Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

258. Information Memorandum From the Special Advisor to the President and the Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters (Nitze), the Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs (Holmes), and the Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of State (Timbie) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, June 17, 1988

SUBJECT

• ICBM Force Modernization

Once again, the U.S. Government is in disarray over the question of what steps we should take to ensure the future survivability of the land-based leg of the triad. The Administration is coming under intense criticism for this state of affairs, which is being used to justify opposition to individual ICBM programs as well as arguments to abandon efforts to conclude a START Treaty during this term. It is imperative that we strive to establish a comprehensive approach to ICBM force modernization that will receive broad support from the Congress and the public.

There are currently three general options for ICBM modernization; our program would presumably derive from one or more of these options:

1. Midgetman, deployed in hardened road-mobile launchers. This program is currently in advanced development, with $700 million appropriated for FY88.

2. MX, deployed in a rail-garrison mode. This program is also in full-scale development, with $350 million appropriated for FY88.

3. Minuteman III, deployed in a multiple protective shelter (MPS) scheme referred to as “carry-hard”. This concept was studied and rejected earlier in the Administration, but recently resurfaced by OSD.

In evaluating these options, we should use the following criteria:

1. Survivability, in terms of the number of Soviet RVs required to destroy our force

2. Cost

3. Political viability

On the basis of currently available information, the options can be assessed as follows.

Survivability

1. Midgetman. We have agreed with the Soviets that, under START, road-mobile ICBMs would be confined to restricted areas, with a small portion allowed outside these areas on a day-to-day basis and the entire force allowed outside for a limited number of exercises or for dispersal during crises. We have proposed that these areas be 25 square kilometers in size, while the Soviets prefer 100 square kilometers. We have in mind restricting the number of launchers in each area to 9 (the number of launchers in an SS–25 regiment).

Our own plan, however, as recently briefed by the Air Force to the START IG, is to deploy 2 launchers at selected, existing Minuteman silos. An area of about one acre size around each silo would constitute the restricted area; thus, a 500-Midgetman force would use 250 restricted areas. The launchers would remain within this one-acre area during day-to-day operations, despite being allowed to use a larger area of 25–100 square kilometers. The Air Force is willing to keep the launchers in such a small area, because of their ability to disperse rapidly on receipt of tactical warning.

Should the Soviets initiate an attack, our early warning systems should provide us 20–30 minutes’ warning. The entire Midgetman force, which would be kept on high-alert status, could begin to disperse almost immediately upon receipt of warning at the Midgetman site. (If our early warning system were to catastrophically fail, each 2-missile unit could be destroyed with 1 SS–18 RV.) Because the Midgetman launcher can reach speeds up to 60 MPH, the number of SS–18 RVs required to destroy the force would increase rapidly as the dispersal proceeded. For example, 15 minutes after scrambling, each 2-missile unit could increase its possible operating area by about 600 square kilometers and hunker down to give itself 30–50 PSI hardness. This would force the Soviets to use about 60 SS–18 RVs to barrage the entire area in which the unit might be located. (It would be necessary to select Minuteman silos that were sufficiently spaced, however, to ensure that Midgetman dispersal areas did not excessively overlap.)

2. MX. The agreed START scheme for rail-mobile ICBMs also would use small deployment areas, with the same provision for day-to-day exits and dispersals. This scheme is consistent with the rail-garrison concept the JCS plans to use should there be no START agreement.

MX in this basing mode would be destroyed with far fewer RVs than would Midgetman if there were insufficient warning. The garrisons would likely be about 1 square kilometer in size, and the launchers [less than 1 line not declassified] in hardness. Thus, if the trains were caught in garrison, it would require only 1 SS–18 RV to destroy the 8–12 missiles in each garrison (or about: 1/100 RV per MX RV destroyed).

MX would also require more warning time. Except for one alert train per garrison, or a total of about 14 missiles, which could scramble in minutes, the force would take about 2–3 hours to begin scrambling.

3. Minuteman III. The MPS scheme would use about four [less than 1 line not declassified] shelters per RV, spaced about 1500 feet apart so that a single SS–18 RV could not destroy more than one shelter. The Minuteman III missiles would be moved randomly among these shelters. As long as the Soviets remained uncertain which shelters housed missiles, and thus had to attack all of them, they would need to use at least 4 SS–18 RVs per Minuteman III RV destroyed. There, of course, would be no requirement for strategic warning in this basing scheme. Concerns about potential vulnerability would center on the possibility that the Soviets might somehow determine which shelters contained missiles.

Cost

The following costs, expressed in FY 88 dollars, are for acquisition of a 500-RV force.

1. Midgetman. About $33 billion (this is the current DOD estimate, but contractor bids have indicated the cost might be more like about $25 billion).

2. MX. About $10 billion (this figure may also be reduced in light of recent contractor bids).

3. Minuteman III. About $15 billion.

The cost of operating and maintaining the force would also vary among the options. It would be lowest for MX and highest for Midgetman, which would cost an additional $3–5 billion compared to MX over 15 years.

Political Viability

1. Midgetman. The Midgetman force would remain on Minuteman bases at all times, except during operational dispersals. This should minimize the public interface problems faced by previous mobile ICBM options. There are several influential supporters of the program in Congress and elsewhere, including the members of the Scowcroft Commission. Those who oppose the program do so principally on the basis of cost.

2. MX. While the majority of the MX force would remain on government land during day-to-day operations, training trains would have to use the public rail system regularly. This is likely to create considerable problems with the public. The program has also run into Congressional opposition, due to this problem and to the requirement for several hours’ strategic warning for survivability. It is supported by others as the cheapest way to deploy 500 modern ICBM RVs.

3. Minuteman III. The entire force would remain on government land at all times, and thus should present no public interface problems. As a lower cost alternative to Midgetman that avoids the survivability and public interface problems of MX, this option could receive substantial support in Congress. It would be necessary, however, to address the breakout problems that might arise under a START Treaty, if the Soviets were also to deploy a large number of shelters.

Additional Alternatives

In addition, to the baseline options analyzed above, two other alternatives have been suggested. One is to use a new, more capable, 1- or 2-RV Minuteman IV rather than the Minuteman III in the MPS deployment scheme. This option would be similar to the Minuteman III option in survivability and political viability, but higher in cost.

The other alternative is to deploy Midgetman initially in silos, which would be cheaper than mobile basing, and eventually supplement it with mobile or MPS deployment. The silo-based missiles would exact a price of l-to-2 SS–18 RVs per RV destroyed, not as good as mobile Midgetman but still a net loss of warheads for the Soviets should they attack. As a cheaper version of Midgetman that avoids the problems of MX, this option could also receive substantial support in Congress.

Next Steps

We should attempt to establish an agreed U.S. Government program as soon as possible, and a concerted effort to develop a bipartisan consensus with the Congressional leadership will be necessary. To obtain such, the Administration must first reach its own consensus on what to recommend to Congress. The essential requirement is to achieve a deployment mode that has a good prospect of surviving without requiring strategic warning. A deployment scheme that relied on strategic warning would constitute a dangerous invitation to surprise attack. It is our recommendation that, in discussions with Carlucci and Powell, you propose that we explore either the Minuteman/MPS deployment scheme or the scheme to place Midgetman in silos while preserving the option to supplement it with mobile or MPS deployment. We will be sending you further thoughts on how to pursue this objective.

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1988 NODIS and EXDIS Memorandums, Lot 94D433, 1988 Nodis Memorandums: June 1–30, 1988. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Michael Stafford (S/ARN); cleared in PM, C, EUR/RPM, and for information in EUR/SOV. Stafford initialed for all clearing offices.