Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

32. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Bush¹

Washington, June 14, 1989

MEETING WITH THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

DATE: June 15, 1989

LOCATION: Cabinet Room

TIME: 3:00 p.m.–4:00 p.m.

I. PURPOSE

For your advisors to review major issues in START in preparation for the resumption of negotiations on June 19, 1989. A background paper (Tab A) has been prepared to assist in preparing for this meeting.

II. BACKGROUND

You have previously held NSC meetings that focused on our positions in the Defense and Space negotiations and the objectives underlying our approach in START. I recommend that we use this meeting to briefly review our past NSC discussion on START and address the principal areas where you need to consider alternatives now: mobile ICBMs, nondeployed missiles and ALCMs.

Objectives. In START we are pursuing an arms control agreement that supports our overarching security objective of maintaining a stable, effective nuclear deterrent. Our goal in START should be stability and reduced risk of war, not reductions, per se.

Verification affects every limit in START and will prove to be the most controversial issue in the ratification debate. The fundamental issue is whether a START treaty is in our interest even though we can not detect all cheating. Our current verification approach is heavily weighted toward a standard that no undetected cheating is acceptable.

An alternative approach to verification would explicitly consider the military risks posed by potential cheating were it to occur. Such an approach requires a “military risk” assessment for each case. JCS is in the best position to perform such analyses and to testify about them during ratification hearings.

SLCM. The Soviets have told us repeatedly that our position of no limits on SLCMs is a show-stopper—they repeated that message in Moscow last month. The time will come when we have to move to our bottom line.² We need to do our homework on SLCMs. On an issue this complicated we need to begin to sort out our priorities and interests.

Mobile ICBMs. The U.S. has proposed a ban on mobile ICBMs largely out of concern that our inability to count accurately Soviet mobiles could lead to a militarily significant problem if the Soviets hid missiles and launchers for deployment in a crisis. Recently, you signaled a major strategic commitment to mobile ICBMs in your decision to fund the rail-garrison MX and road-mobile Small ICBM. You need to decide if we should drop our ban and, if so, how.³ Major considerations are: how to help build a Hill consensus on MX and Midgetman; how to protect ratification prospects given uncertain future of ICBM programs; do we need to strengthen the current verification scheme on the table in Geneva; and are there interim measures we should propose to mitigate our concerns, especially if there is a considerable delay in completing a Treaty?

Nondeployed Missiles. An issue that has become closely related to mobile ICBM limits is how to constrain missiles which could be used for refires or to break out of treaty limits in a crisis—so-called nondeployed missiles.⁴ Verification is important; [2½ lines not declassified] There are two issues here. First, what types of nondeployed missiles are we most concerned about: just mobile missiles or all missiles that give the Soviets some potential to cheat? The second issue is, how do we trade off our need for nondeployed missiles as test missiles and spares against our desire to constrain the Soviets? Low limits could help constrain Soviet cheating but significantly add to the costs we have to pay to support a reliable missile force.

ALCMs. There are a number of related issues here, but the most important is how to count ALCMs deployed on bombers. The U.S. has proposed that each side specify which heavy bombers can carry ALCMs. Each of those bombers would then count as ten warheads under the 6000 limit, regardless of its true capacity to carry ALCMs or its actual ALCM load. This position sidesteps the need to verify actual ALCM loadings, which could change rapidly, and permits us great flexibility. However, the Soviets claim that our attribution rule is unfair; they propose to count each bomber based on the maximum number of ALCMs they are capable of carrying.

Our current position tends to undercount ALCMs and therefore may encourage larger ALCM forces. How far should we go in encouraging greater Soviet reliance on ALCMs? If the B–2 program is significantly delayed, ALCM options and flexibility could become more important for the U.S. Given the difficulty in verifying Soviet ALCMs, what restrictions on the U.S. ALCM forces should we accept?

III. PARTICIPANTS

List at Tab C.⁵

IV. PRESS PLAN

White House photographer only.

V. SEQUENCE

The agenda for the meeting is at Tab B.

Tab A

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council Staff⁶

Washington, undated

ISSUES IN THE NUCLEAR AND SPACE TALKS

The Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) began with the Soviets in June 1982. They have continued in regular sessions ever since, broken by a 15-month Soviet delay following our initial deployments of INF missiles. After the Soviets returned to the table in March 1985, we conducted three negotiations in parallel—START, INF, and Defense & Space—under the title of Nuclear and Space Talks (NST). Now that the INF Treaty is concluded, only START and Defense & Space remain under NST.

We have agreed with the Soviets to resume both negotiations June 19 in Geneva. We anticipate the first session to last about six weeks with a similar or longer session to follow this fall, depending on the status of the negotiations at that point.

