Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

121. Telegram From the Embassy in Moscow to the Department of State¹

18281.

Moscow, June 4, 1990, 0955Z

SUBJECT

• Official—Informal

1. Secret—Entire Text.

2. Embassy’s draft Memcon for the Moscow ministerial arms control working group’s first START subgroup meeting, para 3.

3. Begin Text

SUBJECT

Moscow Ministerial, May 15–19, 1990: Arms Control Working Group—START Subgroup

TIME: 3:00–5:00 P.M.; May 17, 1990

PLACE: Osobnyak, Moscow

PARTICIPANTS

US—Richard Burt (NST), Linton Brooks (NST), David Smith (DST), Read Hanmer (ACDA), Greg Thielmann (Embassy)—Notetaker.

USSR—Yuriy Nazarkin (NST), Lem Masterkov (START), Gennadiy Khromov (Council of Ministers), Col V. S. Koltunov (START), Yu. I. Roslyakov (START), Gennadiy Shabannikov (MFA Arms Limitation and Disarmament Administration), Nikolay Sokov (MFA Arms Limitation and Disarmament Administration)—Notetaker.

— Ambassador Burt opened the session by asking the Soviet side if it had any response to the points on perimeter-portal continuous monitoring (PPCM) which he had passed on May 16,² expressing his hope that this subject and heavy ICBMs could be discussed in detail at the ministerial. Ambassador Nazarkin replied that the U.S. proposals were being carefully analized, and that if a response could be formulated, the Soviet side would return to them at the ministerial.

Phasing of Reductions

— Burt then raised foreign minister Shevardnadze’s remarks on the phasing of reductions, asking whether they contained anything which the Soviets had not previously described in Geneva. Nazarkin responded that Shevardnadze had, in general, explained the Soviet Geneva position, and asked whether Burt could react to what the minister had said. Burt recalled his question to Shevardnadze during the small group session³ about whether the Soviets were ready to move to a straight and steady rate of reductions. While Shevardnadze had answered “in principle, yes,” this was not the case with the Soviet reductions schedule.

— Nazarkin confirmed Shevardnadze’s language, but explained that in practice, practical realities dictate the actual phasing—it was not possible to have a completely straight line. The Soviet phasing of reductions took into account the structure of the armed forces and the practical capabilities for eliminating missiles. (At this point, Khromov declared in Russian from the back row: “. . . and warheads,” but it was not interpreted into English.) Narzarkin continued that while one would like to have a steady rate of reductions, the maximum deviation from the line according to Burt was 500 warheads. This represented only six percent of the total, and this was the maximum gap—at other times the deviation was much less—so one should not exaggerate.

— Burt urged that the question of how much either side was allowed to diverge from the straight line reduction needed to be thought through. If the United States was as far from the line as the Soviet Union at year five (when the Soviets were 500 warheads over), it would mean a total difference of 1000 warheads—which both sides should agree would be too much. While the United States had proposed that the maximum allowed deviation be 50 warheads, Burt was prepared to recommend that the gap be 100 on each side for warheads and 50 for delivery vehicles. Burt argued that such an arrangement would still allow for flexibility, if not as much as under the Soviet plan. Nazarkin expressed appreciation for Burt’s recognition of practical limitations, and said the Soviet delegation would have to consult with technical experts.

Burt noted to Nazarkin that U.S. experts had said that the phasing schedule should result in a concave reduction curve for both sides. They had “screamed bloody murder” at the notion of a straight line curve, but had been overridden by political authorities. Burt stressed that the 100 warhead deviation allowance was his own personal proposal.

— On the subject of heavy missiles, Nazarkin explained that the Soviet side had analyzed U.S. concerns about the nature and process of heavy missile reductions, and was prepared to make a statement that all heavy missiles would be reduced proportionately. Burt asked: “proportionate to what?” Nazarkin answered: “proportionate to other types of SNDVs.” Nazarkin then confirmed Burt’s rephrasing of the Soviet position that whatever the slope of the reductions line, the heavy missiles reductions line would be the same. Burt said he would report Nazarkin’s proposal, but reminded the Soviet side that the U.S. position was there should be an explicit category for heavy missile reductions.

Backfire Bombers

— Burt next raised the new U.S. Backfire Bomber proposal which had been introduced by Secretary Baker, reiterating two components:

— A statement that Backfires would not be given a capability to operate at intercontinental distances;

— A statement to include all Backfire Bombers (including SNA) in the Atlantic-to-the-URALs zone.

