Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

204. Memorandum From Richard Davis of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)¹

Washington, March 5, 1991

SUBJECT

• Your Meeting With Rick Burt, 3:00 P.M., Tuesday, March 5, 1991

Rick Burt is returning to Washington to push for a final deal on START before his imminent departure as the negotiator. He is scheduled to see Secretary Baker Tuesday morning and may see Secretary Cheney as well before he returns to Geneva Wednesday.

Rick’s primary message will be that the U.S. should make a high-level push to complete the START Treaty as soon as possible. Although he is clearly motivated in part by a personal desire to finish the Treaty, Rick will make the case that the remaining three or four issues must be resolved at the political level. He believes that now is the time to make our best deal in START, and we must seize the opportunity or see the chance for a treaty slip away.

We understand that Rick will attempt to convince Secretary Baker to propose a letter from the President to Gorbachev within the next few days that contains detailed proposals on the principal outstanding issues. The letter would have three interrelated elements: it would (1) invite the Soviets to agree on the outstanding START issues, (2) tell them they must resolve the outstanding CFE disputes, and (3) make clear that these steps would clear the way to setting a summit date this summer. If the Soviets are prepared to accept the START positions outlined in the President’s letter,² Secretary Baker would follow-up during his Moscow visit next week. Once agreement is reached on these issues, Washington and Moscow would direct the Negotiators in Geneva to complete the final treaty text.

Rick will likely propose a deal along the following lines:

Downloading and SS–N–18. The U.S. would accept the Soviet proposal for the equivalent of 2100 RVs downloaded on 3 types of missiles, including the SS–N–18 (paralleling the JCS approach). The Soviets have convinced Rick that they have made force structure decisions that depend on this high level of downloading and any significant changes would come at a very high negotiating price, if they could be achieved at all.

New Types. The Soviets would drop their proposal for including throw-weight in the list of changes that would qualify a modified missile as a “new type.” Dropping the throw-weight criterion would make it more expensive to circumvent either the RV counting rules or numerical limits on NDMs. If a throw-weight criterion is included, it would be easier and less expensive to develop “look-alike” new types that could be used in three ways:

— A modified SS–24 “look-alike” new type could count at fewer than 10 RVs, resulting in de facto downloading without the constraints placed on downloading;

— A modified SS–25 “look-alike” new type (MIRVed with 2–3 RVs) could be deployed in small numbers, and be available to replace existing SS–25s in a breakout;

— If modified SS–25 or SS–24 “look-alike” new types were deployed only in fixed silos, their non-deployed missiles would not count under the NDM limit. Unconstrained numbers of these missiles would be available for breakout or reload.

Rick may propose a fallback to accept a limited throw-weight criterion that would address the SS–24 scenarios summarized above, but would not complicate Soviet deployment of a MIRVed SS–25 “look-alike.”

Data Denial. The Soviets would meet us half way on these issues. They would agree to lock in current telemetry practices to ensure we could receive their telemetry, and give us interpretative information on their telemetry to ensure that we will be able to read their telemetry once encryption is ceased. We would defer exchanging telemetry tapes until either new telemetry practices are adopted or after three years if the sides fail to agree on rules to regulate future telemetry transmission practices. We would also agree to a smaller number of exemptions to permit encrypted SDIO tests. This is another case where the details are important. It could meet our arms control objectives and Intelligence Community concerns, but the SDI exemptions issue would be a hard sell to the Pentagon.

Stage Dimensions. The Soviets would agree to permit verification of the dimensions of first stages and entire missiles within the first three years. Although this appears to satisfy our objectives, the devil is in the details. For example, we do not know what confidence we would have that the missile we measured has the same dimensions as the deployed type. Would the Soviets allow us to measure a live missile, an inert missile, a training missile or some other type of mock-up? Our preference would be to remove a deployed missile from its canister for measurement, but the Soviets have rejected that out of hand because, they say, the missile would be damaged and have to be discarded.

Philip Zelikow, John Gordon and Art Kuehn concur.

1. Source: George H.W. Bush Library, Bush Presidential Records, Brent Scowcroft Collection, USSR Chronological Files, START Files, OA/ID 91122–008. Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe—Strategic Arms Control (March 1991). Secret. Sent for information. Sent through Kanter. A stamped notation indicates Scowcroft saw the memorandum. A second stamped notation reads: “Noted.”
2. An unknown hand wrote in the left-hand margin beside this sentence and the following: “Dave and Arnie will want to discuss the idea of a letter with you.”