The interagency review of our positions in NSR-14 has focused on a review of specific negotiating positions. While that review raised some fundamental issues, it did not engage in a systematic reexamination of the principles and objectives underlying the U.S. position. That task is the focus of your NSC meetings on June 14 and June 15.

The NSC’s review the fundamental policy issues surrounding START and Defense & Space will help you make a number of decisions on specific negotiating positions that are required in order to complete instructions to our negotiator for the opening of talks. In addition, if you plan to make any significant changes in the current U.S. approach or propose new initiatives, this first round of negotiations during your Administration would be the ideal time to do so.

The following discussion reviews where we are in the START and Defense and Space negotiations, and examines the fundamental policy issues.

U.S. START Objectives

The Reagan Administration began the negotiating process by repudiating SALT II and seeking to chart a new course in strategic arms control. One of the arguments against SALT II was that it was not an arms reduction treaty. In effect, SALT set an upper bound on strategic arms—to levels above what each side had when the negotiations began. Thus, a fundamental tenant of START was that it would result in equitable and militarily significant reductions. The Reagan-Gorbachev agreement to seek “50 percent” reductions grew out of this objective. The theme of “deep reductions” was a hallmark of START during the Reagan administration.

A second objective was that START should constrain the militarily important characteristics of ballistic missiles. This led the U.S. to propose limits on ballistic missiles, their warheads and their throwweight, rather than the SALT II approach of limiting missile launchers (such as silos and submarine tubes). For similar reasons, we proposed limits on the inventory of missiles in storage, in addition to those deployed in launchers. We also proposed far more sweeping and intrusive verification measures (many of which became the basis for the verification provisions agreed in INF).

A third objective was to focus reductions on the most destabilizing systems: so-called “fast-flying” ballistic missiles, especially ICBMs which because of their large throwweight and high accuracy could each potentially destroy several hardened targets, such as the other side’s ICBM silos. (Deep cuts in ballistic missiles also would enhance the effectiveness of a future SDI system by constraining the size of the threat with which it had to cope.)

Thus, the U.S. position in START would reduce ballistic missiles, constrain ICBMs more than SLBMs, and required particular reductions in the very large (so-called “heavy”) ICBMs that the Soviets have deployed. We also have proposed separate and somewhat looser limits on “slow-flying” bombers, both because we regarded them as less de-stabilizing than ballistic missiles and because they are an area of traditional U.S. advantage.

The environment in which the talks began was one of a Soviet advantage in the number of ICBMs and their warheads, and a U.S. advantage in airbreathing systems (i.e., bombers and cruise missiles). Those respective advantages remain today. The U.S. has sought in START to reduce the Soviet ICBM advantage and persuade Moscow to shift its nuclear forces to a better balance among ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers, at the same that we have sought to preserve our right to continue to deploy (and modernize) a relatively balanced mix of forces among ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers.

U.S. Defense and Space Objectives

The Defense & Space (D&S) negotiations convened in 1985. The principal U.S. objectives have been to protect our right to develop and test SDI within the “broad interpretation” of the ABM Treaty, and to deploy strategic defenses at a future time. In addition, the U.S. has sought Soviet agreement to a cooperative transition to effective defenses, as well as Soviet compliance with their existing commitments under the ABM Treaty.

Put simply, our current approach to the D&S talks reflects an effort on our part to have it both ways: seeking virtually complete freedom to test SDI and deploy it when it is ready, but using the ABM Treaty to dissuade the Soviets from deploying nationwide defenses in the interim.

Current START Position

After ten rounds of negotiations, the two sides have produced a 400 page joint draft treaty text (which includes extensive bracketed language that reflects disagreements between the two sides.) The principal agreed elements are:

— 6000 accountable warheads on 1600 ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers. (Note that because bomber weapons are “discounted” as one per bomber even though 16 or more bombs may actually be deployed on each, there will be significantly more than 6000 nuclear weapons on each side. The U.S., for example, probably would deploy over 9000 warheads under a START Treaty, meaning that START would result in a 25–30 percent rather than 50 percent cut.)

— No more than 4900 of these warheads can be on ICBMs and SLBMs (about 50 percent of the current Soviet force, 60 percent of the U.S. force); no more than 1540 of those could be on 154 “heavy” ICBMs (the U.S. does not have any heavy ICBMs but the Soviets would have to cut theirs by 50 percent).

— A maximum of 1600 “strategic nuclear delivery vehicles” (SNDVs), a term that encompasses ballistic missiles and bombers.

— Reduction to equal levels in ballistic missile throwweight to about 50 percent of the current Soviet level. (Since this limit is larger than current or planned U.S. forces, it would have no direct effect on us.)

There remain a significant number of disagreements as well. The more important ones are:

— The U.S. has proposed a 3000–3300 sublimit on ICBM warheads. The Soviets say they will only accept one with an equal SLBM warhead sublimit.

