Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

228. Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, July 6, 1991

START

Downloading

Soviet position:

— Change attribution of the Soviet SS–N–18 from 7 to 3; US can download Minuteman III from 3 to 2 or 1 before entry into force. SS–N–18 warhead platforms have been replaced; MM-III warhead platforms would also be replaced.

— In addition both sides could download 2 other existing types by up to 4 RVs each and a maximum of 750 RVs. Replace warhead platforms for missiles downloaded by more than 2 RVs.

US position:

— Change attribution of SS–N–18 from 7 to 3; US can remove 1 or 2 RVs from MM-III. Any additional downloading only by mutual agreement in the JCIC.

Points to make:

○ At the 1987 Washington summit, agreement was reached on the numbers of warheads to be attributed to all existing missiles. The number for the SS–N–18 was 7.

○ This was recorded in the joint statement issued by the two presidents. Subsequent negotiations have been on that basis. We were disturbed when the Soviet Union provided a different number for the SS–N–18 in the data supplied for the Memorandum of Understanding last fall.

○ Looking at downloading more generally, the US believes that the reductions to reach the 4900 ballistic missile warhead level should be accomplished primarily through elimination of ballistic missiles and launchers.

— Such reductions can be verified with confidence and cannot be quickly reversed.

○ Downloading can lead to unpredictability and instability, because warheads removed can be readily replaced. So it must be strictly limited.

○ The right solution is to hold to the numbers in the 1987 summit statement. To meet your needs, we can accept the right for the Soviet Union to download the SS–N–18 from 7 to 3, and the US to download the MM-III from 3 to 2 or 1.

— If in the future we identify further steps that meet our mutual interests, there could be provision for further downloading by mutual agreement in the JCIC.

○ This approach would maintain the integrity and verifiability of the treaty.

New types definition

Agreed criteria:

— number of stages

— type of propellant (liquid or solid)

— 10% change in launch weight

— 10% change in length of the missile or the largest stage

— 5% change in diameter of the largest stage

Soviet position:

— 15% increase in throw weight combined with 5% change in length of the largest stage.

— No cap on increase in throw weight for existing types.

US position:

— At least 30% increase in throw weight combined with 5% change in length of the largest stage.

— 20% cap on increase in throw weight for existing types.

Flexibility to close:

— Can accept 22.5% increase in throw weight.

— Can accept same throw weight value (22.5%) for the cap on increase in throw weight of existing missiles. (FYI: We don’t want the cap to be higher than 22.5%)

Points to make:

○ The new types definition is important because we have one set of rules for existing missiles and another set for new types of missiles. We need a meaningful way to distinguish the two.

○ The definition must ensure that new types are in fact substantially different from existing types, not minor modifications. Otherwise there could be large numbers of allegedly different types of missiles, all treated differently under START but all variants of the same missile.

○ For us the issue of the definition of a new type of ICBM or SLBM is closely linked to the question of downloading. Both involve similar risks.

○ If you can come to us on downloading, I can move substantially on new types:

— I can accept a throw weight number substantially lower than at least 30%, as in the President’s letter.

— And I can agree to use the same number for the cap on the throw weight of existing missiles, something Obukhov raised with Reg in Geneva.

— We would need to agree on rigorous ways of measuring both the increase in throw weight and the change in length. That will need to be part of the package. Reg and the others can spell this out in more detail, but that will need to be nailed down.

○ This is a big move on our part, and involves real risks. It will make the treaty harder to verify, and harder to defend. We are only prepared to do this if we are at the end of the negotiations and you can come around on downloading.
(In the context of resolution on downloading:)

○ We can close with 22.5% as the throw weight number in the new types definition, and the same number for the throw weight cap on existing types.

○ This solution is contingent on agreement on a rigorous way to measure and compare the throw weights of the new missile and its predecessor, and a rigorous way to measure and compare the length of the new missile and its predecessor. We don’t have an agreement on new types until this is settled; experts need to resolve this.

Data denial

○ This needs to be resolved now, not put off to subsequent negotiations.

○ We need the data denial provisions in the treaty so that we will know—and be able to demonstrate to our legislatures—how we will verify missile characteristics and warhead limits that are central elements of the treaty.

○ We are encouraged by the statement in President Gorbachev’s letter that he shares our view on the importance of unimpeded access to telemetric information, and by his commitment to work out substantive and mutually acceptable solutions before signature of the treaty.

○ Three weeks ago the US put forward in Geneva a complex proposal on data denial. Last week during the Bartholomew/Obukhov talks the Soviets side countered with a complex proposal of its own.

○ The Soviet approach fell well short of what we need, but it did contain an important new element—exchange of telemetry tapes. The Soviet approach would use this only in exceptional circumstances. But it is now part of the Soviet position. That decision has been taken.

○ The key to getting START done so it can be signed this month—less than 3 weeks away—is to use tape exchange on a routine basis. This would greatly simplify and accelerate the negotiations.

