Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

278. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Department of State¹

Geneva, September 12, 1988, 1636Z

10050. PM for Mr. Harrison Only; EUR for Mr. Thomas Only; C for Mr. Ramee Only; D for Dr. Timbie Only; S/ARN for Mr. Clyne Only From Edward Ifft. Subject: Krasnoyarsk and other Favorites.

Conversation on Krasnoyarsk

1. At an otherwise uneventful lunch with Yuri Roslyakov on September 8 (reported septel),² the topic of the Krasnoyarsk radar came up, and I thought it best to report this only in this channel. I noted our disappointment with the ABM Treaty review. I said Karpov had started out the week with the statement that the Soviet side is prepared to tear down the radar (or its equipment, whatever that means) in exchange for some joint statement about the treaty. This had seemed to me a promising approach, but Karpov did not follow through and, by the end of the review, was claiming he had no authority to offer to tear down the radar. This was a curious performance.

2. Roslyakov said that Karpov had some “golden words,” which he could not remember exactly, by which the sides would commit themselves to “observe” the ABM Treaty for some period of time. I said the Soviet side could not get such a commitment in exchange for Krasnoyarsk. Any attempt to do so would quickly run into the issues D and S has been unable to resolve—legal status of a non-withdrawal commitment, broad vs. narrow interpretation, time period, etc. What might have been possible, though by no means certain, if Karpov had agreed to dismantle the radar and settle Gomel, was some joint statement to the effect that the sides consider that the treaty is operating satisfactorily. This should have been sufficient for the Soviet side, but the opportunity was missed.

3. Roslyakov said that Karpov and General Burns had agreed to meet again in Geneva on or about September 15 to try again to find a solution. He thought it was good for these two to work on the problem without 20 people in the room. I said I had no knowledge of such a Karpov-Burns meeting, although Karpov had said the sides should continue to work on the problem prior to the Shultz-Shevardnadze.³ I asked whether Karpov had described this meeting as firmly scheduled or only as a possibility. Roslyakov replied that Karpov described it as definitely agreed. He added that perhaps Karpov was mistaken. In any case, this is evidently a sensitive matter.

4. Roslyakov told me August 31 that the Krasnoyarsk radar was a stupid mistake. He now added that those responsible are dead and we cannot expect any solution which humiliates Gorbachev, who was not to blame. He called attention to the fact that the link to Thule and Fylingdales had been essentially dropped, although they were mentioned by Karpov. He thought this was a significant move by the Soviet side that the U.S. side had missed. I said I had noticed and welcomed the change on Thule and Fylingdales. I also understood the Soviet sensitivity to any humiliation of Gorbachev. However, the Soviet side must understand that the U.S. cannot be in the position of appearing to pay something in exchange for the correction of Soviet violation. Roslyakov then remarked that there is a real question whether the issue must be resolved now. Perhaps, from the Soviet point of view, it would be better to settle the problem in the next administration.

5. I strongly urged him to understand the seriousness of the situation. The U.S. has essentially no flexibility on the issue—the only solution is to dismantle the radar. If this does not happen soon, events could be set in motion which would be hard to control. Roslyakov objected that U.S.-Soviet relations are now reasonably good and the U.S. would not want to provoke a “crisis” during the election campaign. I said he failed to understand the U.S. electorate—a very tough stand on Krasnoyarsk would be popular with the U.S. public. Furthermore, waiting for a new administration could be a big mistake if events in the next few months serve to limit the options the new administration will have. Roslyakov took these points, but seemed unconvinced.

6. One other tidbit from this conversation is that Armand Hammer, who was on his way to Moscow, told Obukhov and Roslyakov September 7 that President Reagan is eager for another summit with Gorbachev. Roslyakov threw cold water on this idea, saying it was unlikely to happen. This completes the memcon portion of this message.

Comments on Krasnoyarsk

7. I fear the Soviets do not understand the seriousness of the situation or what bad things could happen if it is not resolved. I talked independently to Karpov, Obukhov and Roslyakov at the U.S. reception August 31 just after the review had collapsed. None of them seemed at all concerned or disappointed. I might add that some members of the U.S. delegation were full of undisguised glee at the fact that the problem had not been resolved. I think Roslyakov’s remark noted above may explain a lot. From the Soviet point of view, it makes no sense that a U.S. administration which has worked hard and successfully to develop reasonably good U.S.-Soviet relations would kick that all away in its final days over an issue which has been around for years. While that is perfectly logical from their point of view, it fails to understand the forces at work in and on the USG right now.

8. The only advice I have to suggest is to do the obvious thing that was curiously not attempted during the review. This is to work in parallel on a commitment to dismantle Krasnoyarsk and language for a joint statement saying something positive about the ABM Treaty. Assuming both parts of the deal were accepted, the statement could be signed by either Shultz and Shevardnadze or Burns and Karpov.

9. We also should accept the Soviet suggestion to develop criteria for determining the difference between ABM radars and Spacetrack radars (I would also add NTM radars). This would provide a small fig leaf for Gorbachev. It should also be in our interest, since it was the failure of the two sides to do this in 1972 which provided the cover story the Soviets apparently thought would make Krasnoyarsk acceptable. Failure to work out such criteria now would just invite the Krasnoyarsk problem to be repeated all over again in the future.

[Omitted here are discussions not related to SDI or the ABM Treaty.]

Hammer

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880810–0870. Secret; Immediate.
2. Reference is to telegram 10035 from NST Geneva, September 12. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880808–0075)
3. Shevardnadze met with Shultz and Reagan in Washington on September 22 and September 23. Memoranda of conversation are printed in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Documents 171–177.