— The U.S. has proposed to ban mobile ICBMs, but with the proviso that we would reconsider if an effective verification regime could be devised.

— The Soviets want limits on sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) and reiterated to Secretary Baker in Moscow that a START agreement will be impossible without them. The U.S. does not consider SLCMs to be strategic weapons that should be subject to START limits, and has not identified an effective verification regime that is not unacceptably intrusive.

— The U.S. has proposed to count each heavy bomber as though it carried 10 ALCMs, fewer ALCMs than they can carry when fully loaded (another reason why the sides would be able to deploy far more than 6000 warheads under START). The Soviets would count each bomber at the maximum number of ALCMS it is capable of carrying.

— The Soviets say they will not sign a START Treaty without an assurance of U.S. compliance with their interpretation of the ABM Treaty. The U.S. has refused to link START and Defense & Space issues, but has said it would not sign START until the Soviet violation of the ABM Treaty (notably the illegal Krasnoyarsk radar) is resolved.

UNDERLYING START PREMISES

We turn now to a discussion of the fundamental premises upon which our negotiating positions are based, both to understand the underlying issues and as a framework to help evaluate possible alternatives.

In evaluating our basic arms control policies and the specifics of our proposals, it is important to keep in mind that we are not pursuing an arms control agreement for its own sake but only to the extent that it supports our overarching security objective of maintaining a stable, effective deterrent. In evaluating START, therefore, we are concerned not just with how it would affect the number of forces on both sides, but also with how it will help shape the capabilities and characteristics of those forces.

Reductions

Our current START proposal emphasizes deep reductions. Reductions in and of themselves, however, do not contribute to stability. An agreement that reduced the total number of weapons, but failed to reduce those weapons that are most destabilizing, discouraged efforts to reduce vulnerabilities, or created opportunities for significant cheating, would undercut our goal of a stable, effective deterrent.

Moreover, an agreement that reduced both sides to low, equal numbers of weapons could make the stability of the strategic balance more fragile and more sensitive to cheating, as well as place even greater burdens on verification. This can be illustrated by a simplistic example: if each side had, say, 10,000 weapons, cheating which gave one side an advantage of 500 weapons probably would not be militarily significant and strategic stability would be largely unaffected. If the same cheating were to occur when both sides had a balance of 1000 weapons, the consequences could be quite different.

START has been characterized by the promise of deep reductions—50 percent. The current U.S. approach, however, would heavily undercount bomber-delivered weapons and would exclude SLCMs, resulting in a reduction in deployed weapons that would be more like 25 percent (with somewhat deeper cuts in ballistic missile warheads). Under this approach, each side could have 8000–9000 or more weapons, not the 6000 popularly believed.

The question is not whether there will be reductions as a result of START: politically there is no other option. The question is whether it should continue to be the centerpiece of our START approach. By changing the emphasis in START to improving stability and reducing the risks of war, we could more accurately portray our central strategic objective of a stable, effective deterrent, more sharply define the rationale for other changes we may make in our negotiating position (notably how we deal with mobile ICBMs), and more accurately represent the meaning and magnitude of the reductions that would result.

At the same time, there are political risks in seeming to ignore the widespread yearning to reduce, if not eliminate, nuclear weapons. A shift of emphasis in START that appeared to sanction a continuing nuclear arms race would fare very badly.

Missiles versus Bombers

Our current position emphasizes large, reductions in ballistic missiles and relatively loose constraints on “airbreathers” (i.e., bombers and cruise missiles). This approach flows in part from the premise that ballistic missiles (“fast-flyers”) are relatively destabilizing because of their distinctive advantages in conducting a surprise attack.

We expect several hours of warning of a bomber attack. By contrast, we would have [less than 1 line not declassified] warning of an attack by land-based missiles, and [less than 1 line not declassified] for an attack by submarine-launched ballistic missiles. By this logic, it might seem that it would be in our interest to seek even deeper reductions in ballistic missile warheads, either in START or in a follow-on agreement.

There are at least three reasons, however, to question whether we should pursue ever larger cuts in missile warheads.

— First, we are taking several unilateral steps to mitigate our vulnerability to surprise attack. In particular, the new mobile missile we plan to deploy (the SICBM, or “Midgetman”) would be able to survive even a surprise attack in substantial numbers.

— Second, the capability of airbreathing systems to conduct surprise attacks is likely to grow in the future. [2 lines not declassified] could be well-suited for some kinds of no-warning strikes.

— Third, our stake in a stable, effective deterrent requires us to have a well-balanced triad of SLBMs, ICBMs, and bombers. This need stems from our plans to use [2 lines not declassified] and our to hedge against unexpected threats to one or another leg of the triad. Very deep cuts in missiles would both hamper our ability to hedge and directly reduce the effectiveness of our airbreathing forces.

