Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

46. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan¹

Washington, June 8, 1985

SUBJECT

• U.S. Interim Restraint Policy

ISSUE

Should the United States continue, modify or abandon current U.S. interim restraint policy?

BACKGROUND

In 1982, on the eve of the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START) and in order to foster an atmosphere conducive to serious negotiation, you decided that the United States would not undercut the expired SALT I agreement or the unratified SALT II agreement as long as the Soviet Union exercised equal restraint. For several years, the United States has scrupulously adhered to this commitment and lived within these agreements. By contrast, the Soviet Union has repeatedly violated its arms control commitments.

Although Soviet noncompliance certainly warrants a regular, critical review of current policy, you face a decision at this particular time because the Congress has required a report on this subject which is due on next Monday, June 10. Were it not for this Congressional requirement, you would not face this issue until the seventh TRIDENT SSBN goes on sea trials this September. Thereafter, certain other events could necessitate revisiting U.S. policy on a regular basis.

— In September, 1985, the seventh U.S. TRIDENT SSBN will begin sea trials. At that time, unless current policy is modified, we would be required to retire and disassemble according to agreed SALT procedures either a POSEIDON SSBN or 14 MINUTEMAN III ICBMs to stay with the SALT II ceiling of no more than 1200 MIRVed ballistic launchers.

— On December 31, 1985, the unratified SALT II Treaty would have expired. If current policy is continued, this milestone will raise the question of whether we need continue to refrain from undercutting an agreement that would have expired.

— In June, 1986, the eighth TRIDENT SSBN enters sea trials and the 121st ALCM equipped B–52 would be deployed. Both these actions would drive further reductions in older POSEIDON SSBNs or MINUTEMAN III ICBMs. The eighth TRIDENT will require us to retire either 2 additional, older POSEIDON SSBNs or 22 MINUTEMAN IIIs. Once we exceed 120 ALCM carrying bombers, we will have to retire one additional MIRVed ballistic missile launcher (either POSEIDON launch tubes [16 per sub] or MINUTEMAN III silos) for each ALCM carrying bomber over the first 120 deployed.

DISCUSSION

In approaching this decision, there are both military and political factors to be considered.

Military Considerations. Continuing interim restraint will have an impact on the number of U.S. forces. Up to now, we have been able to stay within the applicable SALT I constraints by dismantling rather aged systems. Among these were the remaining U.S. POLARIS submarines and the TITAN II ICBMs, both non-MIRVed systems. However, as the next TRIDENT submarines put to sea this September, we will hit the SALT II MIRV limits for the first time. As a result, should we continue our interim restraint policy without modification, we will have to begin dismantling existing MIRVed missiles like the POSEIDON C-3 SLBM (which carries roughly [less than 1 line not declassified] and the MINUTEMAN III ICBM [1 line not declassified].

The real issue is whether the reductions involved affect needed military capability. Given our shortfall in capability to target Soviet hard installations, and the age of a portion of our POSEIDON fleet, it is most likely that the U.S. military would choose to retire POSEIDON SSBNs. While each POSEIDON SSBN dismantled would mean a reduction of [less than 1 line not declassified] (the 16 missiles carried by each submarine, each in turn carrying [1 line not declassified]. The JCS assesses the overall loss of military capability to be marginal. The civilian leadership of the Department of Defense does not fully share this view.

With respect to the impact on Soviet forces, the Department of Defense feels that while the Soviets will also have to retire existing systems to stay under SALT limits, given the nature of the SALT limits, the way that the Soviets have adapted to these limits, and Soviet military requirements, the overall impact of SALT constraints (or lack thereof) on Soviet military capability will also be marginal.

In the next few years, to comply with existing agreements, the Soviets will have to draw down significantly greater numbers of missiles, but these will be non-MIRVed systems. The U.S., on the other hand, will draw down significantly more total warheads, although these will largely be the older POSEIDON C-3 warheads described above.