Burt observed that anyone with even the vaguest understanding of the Backfire issue knew it had been a major problem in strategic negotiations. With acceptance of the proposed statements, the U.S. side would be able to remove its position that the Backfire was a heavy bomber.

— Nazarkin noted that the Soviet side had already expressed its willingness to include non-SNA Backfires (in CFE). With regard to “TU–22M bombers assigned to naval aviation,” Nazarkin’s “preliminary reaction” was that they should be discussed in naval arms control negotiations which should be started immediately.

— Burt acknowledged that the Soviet position on naval arms control was one of principle, as was the U.S. position on SLCMs. He said the United States had tried to be creative to find a way to respond to Soviet concerns on SLCMs, and urged the Soviets to be just as creative on handling naval Backfires.

— Burt observed that it would be very hard to sell any (conventional forces) treaty which did not limit weapons deployed in Soviet Asia; it would be impossible if SNA Backfires were also excluded. The United States needed politically-binding Soviet commitments on limiting Backfires to 400, and on not increasing range.

— Nazarkin took note of Burt’s statements, but said he did not have the authority to comment on their substance. He then asked what the 400 Backfire figure would entail. Burt explained that it would be a global limit for all Backfires, and reminded Nazarkin that the Soviet side had been willing to limit total production figures for all Backfires in Salt II. There was, therefore, nothing new in the concept.

— Noting that the Backfire was also subject to limits being negotiated in Vienna, Nazarkin asked what the ratio of those limits to the 400 would be. Burt responded that he did not know, but emphasized that the 400 limit would be a form of non-circumvention assurance, much like the political commitments on SLCM. It was not so much a reduction provision as one which accorded with the existing reality.

— Nazarkin, emphasizing that he had no authority to negotiate Backfire, offered his personal observation that with a politically-binding statement not to give Backfires intercontinental operational capabilities, there would be no need for the second restriction on numbers. Burt pointed out in response that without numerical limits, the Soviets could build 5,000 Backfires, not capable of intercontinental operations, and then quickly refit them with probes and other refueling equipment. That was why the U.S. side proposed two components. Nazarkin said he understood and would report the U.S. proposal.

— Summing up the status of START subgroup discussions, Burt said the ball was in the U.S. court on non-circumvention, and in the Soviet court on heavy missiles, PPCM, phasing of reductions, and Backfires. Nazarkin offered one amendment to Burt’s summary; he said half a ball was in the U.S. court on heavy missile phasing. Burt suggested that Nazarkin not be overly optimistic on this score. Nazarkin responded that he had been discussing procedure; substantive outcome was another matter.

Joint Statement on Future Strategic Negotiations

— Discussion of the joint statement on future strategic negotiations began with an exchange of competing drafts.⁴ Nazarkin proposed beginning with some comments on the Soviet revised draft, since the U.S. text was totally new and the Soviet side would need some time to examine it. He recalled that the initial Soviet draft had been submitted at the Washington ministerial in April and asserted that the revised draft had taken into account subsequent discussions in Geneva. Burt commented that the Geneva discussions were very informal in nature.

— Addressing the preamble of the Soviet draft, Nazarkin explained that the second sentence had been changed to conform to U.S. references to reducing the risk of war, not just nuclear war; the Soviets had added “transparency and predictability” to the third sentence in order to accommodate U.S. interests; and “equal security” had been replaced by “security.” In the first paragraph of the body of the statement, the Soviets had added “the sides will hold consultations regarding future talks,” and the sentence acknowledging the right of either side “to raise . . . issues related to any kind, type or component of strategic offensive arms with a view to their limitation. Nazarkin said the second sentence of the second paragraph had been formulated to explain the concept of strategic stability on the basis of what the U.S. side had said in Geneva. In the third paragraph, Soviet aims were more precisely expressed, without preempting results and U.S. views were accommodated by striking out “experts group.” In the fifth paragraph, “in particular” had been deleted.

— Burt commented that, while the U.S. side could not agree to the revised Soviet draft, it regarded the draft as much improved over earlier versions. He contended that the Soviet side was engaged in old thinking in talking about new negotiations and a sequential approach to the process. Regardless of draft language issues, he urged adoption of the concept of building on the results of the current negotiations rather than reinventing the wheel, expressing the hope that there would never again be such a long and complex treaty.

