on the issue of whether to fall off our proposed ban on mobiles. If we decided to shift our position on banning mobiles, OSD supports Option 1 with regard to mobile ICBM sublimits, whether or not MIRVed mobiles are permitted. If mobiles are allowed, and sublimits are discussed, OSD would propose a limit of no more than 500–800 warheads nested in the 1,540 limit on heavy ICBM warheads. On moveable ICBMs, OSD supports Option 2.

(S) OSD strongly supports retaining our current position with regard to banning mobiles. The U.S. should retain that ban unless and until we have agreed with the USSR on effective mobile verification and achieved a firm Congressional commitment to U.S. mobile deployment. Both CIA and DIA believe that the currently tabled verification regime is inadequate to effectively verify mobiles. Absent agreement on an effective verification regime prior to shifting our position toward allowing mobiles, U.S. negotiating leverage would be drastically reduced and the way opened for large-scale Soviet cheating. A START Treaty that permitted mobiles without effective verification could not be ratified.

(S) If the U.S. does abandon the mobiles ban, OSD opposes tabling a number for allowed mobile warheads until we have agreed with the Soviets on an effective verification regime for mobile ICBMs.

(S) Our substantive position with regard to a limit on mobiles, if an effective verification regime can be worked out, would be to nest mobile ICBMs under the limit on heavy ICBMs thereby forcing the Soviets to reduce their heavy ICBM force if they deploy mobiles. If MIRVed mobiles are allowed, the limit should be 500–800. If they are not, the limit should be 300. Higher limits would assure asymmetry in the Soviet Union’s favor.

(S) Since the future of the U.S. mobile program is unclear, we must keep our options open with regard to ICBM basing modes. Thus, OSD supports retaining the option of MPS-type basing regimes as part of our START proposal.

Mobile ICBM Verification

(S) Given that there is no significant difference in monitoring confidence achievable under the road-mobile basing mode options, OSD believes the decision should focus on U.S. requirements for mobile ICBM survivability. OSD supports the Option 2 Deployment Area concept for Road-Mobile ICBM Basing Modes as most consistent with preserving basing options for a Small ICBM force. While the current approach—Option 1—is compatible with Minuteman basing, it would not allow unnotified random movement throughout the Southwest basing area. If the Deployment Areas are sufficiently large to permit operational dispersals, OSD can accept Option 2B.

(S) On the issue of Rail-Mobile ICBM Basing Modes, OSD supports the Option 1 rail garrison concept as most consistent with anticipated US requirements for Peacekeeper Rail Garrison. The alternatives will not improve verifiability but will limit flexibility and survivability. We do not have a random movement concept for Peacekeeper Rail Garrison and plan no movement at all during normal peacetime operations, except for maintenance. However, Peacekeeper Rail Garrison will require access to the entire US rail network in order to survive.

(S) OSD has not taken a position on the issue of Perimeter and Portal Monitoring (PPM), pending a decision on whether to permit mobile ICBMs. If the mobiles ban is rescinded, OSD would strongly support Option 3—inform the Soviets that we are withdrawing our proposal pending a review of our position. We believe that the current U.S. approach to PPM would not preclude successful Soviet cheating and the Suspect Site Inspection (SSI) required could be as costly and far more intrusive than PPM.

(S) OSD has not taken a position on Mandatory SSI, pending a decision on whether to permit mobile ICBMs. If the ban is rescinded, OSD would support Option 3—inform the Soviets that we are withdrawing our proposal pending a review of our position.

(S) OSD has not taken a position on Right-of-Refusal SSI, pending a decision on whether to permit mobile ICBMs.

(S) On the issue of SSI at facilities subject to PPM, OSD supports Option 1. We should not allow the Soviets intrusive access to our facilities just because they do not want to establish PPM at them.

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council²¹

Washington, undated

Issues for Decision
START and Defense and Space

As you directed in NSR 14, agencies have undertaken a review of U.S. positions in the START and Defense & Space negotiations. In the course of that review, issues were identified on which at least one agency believed decisions were required before negotiations resumed. The attached discussion papers on these issues have been approved by the Deputies Committee as the basis for decision. This paper summarizes the major issues.

Unless you decide otherwise, all of the current U.S. negotiating positions on other START issues will be maintained, and the U.S. will not reopen any issues on which agreement with the Soviets already has been reached. I will be coming to you separately if I have any recommendations for change in either area. Possible new initiatives in START also will be sent to you separately.

START—Fundamental Limits

1600 Strategic Delivery Vehicle Limit. All agencies agree that the U.S. should retain the existing limit of 1600 strategic delivery vehicles (i.e., ballistic missiles and bombers). JCS believes that any significant change to the existing framework, e.g., limiting or banning MIRVed ICBMs or SLBMs, would require readdressing this issue.