Treating bombers and missiles differently also reflects the U.S. desire to reduce forces in which the Soviets have an advantage and to protect those in which we have a clear lead.

By deliberately undercounting bomber weapons, we can ensure that we have enough warheads to meet our deterrence requirements. But this undercounting also gives lie to the popular conception that START will reduce current strategic forces by “50 percent” to “6000 weapons.” Weapons carried by penetrating bombers like the B–2 “Stealth” bomber we are developing essentially go uncounted against the START ceiling in the belief that the B–2 represents a distinctive U.S. technological and military edge. The same approach also makes distinctions that are essentially non-verifiable in order to insulate valuable U.S. nuclear and conventional capabilities from START restrictions.

Our approach to heavily undercount bombs and cruise missiles is premised in part on a modernization program that projects 132 B–2 bombers and advanced cruise missiles which can reliably penetrate Soviet air defenses. It is not clear, however, whether the B–2 or the new cruise missiles will be available in the quantities or on the schedule originally assumed when we devised our counting rules. We therefore may want to reconsider those counting rules in light of these uncertainties.

Under our approach, the Soviets will face strong incentives to deploy large numbers of bombers and cruise missiles themselves. From some perspectives, their shift in emphasis from ballistic missiles to bombers would enhance stability by reducing their ability to launch nuclear surprise attacks.

However, in sharp contrast to the Soviets who have by far the world’s most modern and extensive air defense network, the U.S. has virtually no air defense and has no plans to deploy one. Thus, our START current position could result in a sharp asymmetry. It would encourage the Soviets to concentrate on forces that would have almost a free ride in attacking the U.S., while forcing us to face defenses that would heavily attrit our bombers and cruise missiles.

ICBM Modernization and Mobile Missiles

The silo-based missiles on both sides are highly vulnerable to attack. None of the START provisions under consideration would lead to a significant improvement in their survivability. Your proposal to Congress to fund two mobile ICBMs was a response to this problem.

The current U.S. position in START, however, would ban all mobile ICBMs. Accordingly, there is a fundamental tension between our current START proposal to ban mobile ICBMs and our modernization program that would deploy two such mobile missiles.

Our START position reflects the difficulty of verifying limits on mobile missiles (especially under a “political verification” approach), reinforced by concerns that the U.S. might not—for domestic political reasons—be able to deploy mobile ICBMs of its own. Your ICBM modernization program, which would rebase the MX missile from silos to trains and would deploy a new road-mobile ICBM, reflects your determination to strengthen strategic stability by enhancing the survivability of our ICBM force.

Although monitoring improvements are possible, mobile missiles do pose substantial verification problems. At present, the intelligence community has great uncertainties in its estimates of Soviet road, and especially rail, mobile ICBMs. Since steps that increase the detectability of missiles also increases their exposure to attack, measures that would significantly improve verification typically erode the survivability of these missiles, thus undercutting their essential rationale. If we follow a “political verification” approach, this dilemma may be insuperable.

Our arms control approach to mobile missiles also is likely to play a central role in determining the sustainability of our ICBM modernization program in Congress. In addition, our approach will likely shape the prospects for reaching agreement with the Soviets on a START Treaty since they already are deploying two mobile ICBMs of their own.

Verification Woes

Our current START proposal reflects a very stringent and demanding verification standard, especially with respect to certain missile limits. (Our verification standards for constraints on bombers and cruise missiles are much lower.) In effect, we require that we be able to detect virtually any cheating. This standard is a major reason why we have proposed a ban on all mobile ICBMs, and one of the reasons why we have chosen not to include SLCMs in START limits.

Certainly we have the right to expect and to demand scrupulous adherence to treaty provisions. But we must be certain that near-perfect verification is the standard which we should adopt for this treaty. Such a standard would put great demands on our intelligence systems, impose significant costs to develop new or additional collection and analysis assets, and open our own facilities to a potentially dangerous level of intelligence collection. Even then, the fact is that some of our START proposals cannot be verified with high confidence, no matter how much money we spend or how intrusive the inspections we conduct.

An alternate approach is to assure ourselves that we can detect cheating of a magnitude that changes the military balance to a point where it results in an important military advantage to the Soviets, and that we can detect this level of cheating in time to develop an effective military reaction or safeguard. The most difficult element of such a standard would be the determination of what is militarily significant cheating—in other words, what is the military risk acceptable in each of the treaty provisions?

If we change our standard, we must do so very carefully. We cannot leave the impression with the Soviets or with the Congress that we have changed our expectations of Soviet behavior, that we are so anxious for an agreement that we are prepared to condone some cheating, or that we no longer believe that scrupulous adherence to every term in a treaty is the only acceptable standard of behavior.

