Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

170. Memorandum From the Head of the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks (Burt) to Secretary of State Baker¹

Undated

SUBJECT

• December Ministerial: Make or Break for START

(S) 1. I know there are many other things on your plate right now, but as I think about your December meeting with Shevardnadze I am a very worried man. I have three important concerns:

— If we don’t sign START in January there is a good chance we may never sign it.

— If we don’t resolve—or at least reduce—the outstanding issues in December, we won’t be able to finish in January.

— To resolve the outstanding issues in December will require difficult, high-level decisions, but we don’t have a process in place to make those decisions.

(S) 2. As you and I discussed recently in Geneva, a war in the Gulf or internal developments in the Soviet Union could make it impossible to complete START if it isn’t done soon. January may thus be our last chance.

(S) 3. If we are to have any chance of completion in January, your upcoming meeting is a make-or-break one. This is especially true because my counterpart tells me that Shevardnadze is the only candidate for the new post of Vice President of the Soviet Union. Obviously, a new Foreign Minister would result in a temporary slowdown in Soviet decision-making.

(S) 4. While the Soviets claim to want to resolve all remaining issues in connection with your December meeting, that is probably not possible: as of this morning there are over thirty issues remaining whose resolution will require action at higher levels in Washington. Most can be settled either between Reg Bartholomew and Obukhov or here in Geneva—assuming we are prepared to streamline the Washington approval process, which currently has taken over ten weeks to pass judgement on a straightforward ad ref agreement on the definition of a heavy bomber.

(S) 5. However, there are three sets of issues which have little chance of being solved below your level: data denial, perimeter and portal continuous monitoring (PPCM), and ALCM/heavy bomber verification. These issues are all extremely complex (the ALCM/bomber issue, for example includes some thirty sub-issues) and all will require difficult decisions on our part. For this reason, they will probably be impossible to resolve during your ministerial, unless there has been significant, cabinet-level discussion in advance.

(S) 6. Perhaps the most crucial of the three issues is data denial. We now differ on power levels to be broadcast [less than 4 lines not declassified] Soviets), and the number of exemptions (which we may be able to solve in Geneva). Until recently, I thought I saw the outlines of a deal in this area. My recent soundings in Washington, however, suggest that the technical types in both the Pentagon and the intelligence community may make a deal impossible. Unlike any of the other remaining issues, if data denial does not come out right, ratification could be jeopardized.

(S) 7. In both PPCM and ALCM/heavy bomber verification we face a choice between tight and loose verification measures. We need to decide whether we want tight verification of solid rocket motor production badly enough to offer intrusive ALCM and bomber inspections, including inspection of the B2, which my sources tell me the chiefs have personally decided is unacceptable even if it means no START treaty. The uncompromising Soviet stand (they refuse to even consider monitoring solid rocket motor plants and claim that inspection of the B2 is a treaty breaker), as well as the competing equities within the U.S. Government, mean that these two issues won’t be solved short of your level.

(S) 8. I understand that in the end-game there is always a tendency for negotiators to be alarmist and that you heard similar words from Vienna before CFE was completed. CFE was a great accomplishment and I confess I was surprised that the United States was able to pull it off. I do not believe, however, that the CFE end-game will be a model for START. Unlike CFE, we can’t send some smart people into a room and tell them to solve it: the issues in START are technically more complex. Of greater concern, in CFE we didn’t have to make painful, last-minute decisions affecting U.S. programs and capabilities; in START we will have to.

(S) 9. Thus, my bottom line: it is my strong view that if we don’t put in place a cabinet-level decision process before your ministerial we cannot expect to resolve enough issues during your two-day meeting to give the President and you confidence that a START treaty can be signed in January. I recognize that your schedule between now and the ministerial is crowded. Despite this, I recommend you speak to your colleagues about setting such a process in motion. Without it, we won’t sign START—in January or ever.

(S) 10. Best regards, Rick

1. Source: George H.W. Bush Library, Bush Presidential Records, National Security Council, John A. Gordon Files, Subject Files, OA/ID CF01033–009, Backchannel [Cables]—November 1990. Secret; Eyes Only.