107. Memorandum of Conversation1
PARTICIPANTS
U.S.:
- Secretary Baker
- Ambassador Bartholomew
- Dennis B. Ross, Notetaker
- Interpreter
USSR:
- Eduard Shevardnadze
- General Akhromeyev
- Pavel Palazhenko
- Sergey Tarasenko, Notetaker
- Interpreter
Shevardnadze: I requested the meeting now because after meeting with the President and seeing how close the dates are on the Summit, I think we really have very little time left if we are going to get everything done and accomplished in time. My question, given the shortage of time, is what do we do now? I think it might be helpful if you would comment on your reaction to the elements of the Akhromeyev package that was outlined. I think it’s important to know what the US reaction to this package is. Also, I think we need to think about how we create an arrangement for further discussions on this and the remaining questions. I don’t think we can rely only on the negotiating mechanism in Geneva, because there are questions that are going to require political decisions, and maybe on a very regular basis. So I think what we need is an exchange of information, maybe including a mechanism of special envoys, so that we can establish meetings as needed. I really do believe strongly that the main issues really need to be decided pretty much before you visit in May.
Baker: I’m glad to hear you say that because I really don’t relish the idea of going to Moscow ten days before the Summit with major issues like the current ones outstanding. My reaction to the Akhromeyev package doesn’t really differ a lot from the reaction I gave you yesterday and repeated to some extent this morning. There are several problems, and they are serious problems. If we have any chance of reaching an agreement at all at the Summit, we’re going to need some process that is different than the one that we have leading.
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Congress a provision that we have no good way of verifying. We just can’t have a limit that is not in any way verifiable. It certainly would open you up to the same criticism in the Supreme Soviet. In fact, you [Page 643] noted this morning that you have your own concerns about ratification with the Supreme Soviet.
I’m happy to agree to some procedure, some process for expediting our discussions and trying to resolve these issues before I come to Moscow. Because, I can tell you that if we are still hung up the way we are right now, there’s really very little chance of our getting a START agreement initialed by the time of the Summit. And if that’s the case, we ought to let our publics know that now.
Shevardnadze: Well, let’s not set ourselves the task of signing the agreement then.
Baker: Well I am not setting us that task. But our two leaders set out the task of solving all the major substantive issues in START by the Summit.
Shevardnadze: Well, we both need to be able to do that.
Baker: Give us a proposal.
Akhromeyev: Mr. Secretary, the US on SLCMs has in effect changed 100% the position that you had in December of 1987. At that time the US President pledged to find a way to solve the verification problem.
Baker: Well, let’s look at the text. I wasn’t here, but I thought we said we would seek to find a mutually acceptable way to verify. We’ve sought to find such a way and we just don’t think there is one. And I’m not sure you do either.
Shevardnadze: No, we believe we could. We think you can inspect ships, inspect planes, inspect plants. What we hear from you is that plants can be inspected, but not ships. I think that is an indefensible position. You spoke about preparing public opinion; well unfortunately that’s going to lead us down the pathway of laying out our arguments about who’s right and who’s wrong. That’s not real productive. On verification, we want an honest agreement. You weren’t in the talks in 1987 and we had a different position and Akhromeyev objected at that time to the whole issue of verification, saying that the Soviet Union could go along with. Now, we’ve turned around on the issue of verification—we don’t have the position that was being pushed by Akhromeyev before. And, what we’re saying is why are you making an exception of naval forces?
Baker: When I said prepare public opinion, I did not mean to cast blame but rather to be careful in our statements that we don’t build up expectations that we cannot fulfill at the Summit. In fact, what I will tell our press conference after our meeting here is that I am disappointed that we didn’t solve ALCMs or SLCMs, but we’re working hard and as is always the case when you try to translate agreements into text, technical issues crop up. I am not going to suggest that this should be a blame-casting exercise, I’m going to avoid that.
[Page 644]Shevardnadze: This is also my intention. This is how I also will speak to the press.
Baker: I hope that’s how our delegations will handle it as well. Of course we can’t guarantee what everyone’s going to say.