Ratification

Verification has the potential of being the Achilles heel of treaty ratification. As the INF Treaty debate demonstrated, some in the Senate—the “verification maximizers”—will demand near-perfect verification, one that can be achieved only by the most expensive intelligence systems and most intrusive of on-site inspection procedures (and perhaps not even then). Others—the “verification minimizers”—will not put up with these drains on our defense budget and intelligence risks to highly classified programs, arguing that arms control in general and START in particular just isn’t worth it.

In brief, we face the possibility of an unholy alliance in the Senate of those who are simply anti-arms control, the “verification maximizers,” and the verification minimizers.” The combination of these camps could well doom the prospects that any START Treaty we negotiate can get ratified. Our current approach to verification, which puts a premium on detecting cheating per se rather than militarily significant cheating, tends to foster such a coalition.

It is unlikely we can do much about the anti-arms controllers outside of hard-nosed political persuasion. We may, however, be able to gain some ground with the verification maximizers and minimizers if we successfully shift our approach to verification so that it takes greater account of military risks rather than focusing on cheating per se, and if we can bring them along as the negotiations unfold, perhaps through the arms control observers group in the Senate.

Strategic Defense Initiative

The priority we give to SDI stems in part from the view that it plays to our technological advantages and helps compensate for growing domestic opposition to strategic force modernization. SDI also complements our goals in START in three ways. First, SDI would provide a way to mitigate the risks that the Soviets would cheat or breakout of limits they agreed to in START. Second, the limits that START imposes on ballistic missile warheads would enhance the effectiveness of any SDI system we were to deploy. Finally, SDI would help strengthen deterrence by helping to directly defeat any missile attack that the Soviets (or a third country) might launch.

As noted above, in our approach to the Defense and Space talks, we are trying to have our cake and eat it too: preserving maximum flexibility to pursue SDI while constraining Soviet ABM deployments. The Soviets have rejected our approach and have insisted that failure of the two sides to reach a Defense and Space agreement will prevent agreement on a START Treaty.

Some people worry that even if our position prevails, we may regret it. They are concerned that we may start down this path but not have the political support to see it through, opening the possibility that the Soviets may be in a position to deploy a system, perhaps less robust or sophisticated, while we are left with nothing.

POLICY ISSUES

You will need to make a number of specific decisions about our negotiating position in the START and Defense and Space talks before our negotiators return to Geneva on June 19. I will be sending you a separate decision package for that purpose. This section highlights the major policy questions that the NSC should address as a means of providing its advice to you about how to proceed in Geneva and should help inform your decisions on specific details.

START

You should consider a shift in emphasis in START from seeking reductions for their own sake (the “deep reductions” theme) to the goal of reducing the risk of war and enhancing stability. Such a shift would have implications for your arms control policies in three related areas and for our specific negotiating proposals in START. These three areas are (a) verification, (b) mobile ICBMs, and (c) other changes in our START position (notably airbreathers) and new START initiatives.

Verification. Our approach to verification involves two kinds of tradeoffs. First, measures that increase our confidence that the Soviets are not cheating typically are expensive and intrusive. The costs of verification are likely to come out of the defense budget and—in an era of very tight fiscal constraints—at the expense of important conventional and nuclear capabilities. Intrusive inspection cuts both ways: the Soviets would have the same rights that we do and could collect valuable intelligence about sensitive facilities and highly classified activities that are entirely unrelated to START.

Recognizing that verification never can be perfect, you will be asked to make decisions about how to strike the best balance among the competing considerations of verification confidence, costs, and intrusiveness in several areas.

One of our approaches to deter the Soviets from producing more missiles than they are allowed under START is to fence some of their missile factories and then count the number of missiles leaving through the gate. This is called “perimeter and portal monitoring” or PPM. PPM is expensive in money and manpower. The greater the number of facilities at which we establish PPM, the greater the deterrent to Soviet cheating but the higher the costs to us. We could propose to monitor fewer Soviet facilities using PPM, or we could rely on less comprehensive procedures, but with less deterrence of Soviet cheating.

Another approach to deterring Soviet cheating is a right to inspect “suspect sites.” If verification were our only concern, we would want extensive inspection rights. But we also need to protect from Soviet inspectors (and their intelligence agents posing as inspectors) facilities ranging from CIA headquarters to the plant where the B–2 “Stealth” bomber is being produced. The more exclusions we insist on for ourselves, the more we must grant the Soviets and the less our confidence that they are not cheating.

