Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

111. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 20, 1990, 10:55–11:50 a.m.

SUBJECT

• START

PARTICIPANTS

• Bartholomew
• Afanasenko (interpreter)
• Timbie (notetaker)
• Karpov
• Omelichev
• Zolotov (interpreter)

Karpov: I have one question while we wait for the interpreters. What is wrong with the distinguishability of non-nuclear SLCMs from nuclear SLCMs? Bartholomew: Anything that takes us over the line on verification gives us a problem.

Bartholomew: Let us begin with para 9 of your ALCM paper.² We speak of exhibitions, your paper says demonstration. Is this a difference, or simply translation? Karpov: There is no difference, it is another interpretation.

Bartholomew: In the same para, we say “confirms the distinguishing features,” and you have “allowing differences to be ascertained.” Karpov: This is again a question of translation. The translation was speedily done. Bartholomew: I understand. That is exactly why I am clarifying these points.

Bartholomew: In para 10, can you confirm this is a continuing right? Karpov: What is a continuing right? Bartholomew: We are permitted 100 (our number is 115) heavy bombers converted for conventional roles. Over the life of the treaty some bombers could be converted into conventional bombers so long as others are taken out and retired, so the number never exceeds 100 or 115. Karpov and Omelichev: Da.

Bartholomew: On para 12, there is a phrase “inability to carry nuclear arms.” This is new. Why has this been added? Karpov: The whole idea is that this bomber has been converted precisely so it cannot deliver nuclear weapons. Bartholomew: This language prejudges the procedures for conversion. Karpov: We say that beyond the 1600 there can be a certain number, say 100, that have been converted that once carried nuclear weapons but that now cannot. All we are doing is specifying the situation in a little more detail. Bartholomew: I think this will be a difficulty.

Bartholomew: On para 14, you speak of an agreed distance between where weapons are stored and a base where heavy bombers with non-nuclear armaments are based. What is your concept, and do you have a distance in mind? Karpov: Both in the negotiations and in the minister’s meetings we have already talked about basing separately heavy bombers with nuclear weapons and heavy bombers without nuclear weapons. We are trying to strengthen this idea by separating bases with a certain distance, so one type would not be close to another. This would help guarantee the distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear heavy bombers.

Bartholomew: Is there a particular number you have in mind? Omelichev: Let the experts look at it. Our preliminary analysis indicates 200–300 km. We should task the specialists at the negotiations, let them argue and work out what that distance should be.

Bartholomew: On para 15, what sort of questions are for Geneva? Karpov: They are already discussing those questions in Geneva. There are things we don’t talk about in Ministerial meetings, for example technical questions. We are not here going to solve all these questions. It is useful to show there are in Geneva more aspects under discussion. This is more a statement than a proposal.

Bartholomew: Turning to SLCMs,³ beginning with para 3. This may be a translation problem, but the phrase “for every subsequent five year period” is not clear. Can you explain it. Karpov: This is the same thing we discussed in Moscow. Bartholomew: It means today I give you a declaration for five years, and a year from now I give you one for the five years from that date? Karpov. Yes, just what we talked about in Moscow. There are no new nuances.

Bartholomew: Let us look at para 6. Karpov: The same text as in Moscow. Bartholomew: This says “equipped for SLCMs,” in Moscow we said “capable of deploying.” Karpov: You are right, there is a small distinction. Our specialists asked the question what does “capable of deploying” mean. There have to be signs. They explained that being equipped for is a sign of being capable. This is why we got to “equipped for.”

Bartholomew: Let me make an editorial comment. I advise you to find a way of saying in Russian “capable of deploying,” which is the phrase in the draft declaration we worked in Moscow. The reason is the phrase “equipped for” comes too close to giving us a big problem in terms of our neither confirm nor deny policy with respect to nuclear weapons. Karpov: I can look into this, but this exchange would be confidential. We are not talking about publishing this or making it public.

Bartholomew: Let me tell you, “capable of deploying” is broader than “equipped for.” Karpov: And a lot more diffuse. Bartholomew: If I say to you this type of ship is capable of deploying I could technically include a type of ship that is not actually equipped for but is capable. This is not something to settle here, but I want to alert you there may be an unnecessary problem here that can be avoided by careful choice of words. Karpov: Ambiguity may cause a problem or uncertainty in the future.

Bartholomew: But we propose the most inclusive definition. Karpov: Take for example a Soviet ship. Does the US side consider it capable of? But suppose it is not equipped for and will not be equipped. We could get into unnecessary arguments. Equipped for is very clear. We are not going to publish or make public the information. And we are not talking about a specific ship but a type. I ask you to think about it. Bartholomew: I asked you first.