Shevardnadze: I recall my work with the US side on the INF treaty and that was work that went on to the very last minute because as you get closer to an agreement the complexity of the questions that remain become much greater. You know I was in Washington, and three times we thought everything was worked out and agreed. And three times problems emerged. Suddenly in a few days technical questions emerged, emerged that were political. Marshal Akhromeyev and I went to Geneva, and it wasn’t easy to get the treaty into the proper condition. It’s just a given that the negotiating process is often times difficult. Those planes that could carry conventional ALCMs are emerging as a problem, and it’s a new problem, it’s a new question. Tactical planes armed with strategic ALCMs, that’s not something that existed before so it’s not necessarily surprising that that question might be opened up. You criticize us on the transfer of SS–23 missiles before the INF treaty, and I must say that I think your criticism is partly appropriate. But, by the same token, you have not told us about these planes that can carry ALCMs with a range of over 600 kilometers.
Baker: A tactical aircraft with that capability doesn’t exist right now.
Shevardnadze: In the process of negotiations, these things happen.
Bartholomew: Neither you nor we raised this issue in Moscow. As a point of information, conventional ALCMs on tactical aircraft was an issue that the Soviet side raised in Geneva as our negotiators were attempting to convert agreements made in Moscow into a joint draft text. We were surprised to hear this. I mean it is not as if it’s a special weapon. It doesn’t make sense that a conventional aircraft, armed with a tactical weapon should be seen as a nuclear weapon subject to START.
Akhromeyev: This is wrong. Before you raised the question there never existed such tactical aircraft armed with strategic missiles.
Bartholomew: A conventional ALCM with a 600 kilometer range is by your own definition not to be included in START.
Akhromeyev: No one had such missiles until now. If they appear now, this can’t be just a unilateral issue for the US, it ought to be something that’s negotiated.
Baker: This is serious. If you’re telling us that conventional weapons have to be in START, then we’re not going to have a treaty.
Akhromeyev: I’m not saying that this has to be written into the START treaty. I am saying that as we negotiate a START treaty and new weapons emerge that no one had, you at least have to consider the possible effect. That’s especially true as we get nearer a treaty. At least one [Page 645] ought to inform the other that the situation is emerging. It is similar to the SS–23 situation. We transferred these to our allies before the INF treaty. We didn’t hide this fact from anyone, we just didn’t announce it. And yet our ministers are saying now that we should have informed you.
Baker: That’s because INF covers the SS–23.
Akhromeyev: Only nuclear arms.
Bartholomew: The current START text says once we’ve worked out an acceptable range, all ALCMs that exist, whether they’re nuclear or conventional, will count as nuclear. And where future ALCMs are concerned, only nuclear ALCMs will be in the treaty. So the current ones will all count as nuclear if they are over a certain range. What we propose, and I thought we agreed to in Moscow, were ways to distinguish whether an ALCM was nuclear or not. For future ALCMs, we’re going to work out ways to distinguish what was nuclear and what was in the treaty.
Baker: This was your distinguishability concern and that’s why we went along with OSI. That’s something we accepted.
Shevardnadze: Well, we’re not going to reach a result in this discussion. We should agree today about the many elements that we’ve discussed and we should try to find a compromise proposal. For example, the issue of dropping verification and OSI for SLCMs is one that you want us to do, what’s the tradeoff if we drop that? This is the way we should be speaking. No treaty is going to be signed without compromise. That’s what it will take. And I think that yesterday and last night Bartholomew and Akhromeyev had a constructive discussion. When I listen to Akhromeyev I thought I saw certain prospects for compromise. If so, that’s the way we should act. If it’s just going to be an exchange of mutual complaints, we’ll each have a lot, and we won’t get anywhere. I am for a reasonable approach. You’ll have to say to us about range what we need and whether there is any solution possible. Tradeoffs are going to necessary but they will have to be reasonable ones.
Baker: We’ve talked a lot about range. We’ve spent a lot of time on it. One of the main problems we have is that on our side, rightly or wrongly, after we left Moscow, we felt there were only three issues to resolve. Now you say suppose I give up verification, what will you pay for it? On our side, our assumption was that we had already done that. The way to approach things now is to acknowledge that there are eleven issues between us and put together a package approach.
Akhromeyev: I have a package.
