257. Electronic Message From William Cockell of the National Security Council Staff to Robert Perito of the National Security Council Staff1
SUBJECT
- S-C-P Breakfast 6/15: SDI
Frank Carlucci prefaced discussion of this issue by noting that Exon had told him he thinks he can get 550m for MX and 200m for SICBM, with neither fenced (so the next president would have flexibility to reprogram). DOD can maintain the MX schedule at 550m.
[Page 920]Frank then turned to SDI, noting that there are two problems with Phase I. The first is the impact of successive budget cuts. Those cuts notwithstanding, however, we could attain Phase I around the turn of the century if we continue to pursue it as a goal. The second problem is cost. Defense estimates the cost to implement Phase I at $138B. That figure is a little inflated as it includes some costs that would be necessary for total (SDI) program implementation. SDIO estimates Phase I costs as closer to $117B. In any event, it is a large bill.
We now have consensus within the Pentagon, Frank continued, on a revised approach to implementation of SDI. Under this new approach, there would be two emphases. The first would be on essential space-based sensors; specifically, the Space Surveillance and Tracking System (SSTS) and the Boost Surveillance and Tracking System (BSTS). These are low orbiters, both of which will be useful in its own right, and for purposes not necessarily limited to SDI. BSTS, for example, will be the replacement for the DSP early-warning system. DOD’s arms control compliance group has looked at the new approach and thinks it is treaty compliant. The second emphasis would be on a ground-based interceptor system, such as ERIS, operating in conjunction with a Ground-Based Surveillance and Tracking System (GBSTS). The technology is moving along quite nicely. We could deploy a reasonable system by ’94–95. Such system would be of limited but useful capability. It could deal with an accidental launch, a third country attack; it could provide protection for the NCA. The latter, he noted, is the only role for which the JCS feel the system could fill a legitimate military requirement.
NCS protection implies a move from Grand Forks to Washington as the site for the single treaty-allowed system, “with all the political hoopla that would involve, as well as the need to inform the Soviets.” The last piece of the puzzle, Frank continued, is the space-based interceptor system. It would come along later. It’s not clear at this point whether we would want to continue to support the kinetic-kill vehicle (KKV), with its very high costs, or whether we should concentrate on a directed energy system that might be deployable around the turn of the century. That issue should be left open. In presenting our decision publicly we should acknowledge the cost problems with the KKV and say we are moving ahead with R&D on directed energy options as possible alternatives.
Frank felt this new approach would broaden the constituency for the program. “It offers something for everyone.” We may be able to get Nunn on board with the concept, though he would be unlikely to endorse it openly until after the election. The approach would be attractive to those who would prefer more emphasis on R&D and less on space-based interceptors. The DAB has looked at the proposed new approach and endorsed it. The staff is now putting together something [Page 921] that describes the program in layman’s terms. Frank proposed unveiling the concept in a speech he will give in Denver in mid-July.
Herres said the JCS supported a limited protective system of the type described and noted that a terrestrial-based layer, such as the proposed system would provide, would be a necessary part of any later Phase I system in any event. “So it makes sense to start the deployment with a ground-based system.” Protecting the National Capital Region makes military sense, from a C3/COG point of view, and considering the fact that the NCR contains a large number of likely Soviet high-priority targets.
Frank reiterated that, in DOD’s view, the system he is proposing probably would be treaty-compliant. Herres noted that, to be treaty compliant, the system would be limited to 100 interceptors. In the context of a major Soviet attack that would provide little protection; but it could buy some warning time and allow measures for protection of the NCA and COG to be implemented.
In the context of an accidental launch or a third world threat, the system could be considerably more effective in defeating the incoming missile(s). It would also provide a hedge against a Soviet breakout, which the Soviets could accomplish rapidly with the SA–12, since they are not averse to using nuclear warheads on their ABM missiles. In the context of major US strategic force reductions under a START agreement, the importance of the proposed system would increase. “If we had no system at that point, and the Soviets broke out, we’d be in a very dangerous situation.” Frank said he thought that’s exactly what the Soviets’ game plan was.
George Shultz reviewed the bidding, noting that Frank was proposing to say, in a mid-July speech in Denver, that we are making a major change in SDI, scaling down our aspirations drastically, and proposing to deploy around our capital a system like the Soviets have deployed around Moscow. He asked where the money would come from. Frank replied that the program assumes FYDP funding will be available—but no more.