The second kind of verification tradeoff concerns the competition between our interest in deterring and detecting Soviet cheating on the one hand, and preserving our own military capabilities and flexibility on the other. Probably the clearest example of this dilemma is presented by the problem of mobile missiles which are, at once, both more survivable and less verifiable. The issue of mobile missiles is discussed in more detail below, but you also will be asked to decide several other issues in START that pose similar tradeoffs.

For example, our current START position would require numerical limits on certain “non-deployed missiles,” i.e., spare missiles that potentially could be launched from makeshift sites or used as refires from existing launchers. For these numerical limits to impose meaningful constraints on the Soviets, however, might require them to be set far lower than the number of spare missiles we ourselves stockpile to support our systems over their lifetimes of 20–30 years. Very low limits on “non-deployed missiles” in START could either greatly add to the expense of maintaining our strategic forces or degrade their reliability.

Our current START positions on “airbreathing systems” such as bombers and cruise missiles reflects a decision to protect important U.S. military capabilities by proposing some limits in START that are essentially non-verifiable and by refusing to accept any limits on other systems, notably sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs). Thus, we propose to exclude “conventional” cruise missiles from any START limits even though we cannot reliably tell whether a missile that the Soviets say is “conventional” really is nuclear-armed. (We were confronted with the same problem in the INF Treaty but made the opposite decision and banned both nuclear and conventional ground-launched cruise missiles in order to deal with this verification problem.)

Likewise, we propose to exclude from START limits any cruise missile that cannot fly more than 1500 km, even though we cannot verify within very wide limits what the actual range of any Soviet cruise missile might be. These positions reflect a judgment that it is more important make sure that the U.S. has enough of these nuclear and conventional capabilities than to be able to tell whether the Soviets either are cheating or are preparing to suddenly deploy large numbers of nuclear cruise missiles in excess of START limits.

As noted above, you face two broad alternatives in your approach to verification. You will need to decide which approach to emphasize.

One is a “political” approach that tries to maximize verification and deter cheating to the greatest extent possible, notwithstanding the budget costs, intrusiveness, and constraints on U.S. forces. The more stringent options (and, to a lesser extent, our current approach) on non-deployed missiles, perimeter-portal monitoring, and suspect site inspections would take you in this direction. You would, however, have to radically alter our current proposals for limits on bombers and cruise missiles to bring them into line with this approach. Such a “political” approach probably would improve ratification prospects, recognizing that no verification measures and no amount of money will satisfy hard-liners who insist on a virtual guarantee against Soviet cheating.

The second approach to verification would explicitly strike a balance among the competing considerations by considering not simply the chances of cheating, but the military risks posed by potential cheating were it to occur. This is what traditionally has been meant by “effective verification” or “adequate verification.” It is a standard that requires that we be able to discover militarily significant cheating in time to take appropriate responses. It acknowledges that not all cheating is militarily significant (although it would have obvious political implications). It also implies that we would apply different verification measures to different START provisions, depending on best balance among budget costs, intelligence risks, military constraints, and verification requirements in each case.

Such an approach requires a “military risk” assessment for each case. An implicit “military risk” assessment underlies our current position on airbreathing systems although no explicit analysis is available. Military risk assessments of other START provisions could lead to more or less stringent verification requirements than those embedded in our current positions. The JCS is in the best position to perform such analyses and to testify about them during ratification hearings. The Chiefs, however, have evidenced great difficulty in the past in making these judgments.

The approach taken in the INF Treaty, especially during the ratification hearings, was more in the direction of “political verification.” The Senate also made clear during ratification hearings that it would hold the Administration to a higher verification standard in START. It will be difficult to persuade the Senate to shift from a “political verification” approach to a harder to understand and more subjective “effective verification” approach. Unless military risk assessments that can withstand Congressional scrutiny are performed, however, there is likely to be no practical alternative to a “political” approach to verification. On the other hand, it may not be feasible to meet the standards imposed by “political verification,” even if it were desirable.

Mobile Missiles. You have proposed to Congress that we deploy two mobile missiles. Our current START position would ban all mobile ICBMs.

You need to decide whether and when to drop our proposed START ban on mobile missiles. If so, you need to decide what if any constraints to impose on mobile ICBMs.

START ban on mobile ICBMs. Many will see a fundamental contradiction between an emphasis in START on strengthening strategic stability on the one hand, and on the other hand banning mobile missiles. They will see a similar contradiction between the strategic rationale—enhanced stability through increased ICBM survivability—that led you to propose that Congress fund two such mobile ICBM programs, and proposing that these missiles and their Soviet counterpart programs be banned in START. In an era of tight defense budgets, arguments that we need to build these expensive systems in order to bargain them away may fall on increasingly deaf ears.

Others will argue that we should maintain our current START position to ban mobile missiles at least until we are more confident that Congress will support rail-garrison MX and/or the new road-mobile ICBM on a sustained basis. They also assert that we should keep the ban in place until we have a devised an acceptable substitute that protects our modernization program and meets our verification requirements.

