Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

110. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 19, 1990, 5:35–6:10 p.m.

SUBJECT

• START

PARTICIPANTS

• Bartholomew
• Karpov
• Timbie (notetaker)

Karpov: I have brought a letter to Secretary Baker from Foreign Minister Shevardnadze.² I will give you a copy, so you can make your own judgement for tomorrow. (Hands over a copy of the letter)

Bartholomew: Is there anything you want to say? Karpov: Shevardnadze made a great effort personally to move toward the US position. This was not an easy task in interagency consultation, there were difficulties. These proposals are now approved as a basis for further discussion. We are not saying this and nothing else. We are ready to negotiate, to seek a common solution acceptable to both sides. This is what we could offer.

Bartholomew: On a first quick reading, and taking into account the fact that where language looks different it may be the result of double translation, and being careful not to get ahead of the story tomorrow with the Secretary, let me first say I respect the effort. That said, I can identify in your paper some if not all of the issues that I banged my head on with Akhromeyev. Let me make some observations and perhaps ask some questions.

Bartholomew: Many of the elements here are troublesome. One troublesome problem that is not here is any mention that tactical aircraft with conventional ALCMs count in START. I note that the 600 km ALCM range, the ALCM heavy bomber limit of 115, the number 100 versus 115 for converted heavy bombers are all still elements of your position which are unacceptable to us. I have a question about the distinguishability language concerning the specifics in parentheses. Karpov: Those are examples, not a definition.

Bartholomew: On SLCMs, I note the 600 km range, the specific agreed numerical limit, the introduction of distinguishability for SLCMs, and the reference to cooperative measures for verification in addition to NTM, all of which are problems for us.

Bartholomew: You deserve a more considered response than I can give you here. I note that while there are some things I am happy not to see, we must recognize that many others still remain problems carrying over from the conversation with Akhromeyev. I also take note of the spirit in which you presented these proposals on behalf of your Minister.

Bartholomew: You will come with Omelichev tomorrow at 10:00. Will there be just the two of you? Karpov: Amb. Dubinin would like to be present.

Bartholomew: I will get this to Secretary Baker this evening. We will take it from there in the meeting with the Secretary tomorrow. I have nothing more to say at this point.

Karpov: As for SLCMs, we have in there in effect two small packages. As we discussed in Moscow and again in Washington, the range and the inclusion of nuclear only or non-nuclear too are related. We have that solution in the package. As Akhromeyev informed you there might also be a trade between the acknowledgement of some ceiling for 15 years and our insistence on strict verification procedures. That too is in the SLCM proposal.

Bartholomew: What I am about to say will not surprise you. These are ideas for trades that Akhromeyev fielded. I told him we liked the second part—inclusion of nuclear SLCMs only and absence of verification—but not the first part. We have real problems with many of your proposals. We understand you have problems on ALCM range, but we have problems too. And we have moved 700 km, you have moved not 1. Another first order problem is the introduction at this late date of a sublimit on ALCM heavy bombers. We made clear to Akhromeyev this is a real problem. Where SLCMs are concerned, Akhromeyev did talk of various ways to set the problem up—a possible tradeoff between range, where we differ because of real asymmetries, and inclusion of only nuclear SLCMs. He also offered a trade on verification, which is a problem for us, but we also have a big problem with numerical limits. This is not an exhaustive list of our differences. Another example is the difference between 100 and 115 for converted bombers. We have a substantive difference here, and in addition we thought this was agreed in Moscow, so there is also the question of the validity of agreements between us.

Bartholomew: This is a preliminary reaction. As envoy of Minister Shevardnadze you will be meeting with the Secretary tomorrow. I note what you say of the effort you have made, and I note the spirit in which your proposals are being presented.

Bartholomew: What are your travel plans? Karpov: I will be in Budapest Monday³ morning. So I will leave at 17:30 tomorrow. By 14:00 I must begin moving toward the plane.

1. Source: Department of State, Office of the Under Secretary for Arms Control, International Security Affairs, Lot 01D127, 1969–1990 Subject Record of James P. Timbie, START Meetings (Bartholomew) April 1990. Secret. Drafted on April 20. The meeting took place in Bartholomew’s Office.
2. Not found.
3. April 23.