Bartholomew: In para 5 you refer to an exchange between the parties before the first exchange of declarations. I have difficulty understanding the relationship between the declarations in para 3 and the prior exchange in para 5. Karpov: This is not a ruse, or a catch. We are talking about exchanging data not only for a five year term but assurances relative to the overall number that will exist throughout the whole period of 15 years. We need to assure that if the first five years are X, the next five years are not 2X, and the third five years 10X. We need to establish a number throughout the whole 15 year term. Prior to the first declaration, the sides unofficially and informally exchange data which would have for each side an obligatory nature.

Bartholomew: So, unofficially and informally, before the first exchange of declarations, I would tell you and you would tell me that in the fifth year the number of nuclear SLCMs will not exceed X, and in the tenth year it will not exceed Y, and in the fifteenth year Z? Karpov: There would be an overall limit that would not be exceeded at any time.

Bartholomew: That is simple. What you are saying is that before we exchange declarations each side says the number will not exceed X, and for you X is 600. Are you saying anything more than each side says, whatever happens, there will never be a number that in your case exceeds 600? Karpov: That is the sense, the rest is entourage.

Bartholomew: What does “on the understanding” mean? Karpov: You say, and Secretary Baker mentioned this just this morning,⁴ that the treaty must be ratified, and an official undertaking would make ratification difficult. We are proposing an approach that is unofficial, informal, not legally-binding, not requiring ratification. This responds to what your Secretary has told us are your concerns. An informal understanding we will hold to without a juridically-binding document that must be ratified by the Senate. A gentleman’s agreement.

Bartholomew: Moving on to para 9, first an observation. The words compliance, obligations, and verify are of course out of keeping with the character of the politically-binding declarations we are talking about. Karpov: Don’t nit pick the words. We can fix this editorially.

Bartholomew: What does the last phrase on cooperative measures mean? Karpov: We have already talked about the type of ships capable of carrying nuclear SLCMs. In the future we might come up with other ideas that make it easier to assure ourselves on the numbers on each side. We are not talking about more than that.

Bartholomew: If I understand this does not establish a future requirement. This says such measures as may be agreed by the parties in the future. Karpov: It is very simple. In the future we might agree on other measures. Bartholomew: This is not required. Karpov: It would be my mutual agreement, it is not excluded.

Bartholomew: Let me make a couple of observations. First, let me underscore to you that what the Secretary had to say, and I have had to say, are initial observations. They do not cover all of your proposals. I want to be careful to tell you that if neither Secretary Baker nor I have not addressed a proposal or asked a question, that does not mean there is not a problem. Karpov: This goes without saying. Bartholomew: It is important to be clear. Again to be clear, the questions I have asked should be understood as seeking clarity, and not as an indication of interest. Karpov: Or more than that, as the establishment of one or another position.

Bartholomew: I have to underscore what Secretary Baker said about the particular problems he cited—ALCM range, ALCM heavy bomber limit, SLCM common limit. I also want to underscore what he said about appreciating what Shevardnadze has sent with you and the work it represents. In terms of following up, the Secretary spoke of taking this up at their next meeting. He almost gave me a heart attack when he said he did not rule out the possibility of responding before that. Karpov: Just work on it, don’t get excited. Bartholomew: We will see if we can give you a response before their next meeting. There is no guarantee.

Karpov: I think these questions that you have raised and the answers we have tried to give have made clear our sense in introducing this. I hope this helps you to give a positive response to our ideas. We put a lot of effort into this. I wanted you to know that. If something causes your reaction to be a rejection, there are certain limits we cannot overcome. Let us try to find matchups within these packages and see if these cannot be resolved. That is the path to a solution.

Bartholomew: If I say, as Secretary Baker did, that while we see movement here these proposals frankly don’t advance us as far as we had hoped, that does not mean I do not recognize that they represent work on your part. I want to be clear on that. You must also understand that we have our own real situation to deal with. I think I can say at the end that Secretary Baker appreciated the way your Minister has engaged the process, and that this visit has been useful.

Shortly after Karpov and Omelichev left, Bartholomew reached Karpov by phone to ask a follow-up question:

Bartholomew: I have one last question that I need to clear up. Last night I noted there is no mention whatsoever of counting in START tactical aircraft that are equipped with conventional ALCMs over the range threshold. Am I correct in assuming that has gone away.

Karpov: In para 11 I believe it says if a bomber is equipped with non-nuclear ALCMs, it should be counted against the 100 non-nuclear aircraft.

Bartholomew: That is not the problem. Let me put it as a question. Suppose we agree the range threshold is X. Are you saying if I have a conventional ALCM with range above X, and put it on an F–16 like the one on my table, that F–16 conventional fighter with that conventional ALCM above X is not counted as a strategic bomber in START? Karpov: No, it should be counted in the 100 non-nuclear bombers. If a bomber is equipped with non-nuclear ALCMs above the range it is included in the 100 level.

