Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

223. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the People’s Republic of China¹

197690.

Washington, June 16, 1991, 1102Z

SUBJECT

• START Letter from Gorbachev

1. Secret—Entire Text

2. At midnight Saturday² night the Soviet embassy here delivered the text of the Gorbachev response on START.³ I sent the following one-page commentary (in para 3 below) to the Secretary, who leaves for Europe Sunday. This is an accurate and complete summary of the substance of the letter.

3. The Soviet translation is very rough, no doubt due to the arrival of the message late on Saturday night. But the content is very clear:

○ On the definition of new types of ICBMs and SLBMS, Gorbachev recognizes that the US took a significant step with our 30 percent throw weight/5 percent length proposal, and counters with 15 percent throw weight/5 percent length. 15 percent throw weight represents a modest step from the 5 percent and 10 percent numbers they proposed in Houston. We will need to do better than this—at least 20–25 percent—and his statement that a mutually acceptable figure should be between 10 and 30 percent indicates this will in the end be achievable. The arguments against higher throw weights (e.g. inability to apply the 40 percent rule) are spurious.

○ On downloading the letter proposes to prune somewhat their Houston proposal. In Houston they proposed to download 2 types by up to 5 RVs per missile and a total of 1250 RVs, plus the SS–N–18. Here they propose to download 2 types by up to 4 RVs per missile and a total of 750 RVs, plus the SS–N–18.

○ More important though, the letter proposes to handle both Minuteman III and SS–N–18 outside downloading. This is actually a step away from the US approach, seeking to expand US downloading rights rather than contract theirs.

○ To deal with the argument that downloaded RVs could be rapidly restored, the letter reintroduces an old Soviet idea that the platforms on which RVs are mounted would have to be replaced, if more than 2 RVs are downloaded. The US rejected this in the past, because we plan no changes in the platforms in our downloading. Since we plan to download at most 2 RVs per missile, this new formulation would have no effect on the US. But in the case of Minuteman III, the letter calls for new platforms, which we do not plan.

○ The confusing paragraph about missile bases and oceans is simply a restatement of the move they made in Houston to accept our base-by-base and ocean-by-ocean approach.

○ On balance, the new proposal still calls for Soviet downloading of 2 Soviet types plus the SS–N–18, and does not take us closer to resolution.

○ On data denial, the letter does not mention deferral, calls for achieving the maximum possible by the time of signing the treaty, and says specialists are being sent to Geneva.

○ To summarize:

— The outcome on new types is in sight (but not in hand).

— They are engaging on data denial rather than calling for deferral.

— The new ideas on downloading do not bring us closer to resolution.

4. The letter calls for a special meeting or meetings between Baker and Bessmertnykh, preceded by exchanges in Geneva including at a higher level, with a view to expediting solution of issues related to the START treaty. It closes with a reference to signing the START treaty at the Moscow summit.

Baker

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N910004–0504. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Timbie; cleared in S/S and S/S-O; approved by Timbie.
2. June 15.
3. See Document 218.