Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

120. Notes of a Meeting¹

Moscow, May 16, 1990

Arms Control.

JB—response to Sov counterproposal

ES—right accent on 2 problems—ALCMs, SLCMs

a converg. on most elements

—counting rules—Sov accomod. over + above limit

—levels for SLCMs.

Issues:

1. Sliding level for heavy bombers w. ALCMs. Exceed 120—if above that—as equipped. We have ratif. problems too—unilateral adv.

(JB—how—you get 40% more.)

[JB—3 issues before Bonn

ALCM range

Limit on SLCMs

Heavy bomber limit

Gave you your pos. on 2 of 3.]

ES—40%—accept—on warheads—you still have adv. 1200 warheads. Reached agree. on warheads t #s delivery vehicles.

No caps—not understood.

Let WG work more.

Expected different reaction.

2. Range—SLCMs

US pos.—300 km, Sov 600.

Compromise (Sov. ceiling on #—660. US—1000 Sov—600)

nuc vs. conv—same as ALCMs—ext. observ. differences

Tactical msl—WG pursue.

JB—SLCM range. nuc. SLCMs only?

ES—all nuclear weapons w. range over 300 kms.

JB—WG discuss. Rationale for public over 600—confid bet. 300–600.

Karpov—carrier aircraft

JB—If # limit on SLCMs so import to you over 600, why not apply bet 300–600. Experts address.

VK—Long range—300–600—tactical weapons. Declaration on strategic. Not just in START. Two parts—range excess of 600; 300 + - deal w. tactical arms.

ES—Fund views on ALCMs + SLCMs. turn to experts. Come back.

New issues—not so bad—doing something new + difficult. New msls keep cropping up. (TACIT RAINBOW)

JB—ALCMs integral part of treaty. Reason for dist—for verif. Major verif prob. on SLCMs. Dist. for SLCMs—[illegible] verif—not being handled in Treaty.

ES—Past antecedents—SLCMs—integral part in Sov view. Now just polit. binding—serious problem. If not dist, no pt to ceiling. Take another look.

Phases of reductions—3–2–2

Heavy msls—reductions—reduced to 154 proportionately throughout duration—dealt w. in declaration.

RBurt—rate of reductions: Sovs- deeper cuts earlier. Sov approach—opposite

ES—In principle, agree. 3 phases—tech. modalities—experts.

JB—Heavies—close if 1540 w/h—154 msls, ban on new types, mobile heavies, lang. dealing w. further elim. of heavies in START II, limit of 2 heavy [illegible] per yr. Cut off of heavy product—Jan 1993.

ES—Follow-on: can think about follow-on. Step up to START II statement.

VK—new ideas on Flt testing

ES—give to experts

Non-circumvention. Still elements rem. unsettled. View pos. US prop—Sides understand non-transfer of strategic arms.

Not clear from US side on UK coop. Sides exchg. info on 3rd country coop.

JB—mention one issue—Backfire.

Sov state—not given cap to op at IC ranges thru refueling.

Not more than 400, inc in CFE Backfire in ATTU

Abandon B. in START. Diff. issue for us

ES—We have made statements—you want these B assigned to naval aviation—[illegible] other naval weapons.

JB—Cover in CFE. Cap. vs assign [illegible].

[Omitted here is a discussion of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty.]²

1. Source: George H.W. Bush Library, Bush Presidential Records, Brent Scowcroft Collection, Robert M. Gates Files, Memorandum of Conversation Files, OA/ID 91166–007, I Bob Gates Memcons 1989–1992 [7]. No classification marking. Drafted by Gates, who handwrote the notes. No formal memorandum of conversation was found. The editor transcribed the portion of the text here specifically for this volume. Brackets, except those indicating illegible or omitted text, are in the original. Baker traveled to Moscow on May 15. In telegram 15716 from Moscow, May 11, the Embassy transmitted an informal translation of the draft Soviet agenda for Baker’s trip listing a 5 p.m. meeting with Shevardnadze as the only scheduled event for May 16. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D900430-0776).
2. The following morning, May 17, Baker and Shevardnadze met at the Osobnyak Guest House of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and traveled by car from Moscow to the Zagorsk Monastery and back. According to the draft agenda (see footnote 1, above), the trip was scheduled to last from 10 a.m. to 3 p.m. According to the memorandum of conversation of the trip, Baker reasserted the U.S. position that “we would sign the START treaty if the Krasnoyarsk dismantlement has started and is proceeding at a reasonable pace.” Shevardnadze responded “that I will keep my word, as stated in Wyoming.” (Department of State, Policy Planning Staff, Lot 03D102, Dennis Ross Files, US/Soviet Memos of Conversation—1989/1990).