Decision²²

START—Nondeployed Missiles (NDMs)

Numerical Limits on Nondeployed Missiles. The basic issue is whether and how to limit nondeployed ICBMs and SLBMs.²³

Discussion

Non-deployed missiles can pose a threat if used to reload mobile or fixed launchers, or used on makeshift above-ground launchers erected in a crisis. All agree that mobile missiles and missiles that are designed to be easily transported pose the most significant threat. Options 1 and 2 are more conservative in attempting to capture a broad range of non-deployed missiles that might be launched in a crisis. Options 3 and 4 concentrate on constraining Soviet mobile-capable missiles that concern us most. The JCS favor Option 6 (or Option 5 as a fallback), arguing that numerical limits low enough to constrain the Soviets are not worth the price in terms of forcing U.S. production stretch-outs, raising procurement costs significantly, and affecting other “operational support” practices.

The following options range from including numerical NDM limits on most ballistic missiles to a position that would not numerically limit any NDMs.

Option 1. Require numerical limits on nondeployed mobile ICBMs, heavy ICBMs, modern ICBMs (including SS-17 and 19), and all future types of ICBMs or SLBMs. (favored by OSD and Ambassador Rowny)

Includes the SS-17, 18, 19, 24 and 25, Peacekeeper, Small ICBM, and all future systems; intended to avoid inclusion of the D–5.

Option 2. Require numerical limits on nondeployed mobile ICBMs, heavy ICBMs, and modern ICBMs (excluding SS-17 and 19). (Current position)

Includes SS-18, 24 and 25, Peacekeeper, Small ICBM, and any future systems meeting the “modern ICBM” definition.

Option 3. Require numerical limits on nondeployed mobile ICBMs and modern ICBMs and SLBMs (excluding SS-17 and SS-19). (favored by ACDA.)

Includes SS-24 and 25, Peacekeeper, Small ICBM, and any future modern SLBMs or ICBMs.

Option 4. Require numerical limits on nondeployed mobile ICBMs and “modern” ICBMs (excluding SS-17 and 19). (favored by State and preferred by the DCI, although any option 1–5 would be acceptable to the DCI)

Includes SS-24 and 25, Peacekeeper, Small ICBM, and any future systems meeting a definition of “modern ICBM” which would be modified to capture only ICBMs that are transported fully fueled.

Option 5. Require numerical limits on nondeployed ICBMs that have been deployed in a mobile mode. (favored by JCS as a fallback)

Includes SS-24 and 25, Peacekeeper (if deployed in a mobile mode), Small ICBM, and any future mobile ICBMs.

Option 6. Do not require numerical limits on any nondeployed missiles. (favored by JCS)

Decision

START—Air Breathing Systems

Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) Counting Rules. The issue is how to determine the number of ALCMs that would count against the 6000 weapon limit.

Discussion²⁴

The current U.S. position is to attribute 10 ALCMs to each heavy bomber that is equipped to carry ALCMs, no matter how many ALCMs that bomber actually carries. Some have raised the question of whether our current position of under-countering cruise missile in this way would favor the Soviets rather than the U.S. in the long run, given the asymmetries in air defenses. Others argue that, while the Soviets appear to be well positioned to take advantage of our current position, encouraging greater Soviet reliance on air-breathing systems has been a central goal of the U.S. START position. Moreover, keeping open options for deploying more ALCMs under START could hedge against uncertainties in the B–2 program. Finally, they note that our current position sidesteps some difficult verification problems.

The JCS have proposed to change our position to an “as equipped” rule along the lines of what the Soviets have proposed. (Option 1). This would mean that we would attempt to count the number of ALCMs actually deployed, but it would not substantially improve verification unless bombers are equipped for a number of ALCMs close to their maximum payload capacity. For example, U.S. B–52s might be “equipped for” 10 ALCMs, but potentially could be converted rapidly to carry 20 ALCMs. A similar Soviet capability could cause us major verification headaches. However, counting B–52s at 20 ALCMs would drastically reduce the cruise missile force we could deploy under START and is not envisioned by any of the options.

Eliminating all limits on ALCMs (Option 5) would remove the verification difficulty, but would be seen by the Soviets and publicly as a major step backward in the negotiations, which could lead, if we persisted, to an unraveling of the counting rule for bombs and short-range air-to-surface missiles and the basic numerical limits.

Option 1. Accept the Soviet demand to count the number of ALCMs each heavy bomber is equipped to carry. (favored by JCS)

Option 2. Retain the existing U.S. position to attribute ten ALCMs for each heavy bomber equipped for ALCMs, regardless of how many ALCMs it can carry, but add a limit on the maximum ALCM carrying capability of individual bombers. (favored by State, DCI fallback)

Option 3. Make no change to the U.S. position on counting rules; retain the existing ALCM attribution rule of ten per heavy bomber. (favored by ACDA and Ambassador Rowny, DCI fallback)

Option 4. Return to the earlier U.S. position that each heavy bomber equipped for ALCMs should count as six warheads, regardless of the number actually carried (favored by OSD).

