Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

118. Memorandum From Arnold Kanter of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)¹

Washington, May 14, 1990

Brent:

Following are some thoughts, reminders, and materials that may be useful background for your 2:45 meeting² on arms control.

Please let me know asap if it will be necessary to change the NSD.

I also recommend that you use the meeting to discuss the CFE game plan. Specifically, should Baker try to do serious CFE business with Shevardnadze at the ministerial (and send a letter so informing the allies), or do we take the time to do real consultations with the allies, and delay the doing of any serious CFE business until the Summit?

START

ALCMs. The only issue flagged by Shevardnadze in Bonn was the Soviet requirement for a subceiling on bombers equipped to carry nuclear ALCMs. In April, the Soviets proposed a sublimit of 90–115. The Pentagon is prepared to accept the concept of a sublimit, but says it must be set at 200 in order to protect the option of retaining all of the B–52Hs and converting all of the B–1s to be ALCM carriers.

It is unlikely that we will ever have 200 ALCM carriers, if only because some B–52s and B–1s will crash over time. The Pentagon, however, insists that there is no obvious nor acceptable stopping point below 200. To accommodate 200 ALCM carriers (which would count as 2000 warheads) within the 6000 START limit probably would require us to give up several hundred SLBM and/or ICBM RVs. I would be surprised if, in the end, Powell or Cheney would make that trade. In brief, insisting on a right to deploy 200 ALCM carriers probably protects an option we can’t or won’t exercise.

The draft NSD³ (attached at Tab 1) has a deliberately vague formulation about how many ALCM carriers we need: “. . . the number of heavy bombers equipped for nuclear-armed ALCMs that adequately protects options for the duration of the START Treaty.”

SLCMs. The deal we are proposing to the Soviets would, in effect, accept a politically binding limit on the number of nuclear (but not conventional) SLCMs the sides would deploy in exchange for the Soviets not insisting on any kind of real verification. Assuming they are willing to make that deal, there are at least two potential sticking points:

— Maximum number of deployed nuclear SLCMs. The Soviets have proposed 600. The draft NSD says “approximately 1000.” The maximum number of nuclear SLCMs we now plan to buy is about 750. The Navy POM cuts this number to about 650. Nobody has any plans or intentions to buy more than 650–750 for the foreseeable future, i.e., for the duration of the START Treaty.

— Range threshold. We want the “politically binding SLCM declaration” to apply to all nuclear SLCMs with a range in excess of 300km. The Soviets want to set the range threshold at 600 km.

Since it will be a declaration, not a limit, one can argue that it doesn’t matter much where the range threshold is set. Following are the arguments usually adduced in support of 300 km:

– It is a precedent for what could become a limit in START II.

– Given the concentration of interesting targets along the U.S. coastline, a 300 km Soviet nuclear SLCM is a “strategic weapon”

– Most Soviet SLCMs are less than 600 km. We therefore could be “embarrassed” by a 600 km range threshold that made it look as though the U.S. has many more SLCMs than do the Soviets.

– We are making “major concesssions” on the SLCM issue and we ought to get something for it. The range threshold is the “something.”

Mobile ICBM Sublimits. A sublimit of 1200 is unlikely to affect any Soviet programs and certainly will not interfere with ours. The problem is that mobile sublimits don’t make sense in principle, and are hard to reconcile with the “stability” rationale that undergirds our approach to START. The only mobile sublimit that might make sense would be one on MIRVed mobiles.

START II. The draft statement for follow-on negotiations is attached at Tab 2.⁴ JCS and ACDA have cleared it with no changes. I assume that State will too. Steve Hadley hates it because it drops all of the references to “strategic defenses” and the Defense and Space talks. He will try to spin up Cheney to get some of those references back in the statement.

We might be able to respond to some of these concerns without at the same time provoking a violent reaction on the part of the Soviets by including as an objective, the achievement of “the proper balance between strategic offenses and defenses.” Both we and the Soviets agree that this is an important question, even though we disagree strongly about what is the right answer.

The statement could be easily adjusted to refer to “steps that reduce the concentration of warheads on missiles” (vice ICBMs), and to make clear that MIRVed ICBMs, especially mobile ICBMs, have priority.

As I mentioned to you, the Navy already is well on its way to proposing a reduction in the planned size of the SSBN force by terminating the program at 18 Trident boats and retiring all the remaining Poseidon boats in FY 1991. Separately, there are analyses inside the Pentagon, that look at what a 5000 warhead “START II” force might look like. Among its features is a D–5 downloaded to 5 RVs.

Assuming changes are not made to the statement at your meeting, I will need your guidance on:

— Relative priorities, if any, between mobile MIRVs and silo-based MIRVs, or whether a generic reference to “land-based” MIRVs is sufficient?

— How much flexibility we want to retain in any references to SLBMs, e.g., do we want to commit to (a) reducing the concentration of RVs on each SLBM, i.e., downloading, or (b) reducing the concentration of RVs on each submarine, either by downloading or ballasting launch tubes? I would prefer (b).

— What, if anything, we say about nuclear SLCMs in the statement?

[Omitted here is a discussion of the Chemical Weapons Convention]

1. Source: George H.W. Bush Library, Bush Presidential Records, National Security Council, John A. Gordon Files, Subject Files, OA/ID CF01657–023, Moscow Ministerials—May 1990 (May 15–19, 1990) (2). Copied to Gates. Scowcroft wrote at the top of the memorandum: “Thanks. B”
2. No minutes were found.
3. Attached but not printed. The signed National Security Directive is Document 119.
4. Attached but not printed is a May 12 draft Joint Statement on Follow-On Strategic Negotiations.