Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

201. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Bush¹

Washington, February 18, 1991

SUBJECT

• Prospects for Completing the START Treaty

Reg Bartholomew led an interagency team to Geneva last week to meet with their Soviet counterparts.² The objective was to engage senior officials from Moscow along with their Geneva negotiating team in a major effort to complete START by the end of February. The effort was unsuccessful. The talks made virtually no progress in resolving the remaining issues. As a result, it is a near certainty that we will not reach the goal of finishing START by the end of the month.

Indeed, barring a dramatic change in Moscow’s approach to START or our acceptance of Soviet positions on the outstanding issues, the prospects for completing START any time over the next few months are poor. All of the signs coming out of Moscow indicate that, if anything, Soviet START positions will harden.

Acceptance by the U.S. of Soviet positions would, in many cases, modify important substantive and verification provisions in ways that could seriously undermine the security value of the START treaty and add substantially to the problems of getting it ratified.

Paradoxically, the Soviets seem eager—even desperate—to sign START, if only to mitigate the strains that arms control problems have put on the bilateral relationship and to open the way for your summit meeting with Gorbachev. But they are unwilling—and their internal politics may make them unable—to show any movement on the hard issues that remain.

You are aware of the harsh Soviet military and conservative criticism of Shevardnadze (and increasingly Gorbachev) for making arms control concessions that undermine Soviet security and superpower status. That backlash is a major reason for the unacceptable Soviet reinterpretation of their CFE obligations you addressed in your recent letter to Gorbachev,³ and for their inability to implement the chemical weapons destruction agreement you and Gorbachev signed at last year’s Washington summit. That same backlash would account for the complaints the Soviets are now making about the remaining START issues:

— Requirements for information exchange that are needed to verify START, but that the Soviet military resent and resist.

— Provisions that require the elimination of strategic weapons such as submarines and ICBMs that the hard-pressed Soviet military-industrial complex may not be able to replace in the future.

— Provisions that constrain ballistic missiles in ways that make already vulnerable Soviet leaders worry about how they will be exploited by their internal political opponents.

None of these substantive issues is new. In fact, in many ways they are what START is all about: achieving substantial reductions in the strategic arsenals of both sides, concentrating reductions on ballistic missiles because they are more destabilizing, and ensuring that the treaty’s provisions are verifiable. Thus, START would require both sides to provide information for verification that each would just as soon keep secret, and to destroy weapons that would be expensive or impossible to replace. These are the price of enhancing strategic stability and international security. Moreover, we have accepted extensive, even onerous, constraints on our bombers in an effort to persuade the Soviets to accept analogous limits on ballistic missiles.

What has changed is the political line-up in Moscow, symbolized by Shevardnadze’s resignation and the increasingly explicit and harsh criticism of policies—including START—with which he has been associated. Many of those who did not and do not want a START treaty on any terms except their own are growing in influence. Many who had previously argued for Soviet flexibility in order to reach agreement no longer are willing to speak out or are being overruled.

It is possible, but not likely, that last week’s stalemate in Geneva will send enough of a shock through the senior Soviet leadership to get the Soviets back to meaningful negotiations. Much more likely is a situation in which the START talks simply continue without conclusion over the next several weeks and months. During that time, Moscow’s willingness and ability to reach closure will become clearer, and we will be able to work on substantive approaches that may help overcome the impasse on the remaining issues.

For now, we will need to manage the disappointed expectations that will result from the likely failure to achieve the goal of completing START by the end of February. We will want to convey a sense of disappointment, combined with a message that we have not given up and will continue to work toward a successful conclusion. We also will want to avoid announcing any new near-term goal or deadline by which we expect START to be finished.

The following elements might be part of that political strategy:

— Take a matter-of-fact approach that avoids creating a sense of “failure,” or an impression that we are returning to the Cold War.

— Emphasize that the remaining START issues are enormously difficult, and that we will work as hard as possible but take as much time as necessary to resolve them.

— Propose to the Soviets a low-key joint announcement that the START negotiations in Geneva will be taking a routine recess in late February-early March (which would allow our people to take a richly deserved break), and will resume on some specific date (e.g., April 15).

— De-emphasize the linkage between signing START and holding a U.S-Soviet summit, so that whenever a meeting with Gorbachev is appropriate, it is not held hostage to wrapping up START.⁴

We can refine this approach between now and the end of the month, taking account of any developments that occur over the next two weeks.

1. Source: George H.W. Bush Library, Bush Presidential Records, National Security Council, John A. Gordon Files, Subject Files, OA/ID CF01034–015, START—February 1991 [1]. Secret. Sent for information. Copied to Quayle and Sununu. Bush wrote in the upper right hand corner: “GB 2–21.” A stamped notation indicates Scowcroft saw the memorandum. Kanter sent the memorandum to Scowcroft for his signature under cover of a February 11 memorandum. (Ibid.)
2. Bartholomew traveled to Geneva on February 7 and returned to Washington on February 10. No memoranda of conversation were found. In telegram 1642 from NST Geneva, February 11, Burt wrote to Bartholomew: “I want to thank you for taking the time and trouble to visit us here in Geneva and to engage in some difficult and sometimes frustrating negotiating. I think your presence here has really made a difference. Whatever the final result, it was deeply appreciated by all the members of the U.S. delegation. We will stay in close touch. By the way, Reg, Obukhov is still wearing the same shirt. Cheers, Rick.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D910138–840)
3. In telegram 46712 to Moscow, February 13, the Department transmitted the text of Bush’s February 9 letter to Gorbachev expressing concern about the Soviet position that ground force equipment held by naval infantry, coastal defense, and strategic rocket forces were not subject to the limits of the CFE Treaty. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N910001–0531)
4. In the margin to the right of this paragraph, Bush wrote and underlined “agree” and initialed “GB.”