Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

224. Letter From Soviet President Gorbachev to President Bush¹

Moscow, June 15, 1991

OFFICIAL STATE DEPARTMENT LANGUAGE SERVICES (OPR/LS) TRANSLATION

Dear George,

I fully share your point of view that, thanks to our joint efforts, it has been possible to reach final agreement on the issues concerning the CFE Treaty. The agreements achieved on conventional forces in Europe are not only an example of cooperation between our two countries, but they are also testimony to our dedication to the cause of limiting and reducing various types of weapons.

I agree with your idea that our next and most important task in the area of arms reduction should be the prompt completion of work on the START Treaty. Its signing at our forthcoming meeting in Moscow would be an event of truly historic magnitude.

Your readiness to contribute personally to finding mutually acceptable solutions for the remaining unresolved START issues now, at the final stage of work in Geneva is extremely important. Like you, I am prepared to spare no effort in order to remove the last obstacles standing in the way of signing an agreement in the area of strategic offensive weapons.

I have already instructed the Minister of Foreign Affairs, A. A. Bessmertnykh, to do everything incumbent upon us in order to finalize the START Treaty as soon as possible.

Like you, I am guided by the need to comply with all the agreements, as they were worked out in Houston by our foreign ministers. The Houston package is a balanced, carefully coordinated solution to the major remaining START Treaty problems. Therefore, our task now is to implement this solution as quickly as possible in the texts of the START Treaty and its accompanying documents.

I am ready to regard as a fundamental reference point in our joint effort the principle outlined in your letter—for each side to avoid the pursuit of maximum unilateral advantage, but to try to strengthen the agreement itself: its durability, confidence in its integrity, the stability it provides, and predictability. This applies equally to all components of the strategic forces of our two sides, both ballistic missiles and heavy bombers.

Acting on this basis, we must decide the disputed START issues mentioned in your letter, which are essential for both sides and on whose resolution strategic stability and predictability depend. Certainly, it is on precisely these issues—agreeing on the definition of new types of ICBMs and SLBMs, downloading the accountable number of warheads on ballistic missiles, and access to telemetric information—that fundamental difficulties have emerged recently at the negotiations.

First of all, I would like to underscore that I share your approach regarding the importance of a just solution to the problem of defining “new types” of ballistic missiles. Our proposal to include throw weight in the criteria determining such a new type is prompted by a desire to avoid a situation whereby a new ballistic missile would not be considered as such only because its size, type of fuel and number of stages would not differ from already existing missiles. In fact, it is possible that a new missile could be developed to be deployed on existing launchers, which would not differ from its predecessor in any of the other criteria which determine a “new type” except for the throw weight.

Lately it has been possible through joint efforts to bring our positions significantly closer on this issue. The U.S. side, as shown by your letter, has acknowledged the throw weight of a ballistic missile as a full-fledged criterion and we, in turn, have taken into account the U.S. concern as regards verification by agreeing that in addition to throw weight, a change in the length of the first stage of an ICBM or SLBM of 5 percent or more be required. Thus, it now remains to agree upon the concrete value of the increase in throw weight which would make it possible to regard an ICBM or SLBMs as a new type of missile.

Our experts believe that the numeric value of 30 percent which you sited in your letter for increasing throw weight is unjustifiably large exactly for the reasons given in the letter. In this case, there would occur exactly that which you warned against: the criterion would not reinforce the principle and its spirit.

The possibility of increasing the throw weight approximately by one third in the process of modernizing an existing missile would result in making this missile potentially capable of carrying one-third more warheads than it would be accounted for in the Treaty. And, for such a missile it would not be possible to apply the “forty percent rule,” as it is envisaged for new types of ballistic missiles. In my opinion, such a situation would truly open wide the “window of instability” and would increase unpredictability and mistrust.

The parameters within which I think we must seek a mutually acceptable figure should be between ten and thirty percent. Therefore, I would propose here the following compromise: a new type of missile would be a missile whose throw weight exceeds by at least fifteen percent, and the length of whose first stage differs by at least five percent, from the corresponding features of the earlier missile.

First of all, the fifteen percent increase in throw weight is sufficiently large to differentiate a new type of missile from an existing one and, besides, it can be effectively verified with the assistance of NTM.

Now, on the matter of downloading the accountable number of warheads on existing types of ballistic missiles.

This issue has its own history. Initially, it was the U.S. side which put forward the proposal to permit change in the earlier stated number of warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs. Based on the need to bring current weaponry into line with new strategic realities which will be established by the START Treaty, we agreed with such an approach.

The possibility of altering the number of warheads on ballistic missiles was also recognized in the Soviet-U.S. statement of summit results in December 1987. In addition, in June 1990 you and I agreed that one of the main guidelines for subsequent negotiations on nuclear and space weapons would be “reducing the concentration of warheads on strategic delivery vehicles.” If we are guided by the desirability of promptly achieving this future agreement, then sooner or later we will have to reduce the number of warheads on existing types of missiles. It would make sense to take measures now in that direction and by all means not to batten down a door which we will have to open tomorrow anyway.

Also, establishing a ban on downloading the accountable number of warheads in the START Treaty can lead to a situation in the future when instead of re-equipping existing missiles there will be a need to manufacture new ones with smaller concentrations of warheads. That would not be justifiable from the economic viewpoint, and ultimately would promote continuation of the arms race.