The overall assessment provided to you by General Vessey at last week’s NSC meeting² was that given the marginal nature of the impact the constraints will have on the overall military capability of both sides, the military factors involved should not drive this decision. However, the Chairman was equally quick to point out that it is essential that the U.S. strategic modernization program proceed as planned, and that the impact of any change in support for this program must be carefully factored into your decision.

Political Considerations. The political situation is quite different. Views on this issue are very strong both here at home and abroad. We must carefully consider the impact that retaining some interim restraint framework has both on the Congress and on our allies.

With respect to the Congress, the most important task we face is to maintain support for our critically needed strategic modernization program and for an adequate overall level of defense spending to meet national security needs. In dealing with our allies, we must focus our efforts on maintaining their collective and individual support for:

— the NATO LRINF modernization program and continued support for deployment of PERSHING II and GLCM as required;

— the SDI program;

— the U.S. position in the Geneva negotiations; and

— overall efforts to sustain the cohesion of the NATO alliance and the associated military capability needed to give the alliance meaning.

It would be easier to maintain the support identified above if we had an interim framework of mutual restraint supported with equal sincerity by the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, the Soviets have not joined us in such a framework. We have tried to better educate both Congress and our allies about the extent of the Soviet noncompliance problem. Appreciation of the significance of the problem is growing—especially of the obvious fact that you simply can’t have effective arms control unless you are serious about compliance. All reasonable parties would like us to do something to resolve the problem caused by Soviet noncompliance. The political argument revolves around what we should do.

Options. The interagency community has provided to you a series of five options.

— Option A would continue not to undercut SALT I and II.

— Option B would continue not to undercut SALT I and II, but with a programmatic response to Soviet violations.

— Option C would continue not to undercut SALT I and II, but with exceptions.

— Option D would discontinue not undercutting SALT I and II.

— Option E would adopt a new policy of independent restraint.

Observations. You have had the benefit of the NSC discussion last week. You have also had subsequent discussions with a number of key players on this issue, and additional written inputs from others. Secretary Shultz has reported to you on the views of our allies as recently sampled at the North Atlantic Council meeting in Lisbon this week.³ Finally, on last Wednesday night, the Senate passed a resolution⁴ on this subject that also is a useful input. I will not try to resummarize these views. After reviewing all of these, however, it is my judgement that, even in the face of the serious problem posed by Soviet noncompliance, the critical tasks we face requiring the assistance of the Congress and the allies will be inestimably more difficult if we set aside the SALT regime.

Draft NSDD. In light of the above, we have carefully reviewed and drawn upon each of the options suggested for your consideration and developed the draft NSDD provided at Tab A. It attempts to balance our concern about Soviet noncompliance while calling for the Soviets to join us in establishing an interim framework of true, mutual restraint. It also mandates that we take actions which represent proportionate response to specific instances of Soviet noncompliance. I would recommend the approach outlined in this NSDD.

RECOMMENDATION

OK NO

____ ____ That you approve the draft NSDD provided for your consideration at Tab A.⁵

1. Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR–088, NSDD–173. Secret. Sent for action. Prepared by Linhard. Brackets, except those indicating material not declassified, are in the original. Poindexter initialed the memorandum on McFarlane’s behalf. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum reads: “Signed.” In a personal diary entry for Saturday, June 8–Sunday, June 9, Reagan wrote: “N.S.C. kept sending intelligence memos having to do with P.M. Gandhis visit & SALT II & our allies position. They want us to continue abiding by it. Tomorrow Mon. I forward my decision to the Cong. We will abide by SALT II to the extent the Soviets do—which means we wont destroy a Poseidon Sub when the next Trident is launched in September.” (Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 468)
2. See Document 43.
3. Reference is to telegram Secto 11044 from the Secretary’s Delegation in Lisbon, June 7. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N number])
4. An excerpt from the June 5 Senate Resolution on Interim Restraint Policy is ibid.
5. Printed as Document 47. Reagan initialed his approval of the recommendation and placed a checkmark next to his initials.