Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

10. National Security Review 14¹

Washington, April 3, 1989

Memorandum For

• The Vice President
• The Secretary of State
• The Secretary of Defense
• The Secretary of Energy
• The Director, Office of Management and Budget
• The Director of Central Intelligence
• The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
• The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

SUBJECT

• Review of United States Arms Control Policies (U)

In directing the review of defense strategy mandated by NSR–12,² I stated that I would task the Arms Control Policy Coordinating Committee to review current U.S. arms control positions and policies both to reflect the results of the defense strategy review and to resolve outstanding issues requiring resolution before resumption of negotiations. The arms control review is to proceed in parallel so that preliminary decisions on negotiating positions can be reached by late April. This National Security Review sets forth guidance for the arms control review. (C)

Nuclear and Space Talks. Not later than May 1, 1989, the Arms Control PCC should forward a recommended date for the resumption of the Nuclear and Space Talks. This recommendation should reaffirm or suggest modifications to (a) the existing negotiating organizational structure, (b) the existing U.S. position on the linkage between conclusion of a START treaty and resolution of existing Defense and Space Treaty issues, and (c) the existing U.S. position that no new treaties in this area can be concluded without the resolution of Soviet violations of the ABM Treaty, especially the large phased-array radar at Krasnoyarsk. (S)

Defense and Space. Not later than May 3, 1989, the Arms Control PCC should complete a review of the existing U.S. position on Defense and Space negotiations. The review should take account of decisions reached as a result of the defense strategy review and should result in (a) options for modifying the U.S. negotiating position; (b) a review of the relationship of the Defense and Space Talks to U.S. plans, as determined by the defense strategy review, for defensive systems research, development, testing and deployment; and (c) a review of whether the United States should seek negotiations restricting anti-satellite weapons, either in the Defense and Space Talks or elsewhere. Where relevant, the review should make explicit the assumptions used concerning interpretation of and adherence to the ABM Treaty. Draft instructions for resumption of negotiations should be submitted on or before June 1, 1989, following my decisions on options developed during the review. (C)

START. The review of the U.S. START position should encompass the following elements:

(1) Review of elements of the existing START position to ensure that (a) there is U.S. consensus on the strategic rationale underlying those elements, (b) that consensus reflects and complements U.S. defense policy and strategy, and (c) any options for altering the existing position are presented for presidential review in a timely fashion.

(2) Comprehensive technical review of the Joint Draft Text to clarify textual ambiguities and to ensure consistency with START policy decisions.

(3) Review of those areas in which the U.S. position is incomplete (a) to determine which, if any, must be completed prior to resumption of negotiations, (b) to identify options for completing these areas, and (c) to establish a schedule for completing remaining elements of the U.S. position. (S)

To accomplish this review, the Arms Control PCC will:

— Conduct a series of reviews of specific elements of the U.S. START position in accordance with the schedule set forth at Tab A. In each case the review should result either in a recommendation to reaffirm existing U.S. negotiating positions or in proposed options for change. Recommendations for change should include explicit consideration of the impact of altering positions to which the Soviets have previously agreed. (C)

— Identify not later than April 3, 1989, those incomplete elements of the United States position listed at Tab B, if any, which must be completed prior to resumption of negotiations. For each element so identified, establish a work plan to present options for presidential decision by June 1, 1989. In addition, by June 1, 1989, the Arms Control PCC shall promulgate a work plan for completing those elements of the U.S. position not requiring resolution prior to resumption of negotiations. (C)

— Supervise a thorough and complete interagency technical review of the existing Joint Draft Text. The review should be completed by April 21, 1989. By June 2, 1989, a second review should be completed resulting in recommended treaty text changes to accommodate decisions resulting from the defense strategy review and the arms control review. (C)

— Forward not later than June 7, 1989, draft START instructions for my review. (C)

Conventional Arms Control. By April 14, 1989, the Arms Control PCC will review the concept of stabilizing measures associated with the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) negotiations. The review will include (a) recommendations on whether such measures can be monitored with high confidence, (b) if not, options for determining what verification standards are appropriate, and (c) options for new stabilizing measures the United States should propose. (C)

By May 10, 1989, the Arms Control PCC will review the concepts of thinout zones and exercise constraints, as proposed by the Eastern Bloc in the Vienna negotiations. The review will identify options for United States action. (C)

By May 24, 1989, the Defense PCC will review the military and political implications of reductions in NATO and Warsaw Pact forces in Europe which exceeds those in the initial Western proposal in the CFE negotiations. The review should identify acceptable levels of reductions and should explicitly consider whether such reductions require restructuring of existing forces and/or changes in existing NATO strategy. Based on the results of this review, I will issue guidance, if appropriate, to examine alternative arms control options. (S)

By May 31, 1989, the Arms Control PCC will review possible confidence building measures which might be proposed in the East-West context. The review will identify options for proposing additional CSBMs. (C)

