Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

70. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Federal Republic of Germany¹

312448.

Washington, October 10, 1985, 0451Z

SUBJECT

• Interpretation of the ABM Treaty. Eyes Only for AMB. Nitze and Norman Clyne From Timbie.

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. This subject was discussed inconclusively at the SACG on Friday.² Roz and Allen supported the approach in your paper.³ Bud directed the following.

— Each agency is to provide its view to the NSC on this question.

— The State Legal Adviser is to provide his opinion.

3. The Washington Post today has an Oberdorfer article headlined “White House Revises Interpretation of the ABM Treaty.”⁴ It says that a senior White House official confirmed McFarlane’s Sunday television remarks.⁵ The article goes on to address this subject at some length, quoting Gerard Smith, anonymous officials etc.

4. This morning at the Shultz-Weinberger breakfast Bud raised this subject with the Secretary in a manner that showed some emotion. The Secretary defended his ground, saying this is too enormous an issue to be decided at the SACG, and must be addressed by the President. Bud responded that it would go to the President, but he knew how it would come out.

5. We have just heard that the NSPG on Friday⁶ at 11:00 a.m. will probably address the ABM treaty and SDI. As you know only the Secretary normally attends but you are on the list for this one so you might try to advance your arrival Friday in order to attend.

6. Text follows of an excerpt from Bud’s backgrounder yesterday:

Q. On Sunday, on the television program in connection with the Soviet offer and the Strategic Defense Initiative, you stated that it was your view that testing and development of ABM systems which are in the category of other physical principles is permitted by the ABM treaty. Is that the position of the administration now? Is that its fixed position?

A. Yes.

Q. And, if it is, how do you justify or explain how that position was reached when the person who negotiated the treaty, Ambassador Smith, says that was not the understanding when it was done and when the administration itself in its arms control impact statements for several years—the last one last year—seems to say the opposite?

A. I think, first of all, the Soviet Union has never accepted such an interpretation that foreclosed what I have said, research testing development of systems based upon other physical principles. They have never tolerated that.

Now it is true that there have been unilateral statements periodically that have stated, under the circumstances at the time that we should seek to limit those systems and that the ABM Treaty ought to encompass that. Never have the Soviets bought that. And the conditions today are substantially different from conditions at the time that speculation was offered.

Different in their sense of these many, many Soviet programs that have, in some cases, matured rather dramatically.

Shultz

1. Source: Department of State, S/S–IRM Special Caption Files, Top Secret/Secret Sensitive Memorandum, Lot 91D257, Eggplant II, September–December 1985. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Timbie; cleared in in S/S and S/S–O; approved by Timbie.
2. October 4; no minutes were found.
3. See Document 69.
4. See Don Oberdorfer, “White House Revises Interpretation of ABM Treaty,” Washington Post, October 9, 1985, pp. A21, A24.
5. October 6. See footnote 2, Document 69.
6. October 11.