86. Memorandum of Conversation1
SUBJECT
- Ambassador Paul H. Nitze’s Meeting with Richard Perle
We first discussed the RSVP report.2 I said my original reaction to the Kamchatka radar section was that it differed entirely from my memory of the episode; I had asked my staff to dig out the records; to my surprise the record fully supports the RSVP statements, not my recollection. Perle said he had had exactly the same experience. This resulted in extended interchange concerning the strange and complicated methods of Kissinger’s scheming.
We then discussed the origins of the SCC’s conception. I stressed the point that neither the Soviets nor we wished to surrender to any independent body decisions vital to its security and that I continued to support this position. I had also wished to make the discussions in the SCC confidential; that did not mean governments couldn’t take their full case to the public; but they should not in public quote what had been said in the SCC. As I saw it the failures re compliance were in the nature of the problem, budgetary problems, congressional problems, shortcomings in our own handling of the problems and Soviet intransigence and trickery. I did not see what the point was in belaboring the nature of the institution; I did not see an organizational solution to the problem. Perle seemed to agree.
Perle then turned to Part II of the RSVP report which has not yet been prepared (or at least circulated). He wanted my ideas as to what should be done. I said I had not given much thought to the matter; I had just finished reading Part I.
He then outlined a number of things which could be done. One was to go to the Congress with a list of supplemental budgetary requests to cover programs necessary to offset, at least in part, Soviet violations. Another was to not phase out, but to recore, Poseidon submarines. This would cost something like $160,000 per R.V. per year over a ten-year operational life, as opposed to ten to twenty times as much for MX or D–5 RVs. He said the Services were opposed because the Poseidon had no prompt hard target kill capability. This got us into an extended discussion of the issues involved. Another idea was that of using the [Page 295] 100 or so “excess” MM IIIs which are stored and will not be used unless deployed. If deployed they could free up MM IIs which have a variety of uses for space launch.
We then had an extended discussion of why he thinks the Soviets are preparing for an ABM breakout to a territorial defense and the steps we should be taking to counter this possibility.
I then got into a step-by-step discussion of my thoughts as to an NST strategy for preparing for the second summit. He agreed with the British and French point, the INF point, the START point, the verification point, and most of the points related to SDI. He continued to differ with me about heading into a clarification of the dividing line between permitted and prohibited development and testing. He thought we would run a danger of cutting off work necessary to keeping defense industry interested in the program.
- Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1985 Nodis and Exdis Secretariat Memorandums, Lot 94D092, 1985 Nodis Memorandums: November 1–30, 1985. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place at the Metropolitan Club.↩
- See footnote 4, Document 83.↩