11. Record of Decisions of an Arms Control Policy Coordinating Committee Meeting1

The following were agreed to:

CW Bilaterals with the Soviets

1.
A decision on resumption is required before Secretary Baker meets with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in May. No decision is required before that date.
2.
The views of the CD Negotiator should be solicited either in person or by cable; ACDA will determine how best to do this.
3.
The PCC will return to the issue at a later date.

Arms Control Review (NSR–14)

1.
In addition to the reviews tasked in NSR–14,2 a review of U.S. compliance policy is required. Additional details will be developed and promulgated by the NSC staff.
2.
NSC staff will circulate a paper on the general Nuclear and Space Talks issues listed in NSR–14. The PCC will deal with this issue on April 19.
3.
A work program for the review of the Defense and Space position will be promulgated by the NSC staff.
4.
In addition to the reviews tasked in NSR–14, a review of the initial Soviet proposal in the CFE talks is required. This review and the Defense PCC review of the military and political implications of reductions in Europe beyond those in the initial Western CFE proposal should both be completed before the NATO summit. The PCC will return to the question of the feasibility of such a review in such a brief time period.
5.
The review of naval arms control will focus on CSBMs such as deployment restrictions, not on ASAT, SLCM or numerical limits on naval platforms.
[Page 43]

Review of the U.S. START Position

1.
The technical review of the START Joint Draft Text will be conducted by the START Backstopping Committee which is reconstituted as a body subordinate to the Arms Control PCC. ACDA will make the necessary arrangements.
2.
None of the gaps in the U.S. position listed in Tab B3to NSR–14 require resolution prior to the resumption of negotiations.
3.
The following items listed in Tab A4 to NSR–14 require review at this time. Indicated agencies will provide a brief statement of the issue by COB Thursday, April 6, 1989.
The 1600 SNDV limit. (STATE)
Sublimits on ICBMs. (ACDA)
Current United States proposals to ban flight testing and modernization of heavy ICBMs and past contingency proposals to allow heavy ICBM testing/modernization subject to a formal equal U.S. right to deploy heavy ICBMs. (OSD)
Allowing the Soviets to retain any heavy ICBMs. (OSD)
Launchweight as a substitute for ballistic missile throwweight. (ACDA)
Limits on non-deployed ballistic missiles and the current U.S. approach to monitoring such limits. (OSD)
The existing U.S. position regarding bomber and air-launched cruise missile limits including all elements listed under item 4 of Tab A of NSR–14. (NSC Staff)
Restrictions on depressed trajectory ballistic missiles. (STATE)
4.
All issues on mobile ICBMs listed in Tab A to NSR–14 require review. The NSC staff will frame the issue which will be broken into at least two parts.
5.
The following do not require review at this time:
Sea-launched cruise missiles.
Verification issues other than those associated with items listed above.
Telemetry encryption.
Backfire.
Former heavy bomber accountability.
Whether to permit conversion of SSBNs to non-accountable submarines.
Golf-II class submarines and SS-N-5 missiles.
  1. Source: George H.W. Bush Library, Bush Presidential Records, National Security Council, Richard A. Davis Files, Subject Files, OA/ID CF01590–009, Arms Control PCC [2]. Secret.
  2. See Document 10.
  3. Attached but not printed. See Tab B, Document 10.
  4. Attached but not printed. See Tab A, Document 10.