Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

171. Memorandum From Richard Davis of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)¹

Washington, December 4, 1990

SUBJECT

• Principals’ Meeting on ALCMs and PPCM in START, December 4, 1990, 1:00 P.M.

This is the first² of two meetings to prepare START issues for Secretary Baker’s December 10–12 meetings with Shevardnadze in Houston. This meeting should be devoted to ALCMs and PPCM; a separate meeting on Thursday³ will address Data Denial. Any issues that remain unresolved should go to the President for decision before the Soviets arrive on Friday.

If the discussion reveals the potential for U.S. movement on PPCM, it could give us useful negotiating leverage to protect B–2 from inspection and ensure that B–1s are not counted as ALCM carriers. For this reason, you may want to address ALCMs first, to give the JCS an opportunity to air their concerns. That discussion may help reveal our relative stakes in the ALCM and PPCM issues.

ALCMs

The primary question is how far can we go in permitting Soviet inspections of heavy bomber bases, in order to gain Soviet agreement on other issues, including no B–2 inspections and not counting the B–1 as an ALCM carrier. In addition, the JCS will likely seek agreement that the dozen or so second order ALCM issues be presented to the Soviets and resolved as a package. Their proposal makes tactical sense as a way to complicate repeated Soviet attempts to reopen ALCM/heavy bomber issues, but these second-order issues do not need to be discussed in your meeting.

B–1 ALCM-carrier. All agree that we have no flexibility in our current position that the B–1 not be counted as an ALCM carrier. To count 95 B–1s as carrying 10 ALCMs each would put us way over the 6000 limit. All agree this is a treaty stopper.

B–2 Inspection. The issue of B–2 inspections also could be a treaty stopper. The JCS are adamant in their opposition to any inspection of the B–2, both because its vulnerabilities to defenses may be revealed by close visual inspection and because the bomb bay is clearly capable of carrying ALCMs. So far, the Soviets have been equally adamant in their insistence that B–2s be subject to inspection. Although the substantive reason for their position is weak (since ALCM-carrying capability cannot in any event be verified by inspection), the Soviets emphasize a political point: they cannot accept a treaty in which all heavy bombers except the B–2 are subject to regular inspections.

A related issue is Soviet insistence that the B–2 not be permitted to carry long-range non-nuclear ALCMs unless we are prepared to count it as an ALCM carrier. If we wish to retain the option of deploying B–2s in significant numbers as conventional standoff bombers armed with yet-to-be-developed long-range conventional cruise missiles, we cannot accept this Soviet position.

One possible solution would be to offer B–2 inspections starting whenever flight-tests of long-range non-nuclear ALCMs begin from the B–2. The Soviets could possibly agree to the proposal, but the JCS will hate it because the practical effect would be to force some future tradeoff between placing a de facto range cap of 600 km on future standoff weapons, or subjecting the B–2 at some future date to Soviet inspection.

ALCM Inspections. The JCS may be willing to move in this area in return for Soviet agreement to U.S. positions on the B–1 and B–2 issues. The U.S. has resisted mandatory inspections to monitor the ban on long-range nuclear ALCMs at bomber bases other than where nuclear ALCM heavy bombers are deployed, and instead would rely on right-of-refusal inspections. On the other hand, the Soviets have proposed intrusive inspections of entire bomber bases to monitor this ban.

Arnie’s Ungroup has developed the proposal on ALCM inspections attached at Tab 1. You should confirm that this proposal is an acceptable bottom line U.S. position.

PPCM

U.S. and Soviet proposals on PPCM have narrowed considerably over the last year (largely as result of U.S. offers and compromises). The primary issue now is whether, for MIRVed mobile missiles, to PPCM the production plant for the first stage rocket motor, as the U.S. proposes, or the assembly facility, as the Soviets propose. Specifically, should we continue to insist that we be allowed to PPCM the SS–24 solid rocket motor plant at Pavlograd, or can we accept the Soviet proposal to PPCM the SS–24 assembly facility at Pavlograd. If we insist on PPCM at SS–24 rocket motor production, a secondary issue is to what extent we can relax other elements of the U.S. proposal to address Soviet concerns.

On substance, PPCM would be intended to ensure that the Soviets did not cheat by building and storing illegal mobile ICBMs over and above the relatively large number of deployed mobiles allowed under START (1100 mobile ICBM RVs) and in excess of the substantial number of non-deployed mobiles (250 missiles) that would be legal. Moreover, PPCM is most valuable for monitoring future mobile production; both the SS–24 and SS–25 programs are too far along for PPCM to yield an accurate accounting of the existing inventory.