Alternative START positions on mobile ICBMs. There are two broad alternatives to the current ban. One would permit both sides to deploy rail-mobile and road-mobile ICBMs (probably subject to numerical limits and other restrictions). This alternative would allow the Soviets to keep both of the mobile ICBMs they are now deploying, and would allow us to proceed with both of the mobile missile programs you have proposed to Congress. It would, however, pose all of the difficult verification problems noted above.

The second alternative would permit mobile ICBMs that carry only one warhead, but would ban mobile missiles carrying multiple warheads (MIRVs). This option would allow us to proceed with our new road-mobile “Midgetman” ICBM and the Soviets to retain their SS–25 missile. The rebasing of the MX missile from silos to trains you recently proposed to Congress would be prohibited, as would the Soviet SS–24 rail-mobile missile.

From an “effective verification” perspective, many argue that the military risks associated with MIRVed mobiles are much greater because for every Soviet missile that goes undetected, ten warheads could have been covertly added to the Soviet strategic force. They argue that permitting single warhead mobile missiles and prohibiting MIRVed mobile missiles is the best way to reconcile our competing objectives of enhanced ICBM survivability and effective verification of a START Treaty. They also believe that this alternative would strengthen support for the ICBM modernization program that is in trouble on the Hill.

Others note that such an alternative would mean that the U.S. would not be able to deploy a mobile ICBM until the Midgetman was ready in the mid-to-late 1990s. They also worry about the affordability of a mobile ICBM force composed exclusively of expensive single-warhead missiles, and about the credibility of our deterrent if budget constraints restrict us to a very small number. Finally, they fear that a START proposal to ban rail-garrison MX will break apart the Congressional coalition and lead to the defeat of both mobile ICBM programs.

START Initiatives. During his meetings last month in Moscow, Secretary Baker made clear that we reserved the right to make changes in our START position and to introduce new ideas. You need to decide which, if any, of our current approaches to change (in addition to those noted above), and whether to propose one or more initiatives that your negotiators can table in Geneva.

The discussion about our approach to airbreathing systems (pp. 5-7), raised several issues relating to verification, Soviet force modernization incentives, potential public relations problems stemming from claims about cuts to “6000 weapons,” and the prospects for our bomber modernization programs.

You may want to consider possible shifts in our current approach to limits on airbreathing systems in START.

New-Initiatives. You will be hearing about several possible initiatives that are currently being discussed informally within the agencies.

You will need to decide whether you want to propose one or more new initiatives at this, the first round of negotiations, during your Administration.

As you consider them, you will want to bear in mind the following factors:

— The resumption of negotiations is the ideal time for such initiatives, and especially for putting the “Bush stamp” on START and showing your leadership in this area. In their absence, critics will point to the absence of new thinking about strategic arms control six months into your administration. Finally, as a practical matter, it will become increasingly difficult to introduce new ideas into the talks during subsequent rounds. In brief, now is much better than later.

— Most of the new initiatives involve various kinds of limits on multiple warhead (MIRVed) missiles, especially land-based MIRVed missiles. These systems play a major role in our strategic forces. As such, these initiatives could have a major impact on our deterrent capabilities and our modernization programs, but their implications have not been thoroughly analyzed. Land-based MIRVed missiles play an even greater role in the Soviet strategic force structure. In contrast to your CFE proposal, therefore, a START initiative to impose new limits in this area could drive the two sides farther apart rather than improve the prospects for a speedy agreement.

— Initiatives relating to MIRVed missiles are likely to have a major impact on Congressional support for the two mobile ICBM programs you have proposed. Any such initiative, therefore, would benefit from close Congressional consultations.

DEFENSE AND SPACE TALKS

As noted above, our current approach attempts to let us have it both ways: seeking virtually complete freedom to test SDI and deploy it when it is ready, but using the ABM Treaty to dissuade the Soviets from deploying nationwide missile defenses in the interim. The Soviets are unlikely to accept our proposal and will push for provisions that limit our ability to pursue SDI development and that delay deployment as long as possible.

As Adm. Crowe noted during the June 8 NSC meeting, some people are concerned that even if our current position prevails we could live to regret it. They worry that our insistence on a right to deploy SDI after a particular date passes (e.g., seven years after an agreement is signed) virtually compels the Soviets to be ready to deploy their own defenses at that time, but that we might not be ready for a variety of budgetary, political, and technical reasons. They also worry that one such reason is that Congress will not let us take advantage of the flexibility we seek to test SDI under our current negotiating approach, but that the Soviets will labor under no such domestic political restraints.