Chemical Weapons Arms Control. Preliminary decisions associated with the basic United States position concerning a global ban on chemical weapons production and stockpiling have been made incident to the resumption of multilateral negotiations on that subject in the Conference on Disarmament. Therefore, no further review of United States policy on such a global ban need be undertaken until the results of the defense strategy review are available. (C)

The verification of chemical weapons arms control agreements, whether a global ban or any other formal limit, remains difficult. No later than June 10, 1989, the Arms Control PCC should complete a review of verification requirements for chemical weapons arms control, identifying those requirements specifically applicable to a global ban and establishing, if possible, a means of certifying the sufficiency of criteria for such a ban. (S)

Nuclear Testing. Guidance for the review of issues concerning the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty requiring resolution prior to resumption of the Nuclear Testing Talks has been promulgated separately. The question of future U.S. requirements for nuclear testing, whether the United States should reaffirm or modify its commitment to the “step-by-step” approach to nuclear testing limitations, and what, if any, additional limitations on U.S. nuclear testing beyond those of the TTBT and PNET would promote U.S. defense strategy and objectives will be addressed in the on-going defense strategy review. Additional tasking to the Arms Control PCC on the development of specific policy and positions for negotiations following TTBT and PNET ratification will await the completion of that review. (C)

Nuclear Weapons Free Zones. By June 10, 1989, the Arms Control PCC should review U.S. policy with respect to nuclear weapons free zones. The review should result in reaffirmation of or suggested modifications to the policy principles the United States uses in evaluating proposals for nuclear weapons free zones and should recommend U.S. policy with regard to all existing or proposed zones. (C)

Naval Arms Control. By August 1, 1989, the Arms Control PCC should review the United States position on naval arms control. The review should reaffirm or suggest modifications to existing U.S. policy rejecting naval arms control proposals as not in the United States interest. In addition, the review should explicitly consider the various proposals in this area made by the Soviet Union and its allies and provide recommendations on which, if any, (a) are in the U.S. and allied interest and should be pursued, (b) might be acceptable in return for Soviet concessions in other areas, or (c) are unacceptable. (C)

George Bush

Tab A

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council³

Washington, undated

Tab A—START Policy Review

Procedure. The Arms Control PCC will hold weekly meetings to review our START position beginning on April 12, 1989. Topics are indicated below. Agencies represented on the Arms Control PCC will review relevant sections of the existing Joint Draft Text. The agency’s PCC principal will identify not later than April 5, 1989 those areas where they believe existing U.S. positions should be modified. For each such area agency PCC principals will provide the PCC Executive Secretary specific proposals (but not treaty text language) by the Friday preceding the appropriate PCC meeting. The PCC Executive Secretary, or an alternate designated by the PCC Chairman, will circulate an options paper at least 48 hours in advance of the meeting. The PCC Executive Secretary will prepare and forward within one week after the meeting a record of decision recording consensus and a paper setting forth options and agency views where consensus cannot be reached. Where issues arise which require further analysis, they will be identified and scheduled for reconsideration in May. Consideration of options by the Deputies Committee, the NSC and the President will be scheduled on a case by case basis. (U)

On April 12, 1989 the following will be reviewed:

1. Ballistic Missile Issues (other than those associated with mobile ICBMs).

— The fundamental numerical limits on ballistic missiles, including sublimits of ICBMs and the lack of sublimits on SLBMs;

— The acceptability of existing agreed counting rules for the numbers of warheads attributed to each existing type of ballistic missile;

— Current United States proposals to ban flight testing and modernization of heavy ICBMs and past contingency proposals to allow heavy ICBM testing/modernization subject to a formal equal U.S. right to deploy heavy ICBMs. (S)

2. Throwweight. The existing U.S. approach to reductions to equal levels in ballistic missile throwweight at approximately 50 percent of the current Soviet level; the U.S. proposal to treat throwweight for existing types on an “as agreed” basis (i.e., by attributing a negotiated number to each existing type of ballistic missile) and for future types to base throwweight limits on the greater of (a) the sum of the weight of reentry vehicles (RVs), post-boost vehicles (PBVs), and penetration aids or (b) a normalized value that takes into account the range at which it was demonstrated; and the existing U.S. Throwweight protocol. (S)
On April 19, 1989 the PCC will address:

3. Non-Deployed Missiles.

— The need for limits on non-deployed ballistic missiles and if so, on which types;

— The current U.S. approach to monitoring such limits, including through tagging, perimeter portal monitoring, and restrictions on storage locations; and

— Pre-inspection movement restrictions. (S)

In conducting this portion of the review the PCC may assume that an adequate tagging system can be devised, recognizing that such a system has not yet been demonstrated. (S)

4. Limitations on Air-Breathing Systems. The existing U.S. position regarding bomber and air-launched cruise missile limits including:

