Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

28. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to the Senior Arms Control Group¹

Washington, April 4, 1985

SUBJECT

• US Interim Restraint Policy (U)

Since 1981, the United States has pursued a policy of “interim restraint” to “not undercut” existing strategic arms control agreements. This policy was intended to foster restraint on the part of the United States and the Soviet Union while negotiations to achieve arms reduction were underway. The US policy clearly requires Soviet reciprocity as described in the President’s formulation of May 1982 as follows: “As for existing strategic arms agreements, we will refrain from actions which undercut them so long as the Soviet Union shows equal restraint.”² (S)

Both the United States and the Soviet Union have publicly pledged to observe such a “no undercut” policy and both sides have engaged in dismantling of nuclear weapons systems in order to avoid undercutting the terms of the SALT I Interim Agreement and the unratified SALT II Treaty. (C)

However, there is a distinction between “no undercut” and “abiding by” or “complying with” an agreement. To abide by, or comply with, means to observe all parts of an agreement. On the other hand, a “no undercut” policy could be considered to allow things that, while not in full compliance, are reversible. One question to be addressed is therefore the matter of legal interpretations of “interim restraints” and “no undercut.” (S)

A number of issues have brought the question of US interim restraint policy to the fore:

— First, on the basis of available evidence as reviewed extensively by the Arms Control Verification Committee, the President determined in his February 1985 report³ to the Congress (reaffirming the 1984 report judgment) that “the expanding (Soviet) pattern on noncompliance with existing agreements raises serious questions for US national security, our Alliances, arms control, and US-Soviet relations.” Soviet violations or probable violations of the ABM Treaty, SALT I, SALT II, the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, the Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons, the Biological Weapons Convention, and the Helsinki Final Act, as well as numerous ambiguous situations and the increased Soviet concealment and deception, are of considerable military significance.

— Second, while it may have been fairly painless to date for the United States to pursue an interim restraint policy which restricted US military programs only marginally and which required the dismantling only of relatively aged and obsolescing systems, such as the Titan ICBM and older Polaris submarines, there is potential that continued US interim restraint (which would be unilateral in view of massive continued Soviet military buildup and Soviet noncompliance) could become increasingly painful militarily. This fall’s sea trials of the 7th Trident submarine, as well as deployment of subsequent Trident submarines, would require the compensatory destruction of functional and relatively modern weapons systems such as Poseidon submarines or Minuteman III ICBMs. Similarly, by June 1986, when the 121st B–52 is planned for deployment with ALCMs, the US would have to dismantle additional modern submarines or land-based MIRVed missiles for each ALCM-carrying bomber. Longer-term adherence to limitations beyond the scheduled date of expiration of the SALT II agreement would also mean that the US could not test or deploy both the MX Peacekeeper and the smaller Midgetman ICBM.

— Third, the Congress has increasingly raised questions about the status of US interim restraint policy in the face of Soviet noncompliance, with some members recommending that the restraint be implemented unilaterally and with others recommending that the reciprocity requirement be applied and the US thus no longer bound by limitations or agreements that the Soviet Union is violating. The Congress has, inter alia, expressed the sense that the US “should through December 1985 refrain from undercutting provisions of existing strategic arms agreements so long as the Soviet Union does the same,” and has, in addition, asked that “the President shall provide to Congress on or before June 1, 1985 a report that describes the implications of the USS Alaska’s sea trials for the no-undercut policy, assesses potential Soviet responses to the termination of the US no-undercut policy, makes recommendations regarding the future of US interim restraint, and reviews Soviet activities with respect to existing strategic arms agreements.”

— Fourth, the ongoing nuclear and space arms negotiations in Geneva provide an additional context and possible forum for consideration of the interim restraint policy. (S)

Whether or not the United States will continue to limit its own forces even in the face of uncorrected Soviet noncompliance behavior is an issue that merits very careful consideration by the USG. In order to facilitate a comprehensive and timely review of the issues involved, I am therefore establishing herewith an Interdepartmental Group on Interim Restraint Policy under the co-chairmanship of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy and the Director of the Department of State’s Bureau of Political Military Affairs to address the issue of US interim restraint policy and to develop policy recommendations for consideration by the Senior Arms Control Group and the National Security Council. (S)

Pursuant to this requirement, the Interdepartmental Group on Interim Restraint Policy will prepare a paper identifying alternative interim restraint policy options to include major elements, and lead agencies for each element, as follows:

— The Director of Central Intelligence shall prepare analyses of: (1) likely Soviet qualitative and other violations of SALT I and II if a unilateral US restraint policy is continued; (2) likely Soviet force postures from 1986–1991 and beyond if US interim restraints are discontinued in the absence of Soviet reciprocity; and (3) likely Soviet force postures under alternative US interim restraint options that are developed by the interagency group.

— OSD and JCS shall prepare analyses of: (1) US dismantling requirements under SALT I and II and resulting US force postures under alternative interim restraint options, taking account of the projected Soviet forces; (2) the comparative capability of the US to match or redress any surge or increase in Soviet forces identified in the intelligence analyses above; (3) the implication of alternative interim restraint options on the survivability of US strategic forces; and (4) alternatives to dismantling, such as caretaker status, for selected systems.

— The Department of State and ACDA shall prepare a review of: (l) implications of alternative legal interpretations of “no undercut,” “abiding by,” and “irreversibility” standards; (2) presentation and handling of alternative interim restraint approaches vis-a-vis the Soviet Union (3) likely Allied reactions to an alteration of US interim restraint policy, and to specific options, and a strategy for dealing with such reactions; (4) Congressional handling; and (5) a public affairs strategy. (S)

The co-chairmen of the Interdepartmental Group on Interim Restraint Policy shall provide a work schedule to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs by April 12, 1985 with the report, including recommendations, to be forwarded by May 27, 1985. (C)

Robert C. McFarlane

1. Source: Department of State, Ambassador Nitze’s Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, March and April 1985. Secret.
2. Reference is to Reagan’s May 31, 1982 “Remarks at Memorial Day Ceremonies at Arlington National Cemetery.” (Public Papers: Reagan, 1982, Book I, pp. 708–710)
3. See footnote 4, Document 21.