202. Memorandum From Arnold Kanter of the National Security Council Staff to Florence Gantt of the National Security Council Staff1
SUBJECT
- START update
Florence:
Please give the following message to Brent and Bob. Thanks.
—Arnie2
Brent:
Bessmertnykh has written to Baker saying that Obukov is coming back to Geneva over the weekend to continue to work on START, and proposing that Bartholomew meet him there. Bessmertnykh makes clear, however, that Obukov can and will do business with Rick if Reg is unable to come to Geneva.
There is no enthusiasm among the Ungroup for getting back on a plane for Geneva. I agree. Assurances notwithstanding, it was clear that Obukov did not have the authority to engage in any meaningful give-and-take in our last outing. As a result, we all pretty much wasted our time and several became even sourer about START. There is no way to know whether Obukov will have anything new to say or any more authority to wheel and deal this time. If he does, Rick can engage him as well as can Reg (although Reg almost certainly would be tougher).
Unless I hear to the contrary from you, I will join in the emerging consensus to say home and “let Rick do it.”
There is, of course, no free lunch.
Rick will first try to reach agreement with Obukov on the remaining second tier issues (e.g., terminating PPCM, remaining ALCM issues, size criteria for inspections). If they succeed, they will then turn to the “big three” end-game issues: downloading/SS–N–18, definition of new types, and implementing the ban on data denial. Rick will see what (if anything) Obukov has to offer (or at least reveal) on these three subjects, and then get on a plane for Washington to confront us with the ultimate deal: Here is what the U.S. will have to [Page 1009] accept on the big three if it wants START. If we can’t or won’t, then there won’t be a START treaty, at least not any time soon.
Rick’s idea, of course, is to put maximum pressure on us to say “yes” by confronting us (and ultimately the President) with the stark choice. Rick’s hope and objective is to get Baker to carry his water directly to the President, making the case that if we fail to pay the price now, a START treaty will slip beyond our grasp for a long time, perhaps forever. You also can plan to read about it in the press.
If I read Rick correctly, the price of START may be high, particularly on downloading/new types. In particular, stand by for a proposal (which ironically parallels the JCS approach) to allow downloading of up to 2000 RVs (including the SS–N–18). Even if that is the proposal and it is bargainable, in the end we are likely to face the question of how much downloading we are prepared to allow (1500 RVs? 1000 RVs?) to get START now.
Nothing says that you and the other elephants have to say “yes” to whatever deal Rick brings back to Washington. More to the point, sending us to Geneva is unlikely to affect whether Rick gets on the plane in the midst of the Obukov meetings to come back here for his last hurrah.
Baker is probably the key. If he believes that now is not the time to try to wrap up START, because of the price, because of CFE, because of the state of US-Soviet relations, because of the increasingly complicated situation in the Gulf, etc., then Rick rides off into the sunset and we persevere on START. If Baker believes and tries to persuade the President that now is the time to seize the opportunity on START, then the President gets to make a tough call by choosing among a set of bad alternatives.
We are drafting a memo from you to the President bringing him up to date on the big three issues. You can use it to review the broader political issues with him, and/or with Baker.
- Source: George H.W. Bush Library, Bush Presidential Records, National Security Council, John A. Gordon Files, Subject Files, OA/ID CF01034–015, START—February 1991 [1]. Secret. Copied to Hall, Uhl, Gordon, Kuehne, and Davis.↩
- Printed from a copy bearing Kanter’s typed signature.↩
- Printed from a copy bearing Kanter’s typed signature.↩