Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

71. Memorandum From Robert Linhard of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, October 10, 1985

SUBJECT

• Handling the ABM Issue Before and After the NSPG

This memorandum makes recommendations and seeks guidance on handling the ABM Treaty Interpretation Issue both before and after Friday’s² NSPG. As you will see, it drives us to the clear conclusion that it is absolutely essential that the lag time between the NSPG and the President’s decision be cut to as close to zero as possible. We are working the NSDD as quickly as we can and will have that for your review by late COB tonight at the latest. Based upon the situation outlined in the following paragraphs, the outcome that we really need is for the President to “decide” at the NSPG, announce his decision, and release the NSDD by COB on Friday to guide the weekend’s work.

We are currently building the needed package to permit the NSPG paperwork to be available to administratively fill that square if needed this afternoon. With a largely vanilla piece in the can, we will continue to improve and add to the package so that we have a good final by COB (whenever that is tonight).

Before the Meeting.

1. Meeting with Paul Nitze. It would probably be most useful if you could find the time to spend a few minutes with Paul Nitze privately before the NSPG. It would be a much better meeting if you knew exactly where he stands and had the chance to hear this from him. He will be back from Europe tonight at about 9 pm. He could be available in the morning. In getting information on his availability, we gave no indication of any interest on your part in such a meeting.

Recommendation. That you arrange to see Paul privately before the NSPG.³

2. Private Discussions With SecState and SecDef. It would also be useful for you to find an opportunity to discuss the state of play with respect to public affairs with SecState and SecDef today. A suggestion from them to their staffs to keep this issue from going any further in the press at this time could be very useful insurance—but likely very necessary insurance. (I did talk once again to Ed Djerejian and he made it very clear today in his conference call that no additional comment on ABM Treaty interpretation is authorized.)

Recommendation. That should the opportunity arise [or could appropriately be generated], you get SecState and SecDef to pass this instruction to their staffs.⁴

After the Meeting.

1. Speech on Decision. You had asked us to work towards a speech by Paul or Sofaer on the decision after the NSPG. Steve Steiner and I agree that the forum in San Francisco is wrong for what we want. Steve feels that provided we give notice Friday after the NSPG, and assuming the Press Club is not already booked, we could likely get the platform we need for a Nitze speech there on Tuesday⁵ (Monday being a holiday). If this is the way that you wish to go, we would recommend that your talking points for the NSPG suggest such a speech so that the tasking for such an event results from the meeting. Nitze’s staff can then have Saturday to work on a text and we can review it on Sunday and work with them as needed on Monday to finalize it.

— We are approaching this action from the perspective that it is more important to get on the record, in Washington, early (and without preemption) than to delay to increase the press coverage of the speech. In short, the objective is getting on the record with the interested community—not necessarily getting to the general public.

— Steve has suggested that an alternative approach, which may be more effective for these purposes, would be an “on the record” briefing for press on Tuesday at State. This could be given by Paul with Sofaer assisting in the legal aspects. This may allow us to be a bit more focused in achieving our objective while avoiding any undue hype in public—making this more of a public interest item than we need. To do this, we could set the preparations en train on Friday afternoon, but delay announcing the briefing until Monday or Tuesday morning at State. If we go the speech route, we will need to go outside the Executive Branch to set up the appropriate forum much earlier (i.e., on Friday) which would, of itself, create more visibility and could arouse speculation about our intentions.

— I find this alternative approach (of the Nitze/Sofaer briefing) very attractive and I agree that it would be helpful to have State’s top legal expert take part. It can also serve as a fallback should you decide to have us pursue the speech options and we then find we can’t get the right forum for the speech.

— Nitze is scheduled to give an address to the North Atlantic Assembly on Tuesday in San Francisco (which Jack Matlock arranged with Mathias). All of the above would require he cancel and have someone else give his prepared (and cleared) speech. We can ask Ken—Mathias didn’t want Adelman, but the situation calls for Nitze to be here.

Recommendation. That you consider the alternative and provide guidance on which approach you want us to pursue as primary.⁶

Nitze Speech on Tuesday _______

Nitze/Sofaer Briefing on Tuesday _______

Other _______

2. Meetings with Congress. After the NSPG, we should recognize that the real battleground on the issue will be in the Congress. (Ron Sable is sending you a PROFS note on a conversation he has already had with Norm Dix that you should read.)

a. At the NSPG, the President should hear the views of his advisors as to how best to present the USG position to the Congress. Based on the NSPG discussion, we will need to charge State, Defense and ACDA to come up with a coordinated plan to anticipate and handle the requests for briefings and hearings that will come. Nitze and Sofaer should play a major role in this, especially if you choose to have them brief the press on this on Tuesday afternoon. It would likely, therefore, be best if State were charged with developing and coordinating the drafting of the plan, but it should be made clear that it would be most useful if Paul assisted in the orchestration of this effort. This plan will be needed quickly (for your review on Monday).

b. In addition to this plan, initial contacts should be made with key members as soon as possible. Warner and Nunn have expressed an interest in this subject. Fascell is reported to be planning hearings. You should consider a call from you to Warner—and perhaps Nunn. Contacts to the leadership and other key members prior to Monday needs to be considered in the context of the NSPG discussion (i.e., Warner, Nunn, Aspin, Dole, Byrd, Fascell, Lugar, Michael and O’Neill). It is essential that consultations with key Congressional players occur before any speech or briefing is given to the press.

Recommendation. That we adjust your talking points for the NSPG to include the proposal that a Congressional plan be developed by State and coordinated with Defense and others so that it can be reviewed and implemented on Monday.⁷

3. The Allies. We also need to consider how we can give the allies any appropriate information about this development. The best course would be to ensure that a cable informing posts of activities planned for Tuesday is released on Monday, so that posts have time to brief Allies at least a few hours before we go public.

Recommendation. That we plan to have State draft such a message for release at COB Monday.⁸

4. The US NST Delegation. Finally, the US NST delegation will need to have warning of Tuesday’s events. A separate cable to the US NST delegation will be needed. This should be followed later next week with more detailed instructions on how to handle Soviet questions.

Recommendation. That we plan to have State draft an initial message for the delegation on Monday and plan on having the IG/Backstopping Group meet and develop more detailed instructions on Tuesday for transmission to the delegation as soon as possible later that week.⁹

1. Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR–110, NSPG 120 11 Oct 1985. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. All brackets are in the original.
2. October 11.
3. McFarlane approved the recommendation. No minutes of a meeting with Nitze were found.
4. McFarlane approved the recommendation.
5. October 15 (October 14 was Columbus Day).
6. McFarlane approved the option “Nitze/Sofaer Briefing on Tuesday,” crossed out “Nitze” and wrote “Paul is in San Fran” in the left-hand margin beside the recommendation.
7. McFarlane approved the recommendation.
8. McFarlane approved the recommendation.
9. McFarlane approved the recommendation.