Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

49. Memorandum From John Douglass of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, June 27, 1985

SUBJECT

• Strategic Modernization NSDD (Follow-on to NSDD–91)

After the Senate vote on MX, Admiral Poindexter sent the new Strategic NSDD back to me for redo of the ICBM portion (see note at Tab II).²

I have, accordingly, rewritten that portion to reflect the situation we now face on MX and to make the NSDD compatible with the no undercut NSDD (NSDD–173).³

I have informally coordinated the change with OSD (General Powell), State and the Air Force. In view of the extensive prior coordination on the NSDD and the fact that the summer POM cycle is rapidly passing, I feel strongly that you should move the NSDD on to the President if you still concur with its contents.

I have held the NSDD pending the House floor vote on MX. Now that the House has made its decision I see no point in further delay. We need to regain the offensive on MX and I believe the new MX wording will help achieve this.

By laying out the process for the selection of a new basing mode for more MX, we will clearly be signaling to the Congress that we do not accept the House attempt to permanently cap the program and that we are moving forward on the survivability issue. This opens the door for the continuation of the program and creates a strong rationale for us to use in support of Nunn and the Senate position during conference. It also lays the foundation for denying our critics their strongest argument (that MX is not survivable).

Finally, you asked me to point out in my memo where all the skeletons are buried in the NSDD. The memo at Tab II which sent the last version to you notes that we took all but one or two of DOD’s suggested changes in the final version (the ones we did not take were administrative in nature). There is, of course, more here than appears on the surface. While few objections to the NSDD were raised during the extensive, informal coordination I did this spring, the Navy began to object during the formal coordination cycle. While one can describe their position in various ways, I believe it is fair to say that they felt in their final analysis that it would divert more money into the strategic line and hurt other areas of the budget. They argued this strongly within the JCS and succeeded in getting the JCS to come out against the new NSDD (some factions in the Army and Air Force are sympathetic to this argument). The SecDef reviewed all of this and finally came down in favor of the NSDD with the changes noted at Tab II which we accepted. I would fully expect the JCS to continue their opposition if we were to recoordinate the entire NSDD at this time.

In this regard, it is important to note that I have recoordinated only the new portion of the ICBM language. OSD and State have both agreed to the new language.

Quick action on the NSDD is important because further delay will cause the new portions of the NSDD to miss the summer POM cycle. The delays to date are now sending a signal to those who oppose the modernization program that their efforts to delay the program are succeeding. In fact, my contacts in OSD expressed surprise that the NSDD was still alive. The general conclusion they had drawn was someone had killed it and, therefore, we did not plan to continue the new portions of the program. A failure to move forward with the NSDD in the near future will have broad impact on the resources allocated to strategic forces, especially in the areas where new work is needed to link the program to SDI (air defense, targeting of mobile missiles, etc.).

Bob Linhard, Mike Donley, and Sven Kramer concur.

Bill Wright’s concerns at Tab II still apply.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I⁴ moving the NSDD to the President for signature.⁵

1. Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR–090, NSDD 178. Top Secret; Special Access. Sent for action. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum reads: “Signed.”
2. Attached but not printed. See Document 33.
3. See Document 47.
4. Printed as Document 50.
5. Printed as Document 51. McFarlane approved the recommendation.