Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

255. Memorandum From Robert Linhard and William Tobey of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Powell)¹

Washington, June 6, 1988

SUBJECT

• SDI Program

Significant momentum is building in favor of restructuring the SDI program, either in response to budget cuts or to undertake a limited ABM deployment. The Defense Resources Board will consider restructuring SDI; guidance will be issued later in the Summer. In Congress, amendments favoring limited deployments enjoyed widespread support, including near unanimous Republican support in the Senate. Both Bill Schneider, Chairman of the General Advisory Commission on Arms Control, and Bill Graham have urged that a limited ABM deployment be given more serious study.

Those who favor a limited, treaty-compliant ABM deployment do so for a variety of reasons. They argue that it would: provide protection against accidental or renegade missile launches; thwart an intended decapitation strike by the Soviet Union against Washington; provide experience in manufacturing and operating ABM systems; open U.S. ABM production lines as a hedge against Soviet breakout; and amount to a foot in the door for SDI.

These are worthwhile objectives, but they must be balanced against their cost. Estimates of the cost of a limited ABM deployment range from $8 billion to $20 billion over about five years; (much depends on the effectiveness of the systems and on how the ABM Treaty is interpreted.) Furthermore, the true cost of limited deployments could be to divert us forever from achieving a more comprehensive defenses. This could occur because scarce SDI funds would be siphoned from researching new technology, to producing ground-based systems similar to those of the late 1960s. Furthermore, a limited deployment could sap public support for further deployments because it would have a small effect on our security relative to its cost. Finally, the ABM Treaty may bar successful completion of the accidental launch protection mission.

Funding cuts and the debate over a limited deployment cast a shadow on the Phase I system architecture. Some on the Defense Acquisition Board now argue that Phase I should be scrapped, and that all SDI technologies, including the space-based interceptor should be returned to Milestone 0. This would, of course, be a serious setback for the program.

The debate over the Phase I architecture and whether to pursue a limited ABM deployment cuts to the heart of the SDI program. Any decision to pursue a limited deployment as a prelude to Phase I should be a Presidential decision. Those who wish to restructure the SDI program should have a chance to put their case to the President. Moreover, the President should be kept informed of the results of various panels studying the limited deployment question.

At Tab I² is a scheduling request for an NSPG meeting to allow for a full airing of these issues. We envision a policy and program briefing to review the status of SDI and options for a limited ABM deployment. The President could then issue guidance on next steps. At Tab II are recommended talking points, should you wish to discuss this with Secretary Carlucci.

Recommendation

That you approve the scheduling request at Tab I.³

Steve Steiner concurred in draft.⁴

Tab II

Talking Points Prepared in the National Security Council⁵

Washington, undated

Talking Points on SDI Restructuring

— It’s been over a year and a half since the President has had a briefing on SDI plans and progress.

— Since that meeting much has happened: the DAB approved a Phase I architecture; we’ve been hit with Congressional funding cuts; and, proposals have come from several quarters for a limited deployment.

— We need to make sure the President is comfortable with the course of SDI when he leaves office.

— Therefore, I’d like to schedule an NSPG meeting to brief the President on the program, and give you an opportunity to advise him on next steps.

1. Source: Reagan Library, Robert Linhard Files, Arms Control Chronological File, SDI Program Review, 06/08/1988. Secret. Sent for action.
2. Attached but not printed.
3. Powell neither approved nor disapproved the recommendation.
4. Tobey initialed for Steiner.
5. Secret.