108. Memorandum of Conversation1
SUBJECTS
- Announcing Ministerial Dates, Arms Control Working Group Reports: START, CFE, CW, Proliferation, Nuclear Testing, Open Skies,
PARTICIPANTS
U.S.
- James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
- Robert Gates, Deputy National Security Advisor to President
- Reginald Bartholomew, Under Secretary of State, T
- Ronald Lehman, Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
- Robert B. Zoellick, Counselor, Department of State
- Raymond G. H. Seitz, Assistant Secretary of State, EUR
- Richard A. Clarke, Assistant Secretary, PM
- Dennis B. Ross, Director, Policy Planning Staff
- Margaret DeB. Tutwiler, Assistant Secretary of State, PA
- Jack Matlock, U.S. Ambassador to the USSR
- Richard Burt, U.S. Ambassador to the Nuclear and Space Talks
- Arnold Kanter, Senior Director, NSC Staff
- Steven Hadley, Assistant Secretary of Defense, ISP
- Gen. William Graves, Joint Chiefs of Staff
- James Woolsey, U.S. Ambassador to the CFE Negotiations
- Stephen Ledogar, U.S. Ambassador to Conference on Disarmament
- John Hawes, Ambassador-Designate to Open Skies Negotiations
- James P. Timbie, Special Advisor to Under Secretary Bartholomew
- Alexander Vershbow, Director, EUR/SOV (notetaker)
USSR
- Eduard A. Shevardnadze, Minister of Foreign Affairs
- Yuriy Dubinin, USSR Ambassador to the U.S.
- Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, First Deputy Foreign Minister
- Marshal Sergey Akhromeyev, Advisor to the President
- Aleksey Obukhov, Head, USA & Canada Administration, MFA
- Yuriy Nazarkin, USSR Ambassador to the Nuclear and Space Talks
- Major General Aleksandr Peresypkin, General Staff
- Oleg Grinevskiy, Ambassador to CFE Negotiations
- Sergey Tarasenko, Head, Policy Planning Administration
- Sergey Batsanov, Head of USSR CD Delegation
- Igor Palenykh, Head of USSR NTT Delegation
- Gennadiy Gerasimov, MFA Spokesman
- Georgiy Mamedov, Deputy Head, USA & Canada Administration
- Teymuraz Stepanov, Special Assistant to Shevardnadze
- Vitaliy Luk’yantsev, Soviet Open Skies Delegation
- Vitaliy Churkin, Special Assistant to Shevardnadze
- Viktor Prokofiev, MFA
interpreter (notetaker)
(plus other experts on both sides)
Secretary Baker said he did not believe there needed to be any reports from the regional working groups. He suggested that he and Shevardnadze proceed directly to the reports of the arms control working groups. He also suggested that they forego the closing plenary. He asked Shevardnadze whether the exact dates for the next ministerial could be announced at their press conferences.
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze replied that it would be the correct thing to announce the dates—or at least it would do no harm. The Ministers had already mentioned that another meeting would be necessary before the summit. Therefore if the Secretary agreed he would say that the Secretary’s visit would take place in mid-May. Alternatively, he could say that it would take place on May 16–19.
The Secretary replied that it was fine to go with the exact dates. He then asked Ambassador Burt to report on the START working group’s activities.
Working Group Reports:
START
Burt said that he and Nazarkin, together with their delegations, had had a productive meeting in several areas. They had substantially narrowed the sides’ differences on non-circumvention; pending the results of a legal review of the language that had been discussed, we believed a solution had been found. Similarly, progress had been made on treaty duration. The sides had agreed on 15 years with the provision for extending it for an additional five years under certain circumstances. The only thing left to agree was the mechanism for extension. There had also been a productive exchange on the Soviet approach to the verification of road-mobile ICBMs and this would be pursued further in Geneva.
Burt said that he and Nazarkin had agreed on a list2 of 32 START issues to be resolved in Geneva before the May ministerial. This list would serve two functions: it would give him and Nazarkin added impetus to curtail their lengthy lunches in Geneva; and it would give impetus to the bureaucracies in Moscow and Washington to provide the guidance needed to achieve results before mid-May. Therefore, while there were still some disagreements remaining on START-related issues, Burt believed the sides could meet the goal of completing a START agreement this year.
Nazarkin said that Burt had correctly presented the results of the working group and he had nothing to add.
The Secretary asked whether anyone else had any comments on START. If not, he would turn the floor over to the CFE working group.
[Omitted here are discussions not related to START.]
[Page 650]Ministers’ Comments on Working Group Reports
The Secretary said he was disappointed to hear this negative assessment of the Open Skies discussions. He had hoped to give impetus to this effort so that we could increase the chances of making substantial progress at Budapest. He wanted to offer some final words on START.
The Secretary said the START working group report had not touched on ALCMs and SLCMs. We knew there was a lot of work left to be done in these two major areas. But there was also a lot of work to be done on other START issues. He called the Soviet side’s attention to the list of 32 unresolved issues to be resolved by the next ministerial. It was important that we make every effort to resolve issues in Geneva now that the summit was scheduled for May 30. The fact that we agreed on the priorities should help move our bureaucracies.
Shevardnadze said he would like to endorse the Secretary’s comments and the wishes he had expressed. He also believed the sides were entering a very difficult and serious stage in START. All these issues were related one way or another to the summit. This included ALCMs and SLCMs, as well as chemical weapons. In this respect, time was growing short.
Regarding Open Skies, Shevardnadze noted that the Ministers had agreed in Ottawa to meet again in Budapest to prepare an Open Skies agreement. The working group’s report suggested that the state of readiness was very low.
On CFE, Shevardnadze said that a major political event was on the horizon, namely the all-European summit. If there were no CFE agreement, this would put that meeting in question. All participants were in favor of completing a CFE agreement by the summit; therefore we were entering a momentous phase.
Shevardnadze said he had the impression that our delegations in Geneva and Vienna would need to step up their work so as not to undermine these major upcoming events—events which would be of world significance. He believed a lot would depend on how promptly our governments reacted to their delegations request. Prompt answers would be needed, as well as further contacts between the two sides.
Shevardnadze noted that Ambassador Burt had said that he and Nazarkin had spent much of their time at luncheons. He was prepared to look at the question of controlling Soviet expense accounts. This was the most rational suggestion he had heard. Nevertheless, despite all the difficulties, he retained a sense of healthy optimism. We should meet again in a state of good readiness for these upcoming events. We had no alternatives since we were operating under the direct orders of our leaders.
Shevardnadze then thanked his friend the Secretary and members of the Secretary’s delegation. As for more specific critical comments, he would make these in Moscow.
The Secretary thanked Shevardnadze for his comments. As the two of them had learned, Ambassador Burt was an expert on lunches. He agreed [Page 651] it was important that we react promptly to requests from our delegations for guidance and that we establish contacts as needed between us in the seven weeks between this meeting and the summit. It was important that we institute and utilize whatever processes were necessary, in addition to the normal channels, in order to make the summit a successful one for both Presidents. What we achieved would depend on what we were able to accomplish in the next seven weeks. Despite our differences in one area, he too was optimistic that we could make progress. This would enable our heads of government to have a successful summit.
The meeting adjourned at 4:10 p.m.
- Source: Department of State, Bureau of European Affairs, Office of Russian Affairs, Russia Desk Files, Lot 99D344, Baker-Shevardnadze Washington 4/4-6/90. Secret; Nodis. Drafted on April 11; cleared by Seitz, Ross, and Timbie. The meeting took place in the Benjamin Franklin Room at the Department of State.↩
- Not found.↩