Option 5. Eliminate all limits on ALCMs, retaining only an overall limit on heavy bombers. (favored by the DCI)

Decision²⁵

START—Mobile ICBMs

Allowing Mobile ICBMs. You have proposed to Congress that we deploy two mobile missiles. Our current START position, however, would ban all mobile ICBMs. The issue is whether and when to drop our proposed START ban on mobile missiles. If we do alter the ban, a second decision is needed on what constraints, if any, to impose on mobile ICBMs. Your decision on this issue could be affected by possible new initiatives you might propose in START.

Discussion

Several arguments have been advanced to support a shift in our proposed ban on mobiles in START. One, is the fundamental contradiction between our modernization plans to deploy two kinds of mobile missiles and our START proposal to ban them. Some see a similar contradiction between our START goal of enhancing stability and our proposal to ban mobile missiles that enhance stability through increased ICBM survivability. In an era of tight defense budgets, arguments that we need to build these expensive systems in order to bargain them away may fall on increasingly deaf ears.

Others argue that we should maintain our current START position to ban mobile missiles at least until we are more confident that Congress will support rail-garrison MX and/or the new road-mobile ICBM on a sustained basis. They also assert that we should keep the ban in place until we have a devised an acceptable substitute that protects our modernization program and meets our verification requirements.

If you do decide to drop our current ban, there are two broad alternatives. One would permit both sides to deploy rail-mobile and road-mobile ICBMs (Option 3), subject to numerical limits and other restrictions. This alternative would allow the Soviets to keep both of the mobile ICBMs they are now deploying, and would allow us to proceed with both of the mobile missile programs you have proposed to Congress. It would, however, pose the most difficult verification problems. ACDA supports this option along with advance consultations on the Hill to ensure support for U.S. mobile ICBM programs.

The second alternative (Option 2) would permit mobile ICBMs that carry only one warhead, but would ban mobile missiles carrying multiple warheads (MIRVs). This option would allow us to proceed with our new road-mobile “Midgetman” ICBM and the Soviets to retain their SS–25 missile. The rebasing of the MX missile from silos to trains that you recently proposed to Congress would be prohibited, as would the Soviet SS–24 rail-mobile missile.

Many argue that the military risks associated with MIRVed mobiles are greater because for every Soviet missile that goes undetected, ten warheads could have been covertly added to the Soviet strategic force. They argue that permitting single warhead mobile missiles and prohibiting MIRVed mobile missiles is the best way to reconcile our competing objectives of enhanced ICBM survivability and effective verification of a START Treaty. They also believe that this alternative would strengthen support for the ICBM modernization program that is in trouble on the Hill.

Others argue that a ban on MIRVed mobiles would mean that the U.S. would not be able to deploy a mobile ICBM until the Midgetman was ready in the mid-to-late 1990s. They also worry about the affordability of a mobile ICBM force composed exclusively of expensive single-warhead missiles, and about the credibility of our deterrent if budget constraints restrict us to a very small number. Finally, they fear that a START proposal that would ban rail-garrison MX will break apart the Congressional coalition and lead to the defeat of both of your mobile ICBM programs.

Option 1. Maintain a formal ban on mobile ICBMs pending resolution of our verification concerns. (favored by OSD, JCS, State and Ambassador Rowny)

Option 2. Propose a ban on all MIRV mobile ICBMs, while allowing single warhead mobiles, subject to appropriate sublimits.

Option 3. Modify the U.S. position to allow both single-warhead and MIRVed mobile ICBMs, subject to appropriate sublimits (favored by ACDA).

Decision²⁶

Defense & Space

In Defense & Space you face two issues: (1) options to protect our right to develop and test SDI within the “broad interpretation” of the ABM Treaty during a period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty; and, (2) options to protect a right to deploy defenses after the non-withdrawal period.

1. Testing Rights During a Non-withdrawal Period. The issue is how best to guarantee U.S. rights to conduct SDI testing in space.

Option 1. Our current position. It provides a unilateral U.S. assurance that the number of satellites orbited for ABM weapons testing at any one time will not exceed 15. Further, the U.S. and the Soviet Union would agree to specific notification procedures regarding those satellites. (favored by State, OSD, ACDA, Amb. Rowny, and the Defense & Space Negotiator)

This package is intended to address stated Soviet concerns that U.S. ABM testing in space could become de facto deployment. It is designed to be fully consistent with the “broad interpretation” of the ABM Treaty and thus would not require negotiating any amendments to the ABM Treaty.

The U.S has held that if the Soviets agree to a Treaty requiring notification of ABM tests in space, it would demonstrate understanding and acceptance of the U.S. position that ABM testing in space is permitted under the ABM Treaty.

