205. Memorandum From the Head of the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks (Burt) to Secretary of State Baker1
SUBJECT
- Completing START
Lint Brooks and I met with Brent this afternoon to discuss my ideas for finishing START. I had discussed the meeting beforehand with Arnie Kanter, [Page 1016] and thus hoped that Brent would be softened up and would respond favorably to my ideas. Unfortunately, I am afraid I struck out.
We made the following points:
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- START is overwhelmingly in our interest from the military, political and intelligence points of view.
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- If we don’t finish now, the treaty may unravel and we may never finish.
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- The key to completion is flexibility on the SS–N–18 and downloading.
In response, Brent said that:
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- START is at best a modest contribution to security. The Soviet Union is no longer very important. It is not worth paying a large price for the limited benefits which START would bring.
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- After the Gulf war the Soviets are terrified of our technology. They should be more eager for arms control, not less. Thus there is no hurry.
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- Allowing downloading would make a mockery of the treaty and make us laughingstocks on the Hill. We would be far better off with no treaty than with one that allows downloading.
Brent made it absolutely clear that, in his mind, no flexibility on downloading can be considered, although he claimed he was willing to be flexible on any other subject. As I made clear this morning, I think this is a mistake, but I recognize the reality of the situation.
In view of Brent’s attitude, I do not think a meeting tomorrow would be worth the time. Brent did say he would be prepared to discuss the subject with you at breakfast tomorrow.
- Source: Department of State, Office of the Under Secretary for Arms Control, International Security Affairs, Lot 01D127, 1969–1990 Subject Record of James P. Timbie, Moscow Ministerial (US/Soviet) March 1991. Secret. Sent through Bartholomew, who did not initial the memorandum.↩