Colin asked if Frank thought protection of the NCR would be salable politically. Frank thought it would be; “this is a non-nuclear program we’re proposing.” Herres noted that an NCR system would, in fact, provide much broader geographic coverage than Washington; it would extend from Norfolk to New York. Frank observed that what we would say publicly about the new concept is that we have restructured the program as a result of budget cuts, technological advances, and the conclusion that a ground-based defense would serve a useful military purpose. Such defense would be the first part of a sequential approach. We need the sensors in any event; and the ground-based interceptor system would simply be the initial part of a Phase I system. Colin said [Page 922] that, under this approach, there would be very few dollars left for the visionary elements of the program. Taft observed that he couldn’t imagine Cap getting on this train. Frank replied that ground-based system was always a part of Cap’s Phase I system. Colin noted that many people will simply view this new approach as a mirror image of the Soviet system. Shultz said that what Frank was saying was that the President’s dream is not feasible. “This is the denouement.” Frank replied that he is simply trying to structure something that makes programmatic sense and can survive politically. “For the first time there is consensus in the Pentagon about what should be done.”
Herres noted that the Phase I goal of killing 2000 out of 4700 incoming warheads was very ambitious. “We were soaking up all the money for KKV. We know how to shoot down ballistic missiles. The key is how to do it in an affordable way. We haven’t yet found an affordable way to do that from space.” Frank agreed, but said that, as a longer term goal, we still need the capability to get the missiles in boost phase. Costello said we are not backing off the larger requirement, but recognizing that we have much more investigating to do to get affordable mechanisms. The ultimate answer may be a directed energy system rather than kinetic kill.
George Shultz noted that “if we have any chance to sell (SDI), we shouldn’t give it away. In our negotiations with the Soviets we’ve said we can’t accept a deployment limitation that goes beyond X years. Now it turns out that’s all baloney and we’re talking about throwing SDI overboard without getting anything for it. Why not see what we can do in Geneva before your speech in Denver?” Frank said he agreed, and the Denver speech need not be the driver. He can easily cancel that. He went on to note that he had laid the new approach before the President yesterday.2 “He understood, but grimaced when I talked about a NCR system.”
Colin asked how the change in approach would impact programmatically. Would changes be needed in FY89? 90? Taft said there would be some adjustments in 89. At the 3.7 level, rather than the 5.2 we had requested, “there will be adjustments needed to accommodate the 1.5 reduction, keeping all this in mind.”
Frank observed that we shouldn’t leap to the conclusion that we can accomplish the revised program within the limits of the narrow interpretation of the ABM Treaty. “We’re so wrapped around the axle with lawyers . . . some argue that even the BSTS violates the treaty. The objections can probably be solved, however. There may be some tests [Page 923] though that raise questions about treaty interpretation.” Shultz noted that “rather than pulling the (non-deployment) timeframe down, it is in our interest for it to be longer.” Frank agreed that was a plausible proposition, particularly if we believe that the Soviets are heading for a breakout capability. Extending the limit would restrain them.
Herres felt we could sign up to a ten-year non-deployment provision which would not, of course, impact our ability to deploy a treaty-compliant system. Shultz reiterated his view that, as a matter of priority, we should give some thought to our negotiating position and how we might extract something from the Soviets. Frank said that Jon Howe and Ron Lehman should sit down with State’s people and address that issue. Frank also noted that he had not raised that aspect of the proposal with the President, feeling it would be more proper for Shultz, as the chief negotiator, to do so. Colin said that, after we have had an opportunity to reflect on the implications of the proposal, we should have an NSPG and let the President hear from all of his advisers. Frank said it will leak out in the meantime. Colin noted that there has already been press speculation on the subject.
- Source: National Archives, PROFS System, Reagan Administration, ID 79454. Top Secret. Copies were sent to Stevens, Linhard, Brooks, Tobey, Ledsky, Grant, Snider, Popadiuk, Schillaci, Rodman, and DeKok. No minutes of the breakfast meeting among Shultz, Carlucci, and Powell were found.↩
- Reagan met with Carlucci, Senator Baker, and Duberstein in the Oval Office from 4:03 until 4:31 p.m. on June 14. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) No minutes were found.↩