Those who support this option believe that it would: gain implicit Soviet acknowledgment of certain ABM Treaty testing rights during the non-withdrawal period; reduce treaty interpretation debates during and after ratification, and satisfy the stated Soviet concerns. They argue further that the U.S. completed its Defense & Space position only in the last round of negotiations, and that we have not yet even had an opportunity to explain fully the position to the Soviets.

Option 2. Negotiate an explicit agreement based on the terms of what is now the U.S. unilateral assurance. Seek agreement to permit testing in space of all ABM weapons, including those not permitted under the “broad interpretation” of the ABM Treaty. (favored by JCS)

If successful, the option could provide better protection for U.S. testing rights, constrain Soviet as well as U.S. activities, and counter congressional efforts to legislate restrictions on SDI tests. However, some believe that it is unlikely that the Soviets would accept this proposal and worry that placing it on the table could undermine our claim that we are already entitled to test in space under the “broad interpretation” of the ABM Treaty.

Those who support this option argue that a unilateral testing assurance does not provide a common U.S.-Soviet understanding of what is and is not allowed during the non-withdrawal period, and worry that it would constrain the U.S. without constraining the Soviets. Finally, they argue that such an approach would obviate the debate over the “broad interpretation” of the ABM Treaty, and would discourage Congressional efforts to legislate restrictions on SDI testing.

Decision²⁷

2. Deployment Rights After a Non-Withdrawal Period. This issue is whether the U.S. should insist on an automatic right to deploy SDI at any time after the agreement of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.

Option 1. Our current position. It provides that ABM Treaty provisions (other than those covering withdrawal rights from the Treaty) would continue after the non-withdrawal period, until six months after a side gave notice of its intention to deploy defenses. It would also explicitly give the sides the right to deploy defenses, after a non-withdrawal period and such notice. (favored by State, OSD, ACDA, Amb. Rowny, and the Defense & Space Negotiator)

Those who support this option believe that we should continue to build on the Washington Summit Joint Statement (WSJS) in which President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev agreed that each side would be free to choose its course of action. They also argue that clarifying the WSJS language will avoid interpretation debates after ratification. Finally, they believe that this provision is necessary to redress the fact that the U.S. could face great political difficulty in withdrawing from the ABM Treaty (which allows for withdrawal under certain circumstances on six months notice) in order to deploy defenses, while the Soviet Union is under no such constraints.

Option 2. Revise U.S. position to create a substantial interval (e.g. two years) between the time a side announced its decision to deploy and when it could actually begin deployments. NSC staff has inferred this Option from JCS statements; the JCS has not submitted a formal proposal.) (favored by JCS)

Those who support this option are concerned that the current U.S. position could imply to the Soviets that the U.S. will go beyond the ABM Treaty on a certain date, and push the Soviets to do the same, when in fact the U.S. may not then be prepared to deploy ABM defenses for political, technical, or budgetary reasons. In that event we could find ourselves in a situation in which the Soviets deploy defenses, but we do not.

Decision²⁸

1. Source: George H.W. Bush Library, Bush Presidential Records, National Security Council, H-Files, NSR Files, OA/ID 90006–029, NSR-14—April 03, 1989—Review of U.S. Arms Control Policies [5]. Secret. Copied to Quayle and Sununu. A stamped notation indicates Bush saw the memorandum; an unknown hand wrote “6/20/89” beneath the notation.
2. Scowcroft initialed the note “BS” above his typed signature.
3. Secret.
4. Scowcroft initialed his approval.
5. Scowcroft initialed his approval.
6. Scowcroft initialed his approval.
7. Beneath this sentence Scowcroft wrote: “Let Burt be the judge of moving between Options 3 and 4, but stay closer to 4 until the Soviets show signs that flexibility might be promising.”
8. Scowcroft initialed his approval.
9. Scowcroft initialed his approval.
10. Scowcroft drew a slash through this paragraph and options, and wrote: “we should not be discussing this option with the Soviets unless other prior decisions are made.”
11. Scowcroft initialed his approval.
12. Scowcroft initialed his approval and wrote: “But only pending a more thorough review of other options.”
13. Scowcroft initialed his approval and wrote: “same as for road mobile.”
14. Scowcroft initialed his approval
15. Scowcroft wrote “Option 2” in the box marked “Disapprove.”
16. Scowcroft initialed his approval.
17. Scowcroft initialed his approval.
18. Scowcroft initialed his approval.
19. Secret.
20. Secret.
21. Secret.
22. Bush indicated his approval.
23. Bush drew two underlines beneath “ICBMs” and “SLBMs.”
24. Bush indicated his approval of Option 1.
25. Bush indicated his approval of Option 3.
26. Bush indicated his approval of Option 1.
27. Bush indicated his approval of Option 1.
28. Bush indicated his approval of Option 1.