— The U.S. objective of achieving a START regime that does not constrain long-range, non-nuclear armed, air-launched cruise missiles;

— How to count ALCMs on heavy bombers;

— How to distinguish ALCMs from long-range conventionally-armed cruise missiles; and,

— The range threshold for treaty-accountability as an ALCM. (S)

On April 26, 1989, drawing on the defense strategy review of (a) the relative benefits to the Soviet Union and the United States of nuclear-armed, land-attack, sea-launched cruise missiles and (b) U.S. plans for the mobile ICBM program, the PCC will address:

5. Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles (SLCMs). The existing U.S. position that there is no regime for verifying nuclear SLCM limits or bans, which does not entail unacceptably intrusive onsite inspection that would compromise operational security, disrupt operations, unacceptably constrain conventional SLCMs, or jeopardize our “neither-confirm-nor-deny” policy with respect to nuclear armed ships and thus that the sides should instead make non-binding declarations of their nuclear (but not conventional) SLCM plans. (S)

6. Mobile ICBMs. Issues associated with mobile ICBMs including:

— Whether to alter our formal position banning such missiles;

— If so, what numerical constraints to seek on them;

— Whether to consider an option banning MIRVd mobile ICBMs while allowing single-RV mobile ICBMs.

— Whether, and if so how, to modify the existing verification regime the U.S. has proposed in the Joint Working Paper; and

— Whether, and if so, how to address accountability and inspection provisions for “movable” ICBMs (e.g., fixed area, multiple shelter concept). (S)

On May 3, 1989, the PCC will address:

7. Verification Issues. Major policy issues with regard to START verification, including:

— Whether to reaffirm or alter the U.S. position that suspect site inspections be focused on ballistic missile related activity and include both absolute inspection rights for certain facilities and challenge rights elsewhere.

— Additional major policy issues raised by a review of the Conversion or Elimination and Inspection protocols. (S)

8. Miscellaneous Issues. Any remaining issues. Specific consideration will be given to the following:

— Depressed Trajectory Restrictions. Whether to seek restrictions on the testing of depressed trajectory missiles and, if so, whether to do so via (a) the basic START treaty, (b) a separate agreement negotiated in the START negotiating forum, or (c) an agreement negotiated in a separate forum.

— Telemetry Encryption. Whether to seek a separate agreement in advance of START on telemetry encryption. Whether to ban encryption of cruise missile telemetry as well as ballistic missile telemetry.

— Backfire: Whether to continue to treat the Backfire bomber as a heavy bomber for START purposes.

— Former Heavy Bomber Accountability: Whether former heavy bombers equipped only for non-nuclear weapons should count in either the 6000 or 1600 limits.

— Conversion of SSBNs: Whether to permit conversion of SSBNs to non-accountable submarines.

— Golf-II Class Submarines and SS-N-5 Missiles: Whether to accept Soviet proposals to exempt such submarines and missiles from START in return for a promise to quickly retire all SS-N-5 missiles and Golf-II class submarines. (S)

Tab B

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council⁴

Washington, undated

Tab B—Significant Gaps in the U.S. START Position

— RV Counting Issues: How to attribute the number of RVs for future types, how a missile type’s RV accountability can be reduced, and what inspection procedures will be allowed for existing and future types. (S)

— Missile Accountability: At what point in production does a missile or heavy bomber become accountable and thus subject to the treaty, and at what point in the development of a new type of missile or heavy bomber must it be considered subject to limitations. (S)

— Tagging: Whether a tagging regime is technologically and operationally feasible, and, if so, what will be the nature of the tags, how they will be applied, how they will be read, whether to read tags before flight tests and, if not, what if any implication this has for our position on non-deployed missiles. (S)

— Type Issues: What constitutes a “type” in order to distinguish among different bombers and ballistic missiles. (S)

— New Types Definitions: The allowable changes to a missile, bomber, or ALCM type that, when exceeded, would categorize the altered item as a new type under the Treaty’s provisions. (S)

— Heavy Bomber Distinguishability: How to distinguish between heavy bomber types with National Technical Means, and whether to require functionally related differences. (S)

— Weapon/Warhead/RV Definition: The definition of “weapon”, “warhead”, and “RV” for accountability purposes. (S)

— Closeout Inspections: The scope and purpose of closeout inspections. (S)

— Treaty Duration: The length of the Treaty’s duration (e.g., unlimited, fixed number of years, until another event, etc.) and the conditions for expiration. (S)

— Restrictions on Future Systems: What, if any, restrictions to place on air-to-surface ballistic missiles and intercontinental cruise missiles. (S)

1. Source: George H.W. Bush Library, Bush Presidential Records, National Security Council, H-Files, NSR Files, OA/ID 90006–025, NSR–14—April 03, 1989—Review of U.S. Arms Control Policies [1]. Secret.
2. See footnote 2, Document 9.
3. Secret.
4. Secret.