As regards your concern about the possibility of “restoring the initial number” of warheads on those missiles where their number had been cut, this could be avoided by way of substituting new platforms for the warheads whose design would make it impossible to equip a missile with the previous number of warheads. By the way, this is precisely how the number of warheads on the Soviet SLBM “SS–N–18” was reduced. Moreover, even if one side were to decide to mount on its missiles previously removed warheads, this would require more time and work than the U.S. side would need to equip all its B–1B heavy bombers with long-range nuclear cruise missiles. Nevertheless, in the framework of the comprehensive agreement reached in Houston we agreed that 95 B–1B heavy bombers, each of them capable of carrying 20 nuclear ALCMs (1900 ALCMs total), currently are not accountable as carriers of such missiles.

However, I do not think that we should debate this matter any further.

I have a concrete proposal. We would be prepared to update the Houston agreement on the right of each side to download the accountable number of warheads on not more than two types of ballistic missiles, and by not more than five warheads on each type, with a total ceiling for downloading of 1250 warheads. We could agree that for the purposes of the Treaty, downloading of the accountable number of warheads would be allowed for each side on two existing types of ballistic missiles, by not more than four warheads on each type, with total downloading not to exceed 750 warheads. In order to ensure this procedure is irreversible, the warhead platform would have to be changed when downloading more than two warheads on a missile.

In the context of such a solution to the problem, we could confirm our other step forward, which takes into account the specific manner of deployment of U.S. missiles and stipulates that accounting for downloading ICBM warheads be by missile bases, and for SLBMs by oceans.

As far as the Soviet “SS–N–18” missiles are concerned, all such missiles in reality have been equipped for a long time with front ends of a new design capable of carrying only three warheads each. The previously designed front ends capable of carrying seven warheads have been destroyed. This is why the question dealing with the “SS–N–18” missile was discussed separately in Houston, outside the framework of the right to be established by the Treaty to download the accountable number of warheads on not more than two types of ballistic missiles. The decision on the “SS–N–18” missile is an integral part of the Houston package and it is only necessary to indicate the existing situation in the Treaty.

At the same time, as an expression of good will and provided that our compromise proposal with regard to the downloading of the accountable number of ballistic missiles is accepted, I would be ready to exercise additional flexibility. We are prepared to agree that the United States, before the START Treaty comes into force, could reduce the number of warheads on all of its Minuteman-3 ICBMs from three to two or one at its discretion. By analogy, just as the warhead platform had been replaced on our “SS–N–18” SLBMs, front end platforms would be installed on the aforementioned ICBMs which would allow only one or two warheads to be mounted, and the old platforms would be destroyed. Thus, the downloading of the number of warheads on the “SS–N–18” SLBM and the Minuteman-3 ICBM would not be regarded as covered by the corresponding provisions of the START Treaty.

I would like to draw your attention to the fact that the downloading of the number of warheads on the “SS–N–18” missiles carried out by the Soviet side before the exchange of data for the Memorandum of Understanding totaled 256 units (on 64 missiles with seven warheads, while the remaining missiles had been equipped earlier for three warheads each), and the potential downloading of the number of warheads on your Minuteman-3 missiles can total in this case up to 1000 units.

If we can resolve all the above mentioned issues in a mutually acceptable fashion then the entire package of interrelated agreements reached by our foreign ministers in Houston would finally be put into operation in its entirety including, inter alia, such problems as the definition of new types of ballistic missiles and downloading of the accountable number of warheads on existing types of ballistic missiles. Incidentally, in the framework of our work on the Houston package, already in January we moved significantly toward the U.S. side regarding, in particular, the accounting and inspection of heavy bombers. Our agreement to these solutions was given with the understanding that the U.S. side would take into account our concerns, above all in regard to the problems mentioned in your letter.

As to your proposals regarding unimpeded access to telemetric information, I can assure you that we shall study most attentively the “comprehensive” proposals of the U.S. side, and we will strive to achieve full mutual understanding about this issue.

I share your opinion on the importance of this issue which is directly linked with ensuring a strict regime of verification of compliance with Treaty limitations.

Though the START Treaty will contain other guarantees for thorough verification, this does not eliminate the need for careful working out of provisions dealing with telemetry. We must achieve as much as possible from the point of view of substantive and mutually acceptable solutions by the time of signing of the Treaty.

As we agreed, I have given instructions to send authoritative specialists on telemetric information to Geneva for intensive work on this issue at the expert level with their American colleagues.

George, I believe we have begun a good, substantive discussion on the problems of START. I would like to express my confidence that this will lead to success.

In particular, I like the idea of holding a special meeting (and possibly several meetings) between Minister of Foreign Affairs A. A. Bessmertnykh and Secretary of State J. Baker with a view to clearing away all the remaining obstacles to the Treaty.

It is clear that the meeting of the ministers should be preceded by an exchange of opinions between experts in Geneva, including those at a higher level, with a view to accelerating the solution of the issues related to the START Treaty.

In conclusion, I would like to reiterate my deep commitment to the course of further strengthening relations of partnership between our countries, including in such an important sphere as limitation and reduction of armaments, and to express confidence that our forthcoming meeting in Moscow, and the signing of the START Treaty there, will turn a new page in Soviet-American interaction.

Sincerely yours,

M. Gorbachev

1. Source: Department of State, Office of the Under Secretary for Arms Control, International Security Affairs, Lot 05D259, Records of James Timbie, US-Russia BW, CTB Ratification, START I Baker Bessmertnykh Jul 1991. No classification marking. Printed from the official translation of the Department of State Language Services.