Bartholomew: Your para 11 addresses heavy bombers converted to non-nuclear ALCMs. We are not talking about heavy bombers. Akhromeyev said, and this is totally unacceptable to us, that if we took a non-nuclear ALCM and put it on a fighter airplane, all of a sudden even though this is a tactical aircraft and a conventional missile, it counts as a heavy bomber. This is preposterous.

Karpov: What we suggest is the 100 should comprise all bombers whether converted to non-nuclear or bombers that were not equipped with long-range conventional cruise missiles above the agreed range. If such a bomber is equipped with cruise missiles, it should be counted there in the 100 bombers equipped with non-nuclear cruise missiles.

Bartholomew: I do not understand. Paras 10 and 11 speak of heavy bombers converted for non-nuclear purposes. The issue I am raising is not about conversion of heavy bombers. I am talking about conventional missiles on tactical fighter aircraft. That doesn’t make the airplane count in START whatever the range of the missile. Karpov: Our proposals do not use the word “fighter,” only bomber and heavy bomber.

Bartholomew (reads the text of paras 10 and 11): Paras 10 and 11 as written exclude the case I am talking about and satisfy me. But because this was a point of contention with Akhromeyev, and because this is critical to us here, I want to say the Soviets are not saying to us that if we have a tactical fighter and put on it a conventional cruise missile above the agreed range, then it counts in START whether in the 1600 or the 100.

Karpov: Our proposal deals with only bombers or heavy bombers, not fighters. There is a definition in START that when an aircraft carries an ALCM, it becomes a heavy bomber. Bartholomew: Carries a nuclear ALCM. Karpov: You need to look at all the provisions. Bartholomew: We need to be clear on this. Karpov: Maybe the translation is not careful. Your translators should check the Russian.

Bartholomew: I am disturbed, and not getting the clear answer I hoped for. This point is absolutely critical to us. It is the first point Secretary Baker stressed to you this morning. START is about nuclear weapons. We cannot agree that if we take a conventional ALCM over the range and put it on a Piper Cub, this combination is treated as a heavy bomber in START, either in the 1600 or the 100. This is totally unacceptable. I was looking for a flat statement from you. If the missile is conventional, putting that missile on an aircraft does not make it a START accountable heavy bomber.

Karpov: I will take that remark of yours as homework. Bartholomew: This will have a souring effect if I cannot say that this problem is behind us.

Karpov: Our proposal does not address fighters. We speak only about bombers and heavy bombers. Bartholomew: Just because an aircraft is equipped with a conventional ALCM does not mean it should be counted against START levels.

Bartholomew: I take the Soviet proposal as I read it as not saying that putting a conventional ALCM above the agreed range on an aircraft makes that aircraft a START accountable heavy bomber. This is what I understand. I am happy that this is the case. Any other interpretation is absolutely unacceptable here. It all comes down to these two points.

Karpov: We must take into account the discussion in Geneva about the definition of a heavy bomber, and look at the record of the Washington Ministerial. Bartholomew: We felt so strongly that one of the main points Secretary Baker made to Shevardnadze was on precisely this position the Soviet negotiators had advanced. We need to be clear on this. If we proceed, we will need to proceed on the basis of those two points.

Karpov: I will consult with Gen. Omelichev. There is no mention of fighter in our proposals.

Bartholomew: The real point is a conventional missile 1 km over the range threshold on an aircraft, even a Piper Cub, does not make it a START accountable bomber. Karpov: A bomber is an aircraft built from the beginning as a bomber or if it is equipped with long-range cruise missiles. Bartholomew: long-range nuclear cruise missiles. We agree that an aircraft with nuclear ALCMs counts, but not with conventional missiles. Karpov: We need to look at the definitions in Geneva.

Bartholomew: If your understanding of the two points I made is different, we would have an issue every bit as serious as the most serious problems before us. If you could consult with Gen. Omelichev and get back to us before you leave, that would be useful.

A short time later Zolotov called with the following message:

Zolotov: Before Mr. Karpov left, he asked me to tell you there is a mistake in the translation. In para 11 it should say each bomber, rather than each heavy bomber. So the implication is that if a bomber is converted to carry non-nuclear ALCMs, it should count in the 100 outside the 1600.

Bartholomew: That doesn’t answer the question I was asking. I understand he is on the way to the plane. Inform him if you get the chance that this does not answer the question I put to him, and leaves us with a very serious problem.

Zolotov: I will attempt to convey this to him.

1. Source: Department of State, Office of the Under Secretary for Arms Control, International Security Affairs, Lot 01D127, 1969–1990 Subject Record of James P. Timbie, START Meetings (Bartholomew) April 1990. Secret. Drafted on April 20. The meeting took place in Bartholomew’s office.
2. Not found.
3. Not found.
4. No memorandum of conversation was found. Baker’s talking points and notes from the morning meeting with Karpov and Omelichev are in Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Lot 93D187, Secretary James A. Baker III’s Classified Papers, JAB Papers April 1990.