Baker: I am talking about tradeoffs in the eleven. Why don’t you think about what sort of proposals you would suggest on the three issues that we both agreed were outstanding when we left Moscow? [Page 646] What can you do on those three issues—on the range, nuclear/conventional and the range for SLCMs? Suppose you ended up getting most of what you want from those, what could we expect from you? On all these other issues we’d want to know that we are pretty much getting what we needed. And I can’t tell you that that would be enough for us, but I can tell you that if you came back to us with some kind of a proposal that took account of your getting a good chunk of what you want on the three issues, I’d be prepared in return for your giving up on these other eight, to put that to our group. But I can’t go back on issues we thought we had already closed. I am offering this only as a hypothetical suggestion as to what you might do. In fact, what I am saying is that if we can resolve these three issues and even assume for the moment that you get some of what you want—maybe a lot of what you want on those three issues—is that going to take care of everything else that’s now been raised? I can’t commit to considering anything you might do in this regard, other than to say that I would approach it in a good faith fashion.
Akhromeyev: We can do this. I was reporting two packages—one on SLCMs and one on ALCMs. That was an oral report. Maybe I should sit with Bartholomew and formulate a written report outlining what the tradeoffs are. He and I could initial it. These initials would not be binding, it would just be our thinking and would be something informal.
Baker: Well, I am proposing just that kind of exercise.
Akhromeyev: Well, so in a week’s time we can look at it in Moscow. You’re here, we can exchange views. Or maybe new positions will emerge. That will be our homework. We don’t need it for the bigger group, we’ll just get it done, we’ll just do it in an in-house discussion.
Baker: What I was trying to do this morning is pinpoint the areas of disagreement and the areas in which we are in agreement. The elements of common ground are a good place to start. We have two lists. We’ve got agreed, we’ve got disagreed. And I want to see if there is anyway out of this trap.
Shevardnadze: I believe that’s the way to go. You should identify what we agree on, what we disagree on and then look at what the possible tradeoffs are.
Baker: Well, I think we may have some problems with tradeoffs if it’s based upon your new proposals and not based upon where we were when we left Moscow. But let’s take a look, how do we follow up?
Shevardnadze: We’ll deal internally on these papers and maybe we will come up with some variants.
Bartholomew: We could digest the exchange we’ve had and think about how we both could identify and think about the packages and [Page 647] then communicate to the ministry and if necessary follow up with envoys.
Akhromeyev: I could venture to try to write up the package by 6:00. I don’t want to pledge anything, it wouldn’t be any official communication.
Bartholomew: Well, the problem of trying to do it that quickly even with the best will in the world, we’re not going to work this out in twenty minutes.
Baker: Let the two of them compile a list of agreed and disagreed items.
Akhromeyev: Well, if you’re that skeptical, I could still try to put something together.
Baker: Give us a package you would propose. We’ve got an entire delegation who thought we were down to three issues. If you’re trying to put together a package, I’ve got to reconvene our Defense and our NSC people and in the next three hours it’s going to be hard to do that. I think what might be most useful would be for you to lay out on the three issues that are outstanding what your position would be if you got a lot of what you want on those issues and how it would affect the other eight issues that you’ve now identified. If you come back with something like this, I could surface that in our delegation and we’ll see if I can get approval on going that way.
Akhromeyev: Well, if we follow the Secretary’s approach, then we should go back to Moscow and present you within a week with a formal package.
Baker: It doesn’t have to be formal.
Shevardnadze: We will go back to Moscow, we’ll think again and consult. But one thing we need to be clear about. Do we want an agreement or do we want it to be postponed? I don’t know the views of the others in my delegation. I don’t think it would be a disaster if we don’t sign it. But I do know what the instructions of both of our Presidents were and therefore I think we ought to find a compromise.
Baker: I know our President wants to be in a position where we settle all the major issues by the Summit. Certainly the President expects that. Frankly, I am rather pessimistic but I’m willing to work hard and set up a new process and expand our contacts between now and May.
Shevardnadze: This is precisely what I propose that we do and that should be our main work. Let’s clear away the underbrush and get it done before your visit. We’ll come back to you with our views in about a week’s time and we’ll send you our suggestions. We won’t do it in any formal way.
End Conversation
- Source: Department of State, Policy Planning Staff, Lot 03D012, Dennis Ross Files, US/Soviet Memos of Conversation—1989/1990. Secret.↩