Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

227. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Department of State¹

7434.

Geneva, July 3, 1991, 1722Z

SUBJECT

• START: Brooks-Nazarkin Coffee, July 2, 1991

1. This is NST/START Memcon-XV-M-323. Secret—Entire Text

2. Meeting Date: July 2, 1991

– Time: 5:00 p.m.–5:45 p.m.

– Place: Relais de Chambesy Restaurant, Geneva

3. Participants:

U.S.

• Amb. L.F. Brooks

USSR

• Amb. Yu. K. Nazarkin

4. Nazarkin said he was generally disappointed with the series of meetings between Under Secretary Bartholomew and Deputy Minister Obukhov which had concluded earlier that day.² There had been no breakthroughs and too much time had been spent in making speeches. Brooks said that the working groups had come close to agreement in many areas. Brooks confided that he and others had argued that Bartholomew should extend his stay an additional day. Bartholomew had been considering this. When, however, the Soviet side had become so obstructionist on submarine tunnels and on the Andersen Air Force Base issue, Bartholomew had concluded that there was no useful purpose to be served by such an extension.

5. Nazarkin said that Obukhov, Presidential Advisor Katayev, missile designer Ashratov, General Ladygin, and Soviet delegation members Koltunov and Kryuchkov would all return to the Soviet Union the following morning. Obukhov, Katayev and Ladygin would probably not return to Geneva until the return of Bartholomew. The others would return, probably on Sunday, July 7.

6. Brooks said that the U.S. side proposed to turn the agreements reached on ALCMs and heavy bombers into treaty text. Nazarkin said that Peresypkin was prepared to continue to work with Curtin to reach solutions on the unresolved issues. Brooks repeated that the first task was to document what had already been agreed. Brooks said that the U.S. side would also prepare treaty text recording the progress on PPCM and would attempt to prepare a paper giving the state of play on stage dimensions.

7. Brooks noted that the Soviet side had asked Bartholomew to agree to an agreed statement on Andersen Air Force Base. Although Bartholomew had rejected the idea, Brooks would be willing to ask Bartholomew to reconsider if the statement were a benign one. Brooks asked for a copy of the Soviet proposed statement. Nazarkin responded that the statement was not yet drafted, but that he would provide Brooks with a preliminary copy the following day.

8. Brooks said that he could accept a limit of 25 air crew members on each update of the list of inspectors, monitors and air crew members. The two agreed that this closed out the issue and that the inspection protocol working group would implement their agreement.

9. Brooks asked Nazarkin about a proposal he had made a few days earlier whereby the Soviet side would accept a modified version of the U.S. proposed agreed statement on mobile space launchers, while the U.S. side would accept a thirty day notification following the initial flight test of a new kind of strategic offensive arm. Nazarkin said he expected to be able to give his response the next day.

10. Brooks said he was prepared to make a further attempt to solve the issue of heavy bomber contingency operations. His solution had three parts. First, all reference to such operations would be deleted from the treaty. Second, the current U.S. proposal would be accepted by the Soviet side in the form of an exchange of letters. Third, the Soviet side would accept the remaining aspects of the recent U.S. package proposal on operational dispersals and heavy bomber contingency operations.

11. Brooks then gave Nazarkin a draft³ of a possible exchange of letters. Brooks pointed out that, in deference to Soviet sensibilities, the U.S. side had dropped the term “heavy bomber contingency operations” in the draft letters. Nazarkin said he thought the move was helpful and that he would discuss it with the Moscow participants before they departed.

12. Nazarkin said he wished to make a “very personal” proposal. Suppose, Nazarkin continued, the Soviet side accepted U.S. proposals to use the Global Positioning System (GPS) during reentry vehicle inspections. Could the U.S. side, in return, accept a quota of seven reentry vehicle inspections? Nazarkin said that, if Brooks found the idea attractive, he would discuss it with Obukhov and Ladygin.

13. Brooks asked if the quota of seven would be increased if downloading were to be allowed. Nazarkin said it would, but repeated his past assertion that the Soviet side could not, under any conditions, accept more than ten reentry vehicle inspections per year, including those resulting from downloading. Brooks asked whether it would be possible for the Soviet side to accept ten now, but the U.S. side would agree that there would be no increase for downloading. Nazarkin said he was doubtful.

14. Brooks said he would consider the proposal overnight, but suggested that Nazarkin not raise the subject with Obukhov, since Brooks was skeptical that the approach would be acceptable to the U.S. side. Nazarkin said he would await further word from Brooks on the subject.

15. Nazarkin said that he assumed, based on the recent agreement on the language for ALCMs with multiple nuclear weapons, that the U.S. side wanted to change the SLCM declaration to refer to SLCMs “armed with two or more nuclear weapons.” Brooks said he believed this was correct, but that he would check the text and confirm by phone later in the evening. (Comment: Subsequently done. End Comment.)

16. Nazarkin again proposed that the sides meet the next day to continue the discussion of unresolved ALCM and heavy bomber issues. Brooks stressed that the U.S. side wished to turn first to the documentation of the agreements already reached.

17. Documents exchanged: U.S. proposed exchange of letters on heavy bomber contingency operations (English Only)

Brooks

1. Source: Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control, Lot 02D360, Edward M. Ifft Files, Baker-Nazarkin Memcons 1991. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Sent Priority for information to Moscow, the Mission to NATO, and USNMR SHAPE. Drafted by Brooks; cleared by Kangas; approved by Brooks.
2. No memoranda of conversations were found.
3. Not found.