Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

85. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Crowe) to Secretary of Defense Weinberger¹

JCSM–410–85

Washington, November 26, 1985

SUBJECT

• Response to Soviet Violation Policy (U)

1. (S) On 24 September 1985, the Joint Chiefs of Staff provided² initial military advice regarding responses to Soviet violations of arms control agreements. We stated that the Strategic Modernization Program (SMP) and the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) were developed with full recognition of past and foreseeable Soviet violations. Therefore, adequate funding to support the full capability of the SMP and the potential of the SDI, coupled with continued modernization of US conventional forces, would constitute a proper and effective response to Soviet violations.

2. (S) Since 24 September 1985, the OJCS has reviewed an extensive list of options developed from Service inputs requested³ by ASD (International Security Policy). The review confirmed that balanced and modernized strategic and conventional forces, which are designed to overcome future Soviet defenses (with or without violations) and to deter for the long term, continue to offer the best military response to Soviet violations. For example, there are a number of high technology programs in research that could be accelerated by full funding into production. Additional responses, even those that may offer a measure of military utility, must not be adopted at the expense of the President’s balanced overall modernization program.⁴

3. (S) Further, if additional funding is expected from Congress, priority should be given to the restoration of the full SMP. If properly orchestrated, restoring these programs would send a strong and appropriate signal to the Soviets and to US allies that the United States will take the steps necessary to ensure deterrence in the face of Soviet violations even during periods of budget austerity. The full SMP will be particularly important if arms control negotiations should result in greatly reduced strategic force levels. It should be noted that JCS certification of the US proposal for a 50-percent arms reduction was based on the assumption that the SMP will be executed essentially intact.

4. (S) We recognize the political controversy associated with responding to Soviet violations and the temptation to express US anger in a dramatic fashion. Nevertheless, in the face of the significant FY 1986 budget cuts being considered by the joint conference on defense appropriations, we cannot support additional programs at the expense of the long-term, coordinated strategic and conventional modernization.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC–330–87–0008, Box 3, USSR 388.3 (Nov–Dec 1985). Secret. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum indicates Weinberger saw it on November 27. Printed from an unsigned copy; however, another copy of the memorandum indicates that Crowe signed it. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Weinberger Papers, Department of Defense Files, Box CL 838, Subject File, 1985 U.S.S.R 169–180 (14))
2. JCSM–329–85, 24 September 1985, “Response to Soviet Violation Policy.” [Footnote is in the original.]
3. ASD (ISP) memorandums, 20 June 1985, “DOD Group on Mutual Interim Restraint.” [Footnote is in the original.]
4. Weinberger underlined and drew two short vertical lines to the left and right of the sentence: “Additional responses, even those that may offer a measure of military utility, must not be adopted at the expense of the President’s balanced overall modernization program.”