○ Amb. Obukhov asked for, and Amb. Bartholomew provided, a radical simplification of the US proposal showing how much of the complexity would fall away if we can agree to use tape exchange on a routine basis.

○ There is no way we can sign START without the data denial provisions. The one way we see to complete the treaty on the time scale our presidents want is for us to set aside our complex proposal, and for you to set aside your complex proposal, and for both of us to rapidly agree on a simplified approach based on routine exchange of telemetry tapes.

○ This is the breakthrough we need to put us on the track we want to be on. You have had an opportunity to review the simplified approach in Moscow. Hope you can tell me we can proceed on this basis.

Data denial exemptions

Both sides want some relief from the data denial provisions to encrypt or encapsulate (i.e. record) telemetry from RVs and other payloads (but not telemetry from the missile boosters). [less than 1 line not declassified] The Soviets want it to record RV data during portions of their flight where broadcasting telemetry is difficult.

Soviet position:

— 9 exempted flights per year, including all deployed, retired, and former ICBMs and SLBMs.

— Subquota of no more than 3 flights per type of missile per year.

New US position presented in Geneva:

— 11 exempted flights per year, including all deployed, retired, and former ICBMs and SLBMs. This would include the Polaris A-3 and Minuteman-II.

— The STARS missile would not be considered a Polaris A-3, since it has a different number of stages. STARS would be treated as an R&D booster under the INF treaty.

— For any ICBM or SLBM ever tested with a self-contained dispensing mechanism, a subquota of 4 flights per type per year.

— For existing and future missiles, only encapsulation is allowed. For retired and former missiles only encryption is allowed.

Points to make:

○ The Soviet side has said it needs certain exemptions for encapsulation of telemetry data on reentry vehicles.

○ We need certain exemptions for encryption of payloads.

○ Neither of us proposes any exemption for denial of data from boosters.

○ Last week in Geneva, Amb. Bartholomew gave you a proposal designed cut through our differences and settle this. Your need for encapsulation of RV telemetry on existing and future missiles, and our need for encryption of payloads on former and retired types are both accommodated in a fair and balanced way.

○ This is a political solution to an issue that has dragged on for over a year. You can do what you need, we do what we need, and it is equal for the two sides.

○ Can we put this behind us on this basis?

40% rule for counting RVs on future types

The 40% rule attributes a minimum number of RVs to future missile types, so that at least 40% of the throw weight of future missile types is RV weight. The basic rule was agreed in Houston, but several differences remain.

Soviet position:

— The rule does not apply to missiles of a fundamentally new design.

— The rule does not apply to single-RV missiles.

New US position presented in Geneva:

— We gave them a package that would split our differences over treatment of fundamentally new designs, impose a quota of 2 on such new designs over the next 15 years, and apply the rule to single-RV missiles.

Points to make:

○ One of the most important results of Houston was agreement on the 40% rule for attributing warheads to new types of missiles.

○ In Geneva last week Amb. Bartholomew made a package proposal to resolve all of our remaining differences concerning the 40% rule, including the treatment of unconventional designs.

○ The package would apply the 40% rule to single RV missiles. The language we agreed to in Houston would not make any distinction between single-RV and MIRV missiles. We should stick to the Houston solution.

○ Can we settle this on the basis of the package we presented in Geneva?

Heavy bombers and ALCMs

○ Last week in Geneva the number of heavy bomber and ALCM issues was reduced from over 50 to a dozen. We need to settle them all right now if the treaty is to be ready to sign this month. The US experts have what they need to wrap these up; if yours have the flexibility they need we will be able to put these important issues behind us.

○ Most of the remaining bomber issues can be left to the experts. One cannot, it is a sensitive issue you and I need to address—heavy bomber contingency operations.

○ Such operations are rare, and inspections of airfields are subject to a quota, so in practice the situation may never arise in which a side asks to conduct an inspection of an airfield which is engaged in a contingency operation. But we need to provide for this possibility.

○ As you know, B–52s carrying conventional weapons played a major role in restoring the independence of Kuwait.

○ It is absolutely essential to the US that START not inhibit our ability to use bombers in similar operations in the future, operations unrelated to the central strategic relationship between the US and the Soviet Union.

○ Inspections at airbases preparing for contingency operations could preclude such operations in the future. The purpose of inspections is to monitor compliance, not observe sensitive operations.

○ Because of this, last December we proposed a very limited exemption from the inspection regime in order to allow heavy bombers to be used under special circumstances for purposes not inconsistent with the treaty.

○ Ever since, we have repeatedly adjusted our proposal to take into account Soviet concerns:

— Our proposal now includes timely information to the other side if a request for an inspection is made during such an operation.

— We have offered an extra inspection not counted against the quota if an inspection is cancelled because of a contingency operation.

— We made adjustments to take into account your concern that you don’t want any implication that the Soviet Union supports operations against third countries.

— We have offered to discuss the broader issues related to contingency operations as a crisis management question in a military to military or other bilateral context.