In brief, they worry about the risks that we will neither constrain Soviet missiles defenses nor successfully pursue our own. If their fears are realized, our current approach could unintentionally lead us down a road in which the Soviets have deployed missiles defenses and we had not.

You will need to decide how to weigh these concerns, and whether to change our present negotiating position in two respects in order to reduce the risks of this outcome.

Missile Defense Testing. To afford us the maximum flexibility to do SDI testing consistent with constraining Soviet ABM deployments, our current approach is based on the “broad” interpretation of the ABM Treaty and a series of unilateral assurances the U.S. would offer to reassure the Soviets that we were not deploying SDI under the guise of testing it. Those who would change our approach would have us instead negotiate an explicit agreement with the Soviets about what kind of testing of missile defenses by each side was and was not allowed.

They argue that such an agreement would impose much more predictable constraints on the development and testing program than our “broad” interpretation of the ABM Treaty that Moscow has rejected. They also believe that an explicit agreement is the best way to counter Congressional efforts to impose unilaterally narrower limits on SDI testing. On the other hand, our efforts to negotiate such an agreement could well be unsuccessful, or we might have to accept more constraints on SDI testing than we believe the ABM Treaty imposes. Either way, the development of SDI would be hampered, and its eventual deployment would be delayed.

Missile Defense Deployments. Under our current position, both sides would be free to deploy defenses at any time after an agreed period (e.g., seven years) elapses. In essence, this would waive the ABM Treaty restrictions on SDI deployments. But since it also would give the Soviets virtually no additional notice that we were going to deploy, it virtually obliges them to deploy their own defenses as soon as possible after the agreed period.

Those who worry that our present position creates strong pressures for Soviets to get “cocked and loaded” to deploy their ABM system nationwide would change our position to weaken those incentives. The alternative would create a substantial interval (e.g. two years) between the time a side announced its intention to deploy and when it could actually begin deployments. It is argued that by building in more time for the Soviets to react, they would be less likely to mount an aggressive program purely as a hedge. Such an interval, of course, could lead to delays in deploying SDI when it is ready.

Tab B

Agenda Prepared in the National Security Council Staff⁷

Washington, undated

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

DATE: June 15, 1989

Location: Cabinet Room

TIME: 3:00–4:00 P.M.

START AND DEFENSE & SPACE ISSUES

I. Opening Statement The President

II. START and Defense & Space Objectives Issues Overview Brent Scowcroft

III. Discussion All Participants

IV. Summary Brent Scowcroft

Tab D

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council Staff⁸

Washington, undated

POINTS TO BE MADE ON START

— We have a tough agenda for this meeting, but it is essential that we come to grips with the hard issues before our negotiator heads back to Geneva.

— Today, I would like to critically examine some of the most important policy issues on which we face decisions, without getting mired down in very technical details.

— These may be some of the most important decisions we make during this Administration. They could change the way we think about strategic forces for years to come. They will affect our deterrent capability. They certainly will influence our support in Congress.

— Given our own plans to deploy two mobile missiles over the next several years, we need to examine whether to change the current U.S. negotiating position to ban mobile missiles.

— I also want to hear your views about how to approach the related issue of limits on so-called nondeployed missiles.

— Finally, I want to review the status of air-launched cruise missile limits.

— If there are significant changes to be made, this may be the best time. On the other hand, I am not interested in something that just grabs the headlines for a few days, especially if all we get is a loud “nyet” from Gorbachev that sets back the negotiations.

1. Source: George H.W. Bush Library, Bush Presidential Records, National Security Council, H-Files, NSC Meeting Files, OA/ID 90001–007, NSC0022—June 15, 1989—Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, Arms Control. Secret. Drafted by Davis. Copied to Quayle and Sununu. Gates initialed for Scowcroft. A stamped notation indicates Bush saw the memorandum. Bush wrote at the top of the memorandum: “PATTY—A must: weekend reading for 6–16. GB.” Bush drew two slashes and wrote below it: “GB 6–30.” Gates sent the memorandum to Bush under cover of a June 14 note: “Attached is your briefing paper for the NSC on START issues on Thursday afternoon. Attached to it is a 17 page single space analysis of the issues. You should consider this long paper your equivalent of Dick Cheney’s 100 hour short course on strategic arms control. Brent assures you that you need not feel compelled to read the long paper before the meeting.” Bush initialed Gates’s note. (Ibid.) (no classification marking) According the President’s Daily Diary on June 15, Bush convened a meeting of the National Security Council from 3:05–4:09 p.m. in the Oval Office. No minutes were found.
2. Bush drew a checkmark on this and the previous sentence.
3. Bush drew two short vertical lines in the left-hand margin of this and the previous sentence.
4. Bush underlined “refires” and “limits in a crisis.”
5. Not attached.
6. Secret.
7. Secret.
8. Secret.