— Burt also observed that, while the U.S. side believed additional measures taken to strengthen stability would also result in additional reductions, the explicit focus on strengthening stability underscored new thinking on the part of the United States. The U.S. draft was a good deal more specific about how stability and reductions should be achieved. Drawing on the Bush proposals to Gorbachev it included the phrase, “. . . beginning with the ban on mobile MIRVed ICBMs, leading to a ban on all MIRVed ICBMs.”

— Burt said the U.S. draft reflected a different attitude toward the relationship between offense and defense than the Soviet draft, and asked Ambassador Smith to comment on that aspect. Smith said that in spite of differences with the Soviet draft, he also saw similarities and some positive ideas. Although the Soviets addressed the relationship between offenses and defenses differently, at least the concept was there, as was the question of new technology.

— Regarding the subject of the third paragraph, Smith outlined the principles guiding the U.S. approach. DST should continue after START concludes, if, as was likely, there was no agreement at that time. While this may not be a difference between the two sides, it was not mentioned in the Soviet draft. The United States believed that the sides should be seeking a cooperative transition toward a more stable deterrent which includes a better balance between offenses and defenses. Smith acknowledged that the Soviet position was different on the effect of offensive reductions and new technology on stability, but said there might be elements of common ground. The United States felt a sense of urgency in DST and favored including the objective of achieving agreement by 1992, which was eight years after the start of negotiations.

— Nazarkin thanked Burt and Smith for their comments, expressed the view that the sides did not differ on too many points, and identified the joint task as marrying the two documents. Burt agreed with this task and suggested that the U.S. side attempt a merged draft with brackets where necessary. He opined that the “standard diplomatic” preamble was a little old-fashioned and might be hard for the press to take easily. Since the U.S. draft had some of the same elements, it might be preferrable to drop the preamble. Nazarkin responded that it might be old-fashioned, but it also was more solemn. The Soviets had thought a preamble would put the document on higher ground. Burt joked that congressional resolutions declaring national tree week or national onion day used the same format. After retorting: “so does the U.N.,” Nazarkin said he would offer a major concession and let the U.S. side have a go at it.

Other Issues

— Nazarkin raised the issue of warhead elimination—not just the warheads, but also the hulls of the RV’s. In response to Burt’s inquiry, Nazarkin confirmed that he meant along the lines of the INF Treaty. Burt said he was aware of the Soviet position, knew that the U.S. side owed the Soviets a response, and hoped to have one in the near future.

— Nazarkin brought up the road-mobile ICBM verification package which had been agreed Ad Ref in Geneva, and summarized Moscow’s response: Restricted areas of 5 sq km, in which OSI could occur; deployment areas of up to 125,000 sq km; no notification regime for routine movements; no limits on the number of launchers outside of the restricted areas and no limits on the duration of time outside these areas.

— Burt said that his reaction to this position was “very, very, very negative.” After three weeks of discussion in Geneva, the sides had now gone completely back to the drawing boards. The U.S. side had been successful in getting Washington to concur with almost every Ad Ref Agreement reached. In this case, Burt had spent a lot of capital—including personal capital—to sell the road-mobile agreement in Washington. The United States had originally wanted a much smaller deployment area, but had listened carefully to Soviet concerns about survivability. Burt said there was no way he could sell the latest Soviet proposal in Washington, nor would it do much good to discuss it in Geneva; it would have to be raised at the Summit. Nazarkin said that speaking personally, he had hoped the Ad Ref Agreement would be accepted. His only conclusion was that he would have to be tougher. Burt quipped that Nazarkin was too smart to be tougher.

— Nazarkin then declared that he had been instructed to raise the issue of locating strategic offensive arms on the territory of third parties, even though he had nothing new to offer. The Soviet side believed that strategic offensive arms remaining after the reductions should remain on national territories. Until the reductions were completed, each party would have the right to observe reductions under the treaty wherever the arms were located. Nazarkin said that the United States should be able to arrange such observations with host countries. Burt said he would raise these points with undersecretary Bartholomew.

End Text.

4. Amb Burt did not have an opportunity to clear this draft before departing Moscow.

Joyce

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D900505–0400. Secret; Immediate. Sent immediate for information to NST Geneva.
2. Not found.
3. See Document 120.
4. Not found.