The IC, except DIA, believes that PPCM of Soviet mobile ICBM assembly facilities is almost as good as PPCM of solid racket motor plants. [7 lines not declassified] They believe that the photo signature of rocket motor production plants is more difficult to conceal.

Politically, PPCM will be important to demonstrate that the START treaty is at least as tightly monitored as INF. There is also an argument that the burden of PPCM on U.S. industry will be more easily accepted if Soviet rocket motor producers are subjected to the same treatment.

The Soviets have refused in Geneva even to discuss PPCM of rocket motor plants. Their principal argument is that many more motors are produced than are actually assembled into missiles and that they cannot accept the overcounting. They have also hinted that they have sensitive activities that they do not want exposed to U.S. monitors.

There are two broad options:

1. Insist on the current U.S. position to PPCM SS–24 SRM production, but modify some other provisions to alleviate Soviet concerns.

2. Accept Soviet proposal on PPCM, but add collateral constraints on SRMs, and consider alternatives for undeclared assembly facilities.

These options are described in more detail at Tab 2.

Art Kuehne concurs.

Tab 1

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council⁴

Washington, undated

ALCM Inspection Regime

— No inspections for ALCMs at nuclear ALCM heavy bomber bases.

— At all other heavy bomber bases, all bunkers within storage areas could be inspected to confirm the absence of nuclear ALCMs. Such inspections would begin when START enters force.

— The remainder of the air base outside the weapon storage areas would not be subject to inspections for ALCMs.

— Long-range non-nuclear ALCMs would be inspected to confirm their non-nuclear armament.

— All containers capable of containing the smallest long-range nuclear or non-nuclear ALCM would be inspectable.

— Such containers, other than those identified for non-nuclear ALCMs, could be opened to confirm that they do not contain a long-range nuclear ALCM.

— Containers for non-nuclear ALCMs would be subject to inspection measures designed to confirm the absence of a nuclear warhead.

— All weapons in a storage area could be shrouded as long as their specific distinguishing characteristics (such as length) could be confirmed.

Tab 2

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council⁵

Washington, undated

Options For PPCM

1. Insist on the current U.S. position to PPCM SS–24 SRM production, but modify some other provisions to alleviate Soviet concerns.

PPCM at:

Votkinsk (SS–25)

Pavlograd (SS–24 SRM production)

Thiokol Strategic Ops (MX, SICBM)

Hercules Magna (proposed for reciprocity)

As a deal sweetener, we would increase the size criterion for inspections to the smallest SRM for the first stage of a MIRVed mobile missile.

1a. As a sweetener we could drop rocket motors as the accountable unit: for Soviets, assembled missiles would count toward NDM limit; for US, assembled first stages would count. There would be collateral constraints on rocket motors. (OSD and ACDA oppose).⁶

1b. As a further sweetener, we could drop periodic scheduled tours of “incapable” SRM production. Soviets have focused criticism on the mandatory inspection of plants they claim have no relevance to strategic rockets. (OSD opposes)⁷

2. Accept Soviet proposal on PPCM, but add collateral constraints on SRMs, and consider alternatives for undeclared assembly facilities.

a. PPCM at:

Votkinsk (SS–25 assembly)

Pavlograd (SS–24 missile assembly)

Thiokol Strategic Ops (MX and SICBM stage assembly)

Hercules Magna (for numerical reciprocity)

b. Additional collateral constraints on mobile missile rocket motors:

1. Location restrictions on SRMs (Soviet proposal), including transit notifications.

2. Mandatory SSI at other SRM production facilities—smallest accountable mobile missile SRM is size threshold for inspection. (OSD checking acceptability).

3. Declare in MOU—and possibly publish—the numbers of SRMs produced at each SRM production facility. (OSD checking acceptability.)

c. The two sides would agree on a list of facilities subject to mandatory SSI where covert assembly may be a concern (Soviet proposal).

1. Source: George H.W. Bush Library, Bush Presidential Records, National Security Council, John A. Gordon Files, Subject Files, OA/ID CF01033–030, START—November 1990. Secret. Sent for information. Sent through Kanter.
2. No minutes were found.
3. December 6.
4. Secret.
5. Secret.
6. An unknown hand circled “(OSD and ACDA oppose)” in the above point and wrote “flesh out” in the left-hand margin.
7. An unknown hand circled “(OSD opposes).”