○ Last week during the Bartholomew/Obukhov talks, Amb. Brooks put forward a package that would resolve this and several other issues.

○ On Monday, after you agreed to this meeting at which we are to resolve all issues, your representatives in Geneva told Brooks that Moscow rejects any form of exemption for contingency operations.

○ Mr. Minister, there is not going to be a treaty if we can’t protect the US ability to conduct such operations, operations that are not nuclear, not directed against the Soviet Union, and not related to this treaty.

○ The package Brooks gave you last week represented a big effort to meet your concerns.

— If there is a reciprocity problem here, we can add a provision that if we exempt airbases for such operations you could exempt the same number of airbases without actually conducting such operations.

— We can add that if an inspection is cancelled, we will pay for the wasted trip.

○ Where you have concerns and sensitivities, we are prepared to take them into account. We have demonstrated that. But you can’t just say no. We need an exemption for heavy bomber contingency operations.

(If he suggests that provisions for operational dispersals be used:)

○ Those provisions are for major confrontations between the US and the Soviet Union. We should not pervert them for these lesser operations.

○ Operational dispersal provisions would cause a massive cessation of inspections. Should not use an axe when a scalpel will do.

(If he proposes the US make a unilateral statement:)

○ A unilateral statement can’t change the treaty’s inspection rights. We need something formal.

PPCM/SSI

○ At Houston we settled the question of what facilities are subject to PPCM.

○ Last week in Geneva during the Bartholomew/Obukhov talks, a subgroup discussed a package that would deal with the remaining issues, such as the list of facilities subject to mandatory suspect-site inspection, and what size criteria will govern inspections at the PPCM portal, at declared facilities, and at facilities subject to suspect-site inspection.

○ The problem they were not able to deal with is quota inspections—a quota of inspections at the portal to allow us to observe objects smaller than complete missiles in canisters.

○ In our view quota inspections are essential in order to verify that what comes out of the portal are solid rocket motors and fully assembled missiles, and not stages.

○ You say that stages don’t come out, only fully assembled missiles. We need to verify that, and the way to do it is with an annual quota of inspections.

○ If you can accept this, the whole package will fall into place.

(FYI: In Geneva, the strategy we adopted was to try to get PPCM down to one issue—quota inspections—and get stage dimensions down to one issue—how to measure length—and then consider possible trade-offs. Until then, we would not show flexibility on either point.)

(If he asks what the quota would be:)

○ We can accept a quota of 8 per year per facility.

○ That is the quota for opening canisters at Votkinsk under the INF treaty. We should adopt the same number in START.

Stage dimensions

○ If we are to use length to distinguish new types of missiles from existing types, we need to make sure that differences in length reflect real differences in capability.

○ Mr. Hadley and Mr. Katayev had good discussions of this last week in Geneva, but did not reach agreement.

○ We should get them back together. This is a big issue that needs to be resolved if we are to close on the new types definition.

Throw weight values

○ Mr. MacEachin and Col. Koltunov made real progress on our problems with some of the values your side has declared for the throw weights of Soviet missiles.

○ But they did not finish the job. I hope Col. Koltunov has brought what we need to wrap this up. If we are to use throw weight as a new types criterion, we need to know that problems like this can be worked and resolved.

Use of ICBMs and SLBMs for space launch from airplanes

○ As you know, we have real doubts about this concept. It raises a number of problems—for the START ban on air-to-surface ballistic missiles (which is something you wanted in the treaty), for verification, and for our mutual efforts to prevent proliferation of missile technology.

○ There do not appear to us to be any practical benefits for offset these problems.

○ Nevertheless, Mr. Hadley and Mr. Katayev had useful discussions of the Soviet proposal. Mr. Katayev provided us a paper outlining his ideas, and we have responded with a paper of our own outlining the conditions we would need if something like this is to go forward.

○ The best solution would be simply to drop this. If in the future you should decide to pursue it, you could raise it in the JCIC.

(If he needs to proceed with this concept rather than drop it:)

○ Our paper sets forth the conditions we would need. Are you saying that you accept these conditions?

○ Mr. Katayev and Mr. Hadley should take this up.

Submarine tunnels

○ We came close to resolving this at the Bartholomew/Obukhov talks last week.

○ Amb. Brooks and Amb. Obukhov should agree on language to settle this.

START and INF costs and Khabarovsk

○ Last week we offered to settle several issues in one package.

— We would accept your long-standing request to settle INF and START costs in convertible currency.

— You would agree to Khabarovsk as the eastern point of entry for inspections.

○ Can we resolve these issues on this basis?

1. Source: Department of State, Policy Planning Staff, Lot 03D012, Dennis Ross Files, US Moscow Ministerial July 11–14, 1991. Secret. Timbie sent the paper to Ross under cover of a handwritten note: “D.R.: Points for Baker/Bartholomew on all the remaining START issues. J.T.” (